Romans 8: Dead to the Law, Alive in the Spirit

Author(s):  
Tyler Lohse

This essay comments on the nature of the language of the law and legal interpretation by exam- ining their effects on their recipients. Two forms of philosophy of law are examined, legal positiv- ism and teleological interpretive theory, which are then applied to their specific manifestations in literature and case law, both relating to antebellum slave law. In these cases, the slave sustains civil death under the law, permissible by means of these legal interpretive strategies.

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 180-200
Author(s):  
Sheila Fakhria

The school of law are determined by law and the period of time so that by jurists make legal interpretation based on the time and place. So at this time jurists are always reviewing the law that is based on the presence or emergence of various schools in the philosophy of law shows the struggle of ideas will not cease in the field of law. Similarly, the existence of Islamic law in a society that seeks to be grouped according typology of existing law schools in the philosophy of law.


Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-152
Author(s):  
Alex Silk

ABSTRACTIt is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-395
Author(s):  
Sebastián A. Reyes Molina

The topic of ‘judicial discretion’ has been at the center of the debate on legal interpretation in the philosophy of law.1 In a general sense, ‘discretion’ here refers to the exercise of a judgment by a decision-maker due to the lack of legal constraints affecting one’s ability to decide a case. The most fundamental question on this topic is ‘do judges have discretion when interpreting the law?’ There are three kinds of answers to this query. One kind of answer states that judges never have discretion.2 Another kind of answer states that judges always have discretion in interpretation.3 The third kind of answer states that judges sometimes have discretion when interpreting the law, and sometimes they do not.4


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102
Author(s):  
Paulina Konca

This paper presents the role of some intrinsic sources in legal interpretation. Some of linguistic aids follow from provisions of the law and other from the commonly accepted ruling practice or views expressed in literature. The position of those aids was verified through the analysis of case-law, literature, and provisions of law. The first section and second section focus on the priority of plain meaning rule and intrinsic sources in legal interpretation which is strongly emphasized in legal literature, case-law and the interpretative provisions of many countries. Next, it presents how certain linguistic tools work in case law practice, what problems they can cause and what problems they can solve. The third point addresses the use of dictionaries as tools of linguistic interpretation. The fourth section explores the role of selected interpretative canons often found in legal regulations and case law practice: ordinary meaning canon, gender/number canon, ejusdem generis canon, presumption of consistent usage and prefatory-materials canon. It is concluded that the priority of a linguistic interpretation is not absolute and can never be understood as its exclusivity. Linguistic tools are not in themselves determinants of correct meaning. In order to make a correct interpretation, it is necessary not to be guided, by indications labelled as objective, sometimes artificially imposed, but by the intention of the legislator, which such tools may discover and should only be used for that purpose. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 217-228
Author(s):  
Tomasz Bekrycht

The work of Jerzy Wróblewski has had a huge impact not only on the theory and philosophy of law, both in Poland and internationally, but also on the whole of ​​jurisprudence, especially the fields of doctrinal legal research and the practical application of the law (in particular on adjudication). The aim of this study is to present one of Wróblewski’s most influential concepts, namely the theoretical model of judicial interpretation, from the point of view of axiology and epistemology in the field of jurisprudence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-80
Author(s):  
Aleksandar Ćirić

In the introduction to the paper, the author presents views on the importance and role of law as an achievement of importance for life, economy and relations in every society and state. With his presentations, he tries to find the connection between the law and justice, briefly referring to the understandings of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates. The author believes that the judge's task is to perform his difficult, honourable and responsible function in the judgment process, based primarily on the legal interpretation of regulations, in order to resolve disputes and establish a state of peace in the country, including the economy. The aim of the paper is, in accordance with the theme of the Conference of the Association of Business Lawyers in Serbia - "Companies and Commercial Judiciary", with the analysis of selected cases, which are examples of bad case law, to indicate the need to take measures in order to prevent and eliminate existing shortcomings in the activities of judicial authorities in Serbia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba

‘Accountability’ is one of the democratic values entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. It is a value recognised throughout the Constitution and imposed upon the law-making organs of state, the Executive, the Judiciary and all public functionaries. This constitutional imperative is given pride of place among the other founding values: equality before the law, the rule of law and the supremacy of the Constitution. This study therefore sets out to investigate how the courts have grappled with the interpretation and application of the principle of accountability, the starting point being the relationship between accountability and judicial review. Therefore, in the exercise of its judicial review power, a court may enquire whether the failure of a public functionary to comply with a constitutional duty of accountability renders the decision made illegal, irrational or unreasonable. One of the many facets of the principle of accountability upon which this article dwells is to ascertain how the courts have deployed that expression in making the state and its agencies liable for the delictual wrongs committed against an individual in vindication of a breach of the individual’s constitutional right in the course of performing a public duty. Here, accountability and breach of public duty; the liability of the state for detaining illegal immigrants contrary to the prescripts of the law; the vicarious liability of the state for the criminal acts of the police and other law-enforcement officers (as in police rape cases and misuse of official firearms by police officers), and the liability of the state for delictual conduct in the context of public procurement are discussed. Having carefully analysed the available case law, this article concludes that no public functionary can brush aside the duty of accountability wherever it is imposed without being in breach of a vital constitutional mandate. Further, it is the constitutional duty of the courts, when called upon, to declare such act or conduct an infringement of the Constitution.


Cultura ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-28
Author(s):  
Luis CORDEIRO-RODRIGUES

Marxist Philosophy as an explanation of social reality has, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, been largely neglected. However, some philosophers have contended that it may still be relevant to explain today’s social reality. In this article, I wish to demonstrate precisely that Marxist philosophy can be relevant to understand social reality. To carry out this task, I show that Marxist philosophy of law can offer a sound explanation of Animal law in South Africa. My argument is that South African law is a superstructure that reinforces the power of the animal farming industry in South Africa. That is, the hidden purpose of the law is to benefit the industry. In order to argue for this, I present two sets of arguments. The first set argues that the law facilitates the functioning of the animal farming industry. In the second set of arguments I contend that the law socialises individuals into approving the methods of slaughtering by the animal farming industry.


Author(s):  
Ly Tayseng

This chapter gives an overview of the law on contract formation and third party beneficiaries in Cambodia. Much of the discussion is tentative since the new Cambodian Civil Code only entered into force from 21 December 2011 and there is little case law and academic writing fleshing out its provisions. The Code owes much to the Japanese Civil Code of 1898 and, like the latter, does not have a requirement of consideration and seldom imposes formal requirements but there are a few statutory exceptions from the principle of freedom from form. For a binding contract, the agreement of the parties is required and the offer must be made with the intention to create a legally binding obligation and becomes effective once it reaches the offeree. The new Code explicitly provides that the parties to the contract may agree to confer a right arising under the contract upon a third party. This right accrues directly from their agreement; it is not required that the third party declare its intention to accept the right.


Author(s):  
Masami Okino

This chapter discusses the law on third party beneficiaries in Japan; mostly characterized by adherence to the German model that still bears an imprint on Japanese contract law. Thus, there is neither a doctrine of consideration nor any other justification for a general doctrine of privity, and contracts for the benefit of third parties are generally enforceable as a matter of course. Whether an enforceable right on the part of a third party is created is simply a matter of interpretation of the contract which is always made on a case-by-case analysis but there are a number of typical scenarios where the courts normally find the existence (or non-existence) of a contract for the benefit of a third party. In the recent debate on reform of Japanese contract law, wide-ranging suggestions were made for revision of the provisions on contracts for the benefit of third parties in the Japanese Civil Code. However, it turned out that reform in this area was confined to a very limited codification of established case law.


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