scholarly journals KINERJA SAHAM DURABLE GOODS DAN NONDURABLE GOODS MASA KRISIS FINANSIAL GLOBAL

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 548-568
Author(s):  
Mohamad Samsul

The purpose of this research is to analyze the stock performance of “the durable goods” and “the nondurable goods” during global financial crisis of 2008. The amount of sample used is about 298 kinds of stocks with the data of individual stock index and coupon rate of government bond. The stock performance used Sharpe’s Model. The period of financial crisis divided into two periods: contraction  period and recovery period. Hypothesis: (1) there are differences of stock performance between the durable goods and the nondurable goods during each of contraction period and recovery period; (2) there are differences of stock performance between recovery period and contraction period for each of durable goods and nondurable goods. The result of this research showed that: (1) the stock performance of durable goods is  insignificantly  different than nondurable goods neither for contraction nor recovery period; (2) the stock performance is significantly difference between  contraction and recovery period for each of durable goods and nondurable goods. These result was consistant to prior research. Suggestion: the treatment policy of nondurable goods should be the same as durable goods during the contraction and recovery periods, when the global financial market shock occurred

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 548
Author(s):  
Mohamad Samsul

The purpose of this research is to analyze the stock performance of “the durable goods” and “the nondurable goods” during global financial crisis of 2008. The amount of sample used is about 298 kinds of stocks with the data of individual stock index and coupon rate of government bond. The stock performance used Sharpe’s Model. The period of financial crisis divided into two periods: contraction  period and recovery period. Hypothesis: (1) there are differences of stock performance between the durable goods and the nondurable goods during each of contraction period and recovery period; (2) there are differences of stock performance between recovery period and contraction period for each of durable goods and nondurable goods. The result of this research showed that: (1) the stock performance of durable goods is  insignificantly  different than nondurable goods neither for contraction nor recovery period; (2) the stock performance is significantly difference between  contraction and recovery period for each of durable goods and nondurable goods. These result was consistant to prior research. Suggestion: the treatment policy of nondurable goods should be the same as durable goods during the contraction and recovery periods, when the global financial market shock occurred


Agriculture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Pavel Kotyza ◽  
Katarzyna Czech ◽  
Michał Wielechowski ◽  
Luboš Smutka ◽  
Petr Procházka

Securitization of the agricultural commodity market has accelerated since the beginning of the 21st century, particularly in the times of financial market uncertainty and crisis. Sugar belongs to the group of important agricultural commodities. The global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a substantial increase in the stock market volatility. Moreover, the novel coronavirus hit both the sugar market’s supply and demand side, resulting in sugar stock changes. The paper aims to assess potential structural changes in the relationship between sugar prices and the financial market uncertainty in a crisis time. In more detail, using sequential Bai–Perron tests for structural breaks, we check whether the global financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have induced structural breaks in that relationship. Sugar prices are represented by the S&P GSCI Sugar Index, while the S&P 500 option-implied volatility index (VIX) is used to show stock market uncertainty. To investigate the changes in the relationship between sugar prices and stock market uncertainty, a regression model with a sequential Bai–Perron test for structural breaks is applied for the daily data from 2000–2020. We reveal the existence of two structural breaks in the analysed relationship. The first breakpoint was linked to the global financial crisis outbreak, and the second occurred in December 2011. Surprisingly, the COVID-19 pandemic has not induced the statistically significant structural change. Based on the regression model with Bai–Perron structural changes, we show that from 2000 until the beginning of the global financial crisis, the relationship between the sugar prices and the financial market uncertainty was insignificant. The global financial crisis led to a structural change in the relationship. Since August 2008, we observe a significant and negative relationship between the S&P GSCI Sugar Index and the S&P 500 option-implied volatility index (VIX). Sensitivity analysis conducted for the different financial market uncertainty measures, i.e., the S&P 500 Realized Volatility Index confirms our findings.


2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsiao-Yin Chen ◽  
Cheng-Few Lee ◽  
Tzu Tai ◽  
Kehluh Wang

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the 2007 financial tsunami on the Taiwanese financial market. We find that, although significant for banks, security firms, and insurance companies, the effect was relatively lower if compared with that in Europe and the United States. In addition, we present fiscal and monetary policies issued by the Taiwanese government in reaction to the global financial crisis. These policy measures focused on stabilizing the financial market, reducing the level of unemployment, and creating more lending opportunities in support of Taiwanese companies. We also discuss the policy measures of the US government and other Asian countries in relation to the global financial crisis. Finally, we provide some suggestions to improve financial supervision and enhance financial reforms in Taiwan.


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robiyanto Robiyanto

Financial market integration in Southern Asia especially in ASEAN main member countries still attractive to scrunitized. Most of these countries were devastated during severe regional financial crisis in 1997 but global financial crisis in 2008 have different impact toward these countries. The finding shows that comovement were exist among Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand’s capital market during January 1997 to December 2013 period. Comovement still exist during post Asian financial Crisis 1997 and post global financial crisis 2008 period. This study conclude also that degree of integration between some ASEAN capital markets have fading out after global financial crisis in 2008. Hence, investor could formulate a portfolio which consist of stocks across ASEAN capital markets.


2020 ◽  
pp. 203-222
Author(s):  
Thomas Rixen ◽  
Lora Anne Viola

The global financial crisis led G20 states to conclude that stronger regulatory standards and improved compliance were needed to ensure global financial stability. To this end, the G20, as collective governor, granted an institutional intermediary, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), authority to develop and supervise financial market regulations. However, the G20 designed the FSB in ways that stymied its regulatory competence. Why did the G20 design the FSB in ways that were inadequate to meeting its own governance goal? Competence–control theory provides a compelling answer. The G20 faces a tradeoff between a competent intermediary and control over the intermediary; this tradeoff is exacerbated by the G20’s collective nature. While the G20 has a collective long-term interest in an intermediary with the expertise and capacity to promote stability-enhancing regulations, intense short-term distributive conflicts among member states yield strong incentives to control the intermediary. These internal distributive conflicts are more easily overcome during systemic economic crisis, when a competent intermediary is urgently needed. Once the crisis has passed, however, the governor reasserts control, again compromising the intermediary’s competence. The chapter illustrates this argument with an account of reforming the Financial Stability Forum into the FSB, and three case studies of policy reforms after the financial crisis.


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