scholarly journals The development and realization by the nazi leadership of the wehrmacht’s plans of the offensive operation for the spring-summer campaign of 1942 in the south wing of the soviet-german front

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-462
Author(s):  
Sergei Ivanovich Linets ◽  
Ludmila Ivanovna Milyaeva ◽  
Aleksandr Sergeevich Linets ◽  
Margarita Sergeevna Bogoslavtseva ◽  
Olga Borisovna Maslova

The article shows the history of the development by the German High Command of the plans of the Wehrmacht’s offensive operation in the south wing of the Soviet-German front for the spring-summer campaign of 1942. The objective of this paper is to elaborate on some individual aspects of the planning by the Nazi leadership of “Case Blue” (German – Fall Blau) and its subsequent realization. The result of this correction was a quick creation of the two new strategic plans: “Operation Braunschweig” – the offensive against Stalingrad and “Operation Edelweiss” – the offensive against the Caucasus. In the paper, the authors as a conclusion note that such dispersion of the armed forces of the German army led in the end to the shortage of forces for the realization of the both plans and the defeat of the Wehrmacht both in Stalingrad and in the battle of the Caucasus. The victories of the Red Army in those battles resulted in the radical turning-point at the entire Soviet-German front, in the beginning of the liberation of the Soviet territories from the German occupation troops.

2006 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Black

Andrej Angrick's definitive work on Einsatzgruppe D is more than a history of the mobile killing unit, for the latter did not operate in a vacuum, but cooperated with the German military authorities to realize Nazi occupation policy in the south Ukraine and the Caucasus. In Angrick's words, Einsatzgruppe D was the “first and most radical instrument for the formation of the to-be-conquered Lebensraum” (p. 732). German determination to recast the ethnic composition of the U.S.S.R. was no “desk fantasy,” as reflected in the priority placed on settlement planning, which required the disappearance of Soviet Jews. Unlike Jewish communities in the western U.S.S.R., where survival of some was guaranteed by the need for labor, survivors in areas “worked” by Einsatzgruppe D were “minutely few”(p. 733). Angrick notes that his work is “perpetrator history”: his perpetrators permitted few victims to survive; and those who did were primarily peasants and Red Army soldiers whose stories were not told after the war. Nevertheless, postwar statements of the perpetrators assist the historian to “reconstruct … the internal history of the unit, down to the individual,” although cautions about judicial and historical “truth” should be well taken.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1149-1162
Author(s):  
Konstantin N. Kurkov ◽  
◽  
Alexander V. Melnichuk ◽  

The article studies some of the more complicated and sensitive issues of the Civil War in the South of Russia – relations of the Armed Forces of South Russia with the Krai governments of the Don and the Kuban and separatist movements as an important factor in the Whites’ defeat in the South of Russia. Both issues are covered in ‘Defamation of the White Movement,’ one of the last works of General A. I. Denikin. Its manuscript has been introduced into scientific use by the authors. Commanders and military authorities of the Volunteer Army with A. I. Denikin at its head were not tied down by regional interests and could pursue national interests in their policy in order to restore an all-Russian unity destroyed by the revolution. Regional concerns of the Don, Kuban, Little Russian, Caucasian independentists were in direct conflict with the national tasks that the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of South Russia strove to solve. Unlike the Don Ataman P. N. Krasnov, who was forced to cooperate with the occupation authorities of Imperial Germany, whose troops had occupied the territory of the Great Don Army for the most of 1918, and unlike other regional administrators in the German-occupied territories, the Whites did not cooperate with the occupiers and at times counteracted their anti-Russian policy. Denikin's propaganda successfully used this fact to fall back on traditional patriotic sentiments and to eat away at the Kremlin regime’s support. Centrifugal tendencies in the South of Russia did not allow the Volunteers to consolidate anti-Bolshevik forces and made an armed resistance to the Bolsheviks impossible. Hence A. I. Denikin’s uncompromising stand on separatist aspirations of independentists. In his view, it was the separatists’ activities in different regions of the former Russian Empire that hindered the successful offensive of the armed forces of South Russia, for instance, on the Moscow direction. Internal dissent was exacerbated by intervention of foreign forces – German occupation forces, the Allied Intervention, and active Bolshevik influence on the outskirts of the former Empire. The article compares Denikin’s text with testimonies of contemporaries and writings of historians. Thus, the authors have been able to show that his slender work reliably and accurately recreates the complex and dramatic situation, which led to the defeat of the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Civil War.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 245-264
Author(s):  
Andrey Ganin

The document published is a letter from the commander of the Kiev Region General Abram M. Dragomirov to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia General Anton I. Denikin of December, 1919. The source covers the events of the Civil War in Ukraine and the views of the leadership of the White Movement in the South of Russia on a number of issues of policy and strategy in Ukraine. The letter was found in the Hoover Archives of Stanford University in the USA in the collection of Lieutenant General Pavel A. Kusonsky. The document refers to the period when the white armies of the South of Russia after the bright success of the summer-autumn “March on Moscow” in 1919 were stopped by the Red Army and were forced to retreat. On the pages of the letter, Dragomirov describes in detail the depressing picture of the collapse of the white camp in the South of Russia and talks about how to improve the situation. Dragomirov saw the reasons for the failure of the White Movement such as, first of all, the lack of regular troops, the weakness of the officers, the lack of discipline and, as a consequence, the looting and pogroms. In this regard, Dragomirov was particularly concerned about the issue of moral improvement of the army. Part of the letter is devoted to the issues of the civil administration in the territories occupied by the White Army. Dragomirov offers both rational and frankly utopian measures. However, the thoughts of one of the closest Denikin’s companions about the reasons what had happened are interesting for understanding the essence of the Civil War and the worldview of the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Camp.


Istoriya ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (11 (109)) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Leonty Lannik

Military actions on the Eastern front of the Great War were restarted on February 18th, 1918, but were not finished with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signment. By middle ofMay, the zone of the First German occupation was expanded also to a number of territories recognized by the Central Powers as belonging to Soviet Russia. After a series of battles in April some areas of the modern Bryansk region were set under the German occupation for the next few months. This period in the history of the region has clearly received insufficient attention from researchers. The favourable geographical location and the access to an important railway infrastructure caused that the Bryansk Region had a crucial importance for German attempts to stabilize the occupation regime in Ukraine. Steady and often illegal flows of migration and smuggling have begun to develop. Extremely important for the occupiers were also different raw resources and food supply. That led to increased exploitation by German troops and hence the growth of the insurgency. Despite the extremely difficult military situation of Soviet Russia in summer 1918 and the risk of untimely provocation on the demarcation line, activities by the troops of the Western curtain of the Red Army near the Bryansk increased gradually. By the mid-autumn of 1918, the Bryansk Region had acquired the significance of a springboard for future military operations for all parties claiming control of both Belarus and Ukraine. In the specific military-political situation after the Compiegne armistice, control of the region's railways played a key role both in the Red Army's offensive in Ukraine in the winter of 1918—1919 and in the relatively successful evacuation of the German occupation forces from army group “Kiev” and the 10th army.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
David McDowell

<p>"In the beginning, this island now called Niue was nothing but coral rock (he punga)... There came a god, an aitu, from the south, a god sailed to and fro on the face of the waters. He looked down here and saw far below on the ocean the white punga rock. He let down his hook and hauled the punga up to the surface, and lo! there stood and island!" - John Lupo. The genesis of Niue remains conjectural. The Polynesian calls in a supernatural agency, an aitu from the south, to explain the emergence of the multiplication of corals and algae from the waters of the mid-Pacific to form an island two-hundred feet high, but the story of the god and his line and hook is a local adaptation of a very ancient and widespread fable, as are in varying degrees other Polynesian versions of the birth of the island, Cook advanced two further possibilities in 1777 when he speculated: "Has this Island been raised by an earthquake? Or has the sea receded from it?"</p>


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran O'Reilly ◽  
Noelle Higgins

AbstractThe 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, involving both Georgian and Russian armed forces, attracted much international attention and debate. This article seeks to analyse the international legal framework regarding the use of force which should have applied to this conflict. It will first look at the history of, and circumstances surrounding, the South Ossetian conflict, and then examine the jus ad bellum regarding wars of national liberation and aggression. The concept of intervention to protect nationals abroad will also be discussed. These legal paradigms will then be applied to the events of August 2008 in the region of South Ossetia to analyse the legality of the use of force in this conflict.


Author(s):  
Shchur Yu.

The purpose of the work. The article is about the personality of a OUN(r) March Groups member Yulian Wojtowych and his work in the field of education in Kherson during the German occupation in particular. The attention is focused on the history of foundingan agricultural school where Yulian Wojtowych taught history and geography. The historiography of the issue embraces works which cover the topic of OUN activities at the South of Ukraine, particularly that of Lev Shankovsky and Yevgen Gorburov, and Mykola Shytiuk. OUN March Groups members’ memoirs and Soviet State Security agencies’investigatoryfiles, as well as operative ones, about OUN activities in Kherson became sources for this research.Results and scientific novelty of the research. It was found out, that educational line was one of the primary ones in the OUN activity in Kherson during the German occupation. Ukrainian nationalists paid special attention to teaching the history of Ukraine in the learning process because this very subject together with geography formed the students’ outlook. As OUN members believed, it was the school which shaped future architects of the Ukrainian State. Yulian Wojtowych who had had complete theological education was actually a teacher of history and geography, participated in composing the history of Ukraine curricula for Kherson schools. In thecrisis situation in education sphere caused by the policy of the Nazi occupational authorities, special (professional) educational institutions, namely agricultural school, were for OUN members of particular interest.The occupational authorities had their own interest in opening such schools which would train mid-level professionals (“help staff”). OUN members considered them as opportunities for Ukrainian youth to obtain education and for themselves to recruit new staff for the struggle for independence of Ukraine. Due to his nationalist underground activities and realization of the organisation leaders’ instructions on the Ukrainian education development, Yulian Wojtowych suffered repressions from the Nazi secret services and had to undergothe “Vodokachka” camp, Buchenwald, Dora and Bergen-Belsen.Key words: Nazi repressions, Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN March Groups, Agricultural School, Kherson. Мета роботи. Стаття присвячена постаті учасника Похідних груп ОУН-р Юліана Войтовича, а саме його діяльності на освітній ниві у Херсоні під час німецької окупації. В центрі уваги історія створення херсонської сільськогосподарської школи, де Юліан Войтович викладав історію та географію. Історіографія проблеми охоплює роботи, в яких висвітлюється питання діяльності ОУН на Півдні України, зокрема Лева Шанковського та Євгена Горбурова й Миколи Шитюка. Джерелами дослі-дження стали мемуари учасників похідних груп ОУН та слідчі й оперативні справи радянських органів державної безпеки щодо діяльності ОУН у Херсоні. Результати та наукова новизна дослідження. З’ясовано, що освітянський напрямок був одним з провідних в діяльності ОУН у Херсоні під час німецької окупації. Важливе місце в освітньому процесі українські націоналісти відводили викла-данню історії України, оскільки саме цей предмет, разом з географією, формував світогляд учнів. На переконання членів ОУН саме школа формувала майбутніх будівничих Української Держави. Юліан Войтович, який мав закінчену вищу богословську освіту, якраз був викладачем історії та географії, брав участь у складенні програм з курсу історії України для шкіл Херсона. В умовах кризи освітянської галузі, спричиненої політикою нацистської окупаційної влади, значний інтерес для членів ОУН представляли спеціальні (професійні) освітні заклади, зокрема – сільськогосподарська школа. Окупаційна влада мала свій інтерес у відкритті подібних шкіл, які мали готувати фахівців середньої ланки («обслуговуючого персоналу»). Члени ОУН вбачали у подібних школах можливості для української молоді отримати освіту, а також залучення нових кадрів для боротьби за незалежність України. Через свою діяльність у націоналістичному підпіллі, реалізації настанов організаційних провідників щодо розвитку української освіти, Юліан Войтович зазнав репресій нацистських спецслужб, пройшовши шлях від табору «Водокачка» до Бухенвальду, Дори й Берген-Бельзен. Ключові слова: нацистські репресії, Організація українських націоналістів, Похідні групи ОУН, Сільськогосподарська школа, Херсон


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 869-888
Author(s):  
Alexey Yu. Bezugolny

The present article continues the research about the role of the ethnic factor in Red Army recruitment during the Great Patriotic War, the first part of which was published in RUDN Journal of Russian History 19, no. 2 (May 2020). This time the focus is on admission restrictions and prohibitions for certain Soviet ethnic groups, as well as on purges from the army due to soldiers nationality. The contribution analyzes the major causes and the scale of this phenomenon, as well as the regulatory framework of restrictions and prohibitions and their development during the war. It is established that the reason for such restrictions could be political motives (distrust towards citizens on ethnic grounds), but also the ethno-cultural and linguistic features of conscripts coming from certain nationalities, with the idea that these features prevented their full use in military service. The article analyzes the practice of restrictions on ethnic grounds, including cases when military authorities in the field allowed for significant deviations from the regulatory framework. The scientific novelty of the present research consists in the fact that for the first time the ethnonational aspect of the history of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War is analyzed with quantitative methods, which made it possible to significantly deepen our understanding of ethnic processes in the Soviet armed forces.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-105
Author(s):  
V.A. Chichinov

The purpose of this article is to research the information by historical sources related with the Mongolian invasion to the South-Western Rus, determination exact dates of the conquest of Russian southern cities and consideration the quarrel of the Mongol princes, as a turning point in the history of the Mongol invasion and the Mongol empire. The author has some several conclusions. Firstly, the Russian chronicles, the chronicle of Rashid al-Din, and the “Secret History of the Mongols” contain the information, by which we can reconstructing the chronology of events past. Secondly, to determination an accurate chronology of the events of the Mongol invasion of South-Western Russia, it is important to use a source such as “The Secret History of the Mongols”, which was written by an eyewitness to the events that unfolded in the residence of the Mongolian emperor. Thirdly, the author was able to date the events associated with the capture of some southern Rus cities by the Mongols. The research has provided information that reveals the specifics of the Mongol conquest of Kiev, namely, the date of the event was clarified, and also identified the commanders who did not participate in this campaign and were mistakenly counted among the conquerors of Kiev, the “mother of Russian cities”.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Anne E. Hasselmann

In the wake of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet museum curators began to establish a museal depiction of the war. This article analyzes these early beginnings of Soviet war commemoration and the curtailing of its surprising heterogeneity in late Stalinism. Historical research has largely ignored the impact of Soviet museum workers (muzeishchiki) on the evolution of Russian war memory. Archival material from the Red Army Museum, now renamed the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, in Moscow and the Belarus Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War in Minsk documents the unfolding of locally specific war exhibitions which stand in stark contrast to the later homogenized official Soviet war narrative. Yet war memory was not created unilaterally by the curators. Visitors also participated in its making, as the museum guestbooks demonstrate. As “sites of commemoration and learning,” early Soviet war exhibitions reveal the agency of the muzeishchiki and the involvement of the visitors in the “small events” of memory creation.


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