scholarly journals Review: The realities of authoritarian media in China

2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Philip Cass

Review of: Stockman, D. (2012). Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-01844-0 China can no longer be called Communist. It is an authoritarian state in which a party that likes to call itself Communist maintains a firm grip on the country. However much the party and the corrupt party princelings enjoy the benefits of capitalism (and let us be frank that it is a distinctively 19th century robber baron style of capitalism), the government usemethods of media control that have not changed since Mao took power in 1959. Censorship has always been part of the regime, but Mao and his direct successors were always clever enough to give the masses a chance to let off steam now and then through such projects as the Hundred Flowers campaign and the Democracy Wall movement.

Author(s):  
Liubomyr Ilyn

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze and systematize the views of social and political thinkers of Galicia in the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries. on the right and manner of organizing a nation-state as a cathedral. Method. The methodology includes a set of general scientific, special legal, special historical and philosophical methods of scientific knowledge, as well as the principles of objectivity, historicism, systematic and comprehensive. The problem-chronological approach made it possible to identify the main stages of the evolution of the content of the idea of catholicity in Galicia's legal thought of the 19th century. Results. It is established that the idea of catholicity, which was borrowed from church terminology, during the nineteenth century. acquired clear legal and philosophical features that turned it into an effective principle of achieving state unity and integrity. For the Ukrainian statesmen of the 19th century. the idea of catholicity became fundamental in view of the separation of Ukrainians between the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. The idea of unity of Ukrainians of Galicia and the Dnieper region, formulated for the first time by the members of the Russian Trinity, underwent a long evolution and received theoretical reflection in the work of Bachynsky's «Ukraine irredenta». It is established that catholicity should be understood as a legal principle, according to which decisions are made in dialogue, by consensus, and thus able to satisfy the absolute majority of citizens of the state. For Galician Ukrainians, the principle of unity in the nineteenth century. implemented through the prism of «state» and «international» approaches. Scientific novelty. The main stages of formation and development of the idea of catholicity in the views of social and political figures of Halychyna of the XIX – beginning of the XX centuries are highlighted in the work. and highlighting the distinctive features of «national statehood» that they promoted and understood as possible in the process of unification of Ukrainian lands into one state. Practical significance. The results of the study can be used in further historical and legal studies, preparation of special courses.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 161-168
Author(s):  
Alexander D. Gronsky

The article examines the relationship between Western Russianism (Zapadnorusizm) and Byelorussian nationalism. Byelorussian nationalism is much younger than Western Russianism, finally shaping only in the end of the 19th century. Before 1917 revolution Byelorussian nationalism could not compete with Western Russianism. The national policy of the Bolsheviks contributed to the decline of Western Russianism and helped Byelorussian nationalism to gain stronger positions. However, Byelorussian nationalists actively cooperated with the occupation authorities during the Great Patriotic war. That caused distinctly negative attitude of Byelorussians towards the movement and collaborators. Currently, Byelorussian nationalism is supported both by the opposition and by the government. Western Russianism has no political representation, but is supported by the majority of Byelorussian population.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 293-317
Author(s):  
Protopriest Alexander Romanchuk

The article studies the system of pre-conditions that caused the onset of the uniat clergy’s movement towards Orthodoxy in the Russian Empire in the beginning of the 19th century. The author comes to the conclusion that the tendency of the uniat clergy going back to Orthodoxy was the result of certain historic conditions, such as: 1) constant changes in the government policy during the reign of Emperor Pavel I and Emperor Alexander I; 2) increasing latinization of the uniat church service after 1797 and Latin proselytism that were the result of the distrust of the uniats on the part of Roman curia and representatives of Polish Catholic Church of Latin church service; 3) ecclesiastical contradictions made at the Brest Church Union conclusion; 4) division of the uniat clergy into discordant groups and the increase of their opposition to each other on the issue of latinization in the first decades of the 19th century. The combination of those conditions was a unique phenomenon that never repeated itself anywhere.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095792652110131
Author(s):  
Michael Billig

This paper examines how the British government has used statistics about COVID-19 for political ends. A distinction is made between precise and round numbers. Historically, using round numbers to estimate the spread of disease gave way in the 19th century to the sort precise, but not necessarily accurate, statistics that are now being used to record COVID-19. However, round numbers have continued to exert rhetorical, ‘semi-magical’ power by simultaneously conveying both quantity and quality. This is demonstrated in examples from the British government’s claims about COVID-19. The paper illustrates how senior members of the UK government use ‘good’ round numbers to frame their COVID-19 goals and to announce apparent achievements. These round numbers can provide political incentives to manipulate the production of precise number; again examples from the UK government are given.


2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Huang

Despite the prevalence of anti-government rumors in authoritarian countries, little is currently known about their effects on citizens’ attitudes toward the government, and whether the authorities can effectively combat rumors. With an experimental procedure embedded in two surveys about Chinese internet users’ information exposure, this study finds that rumors decrease citizens’ trust in the government and support of the regime. Moreover, individuals from diverse socio-economic and political backgrounds are similarly susceptible to thinly evidenced rumors. Rebuttals generally reduce people’s belief in the specific content of rumors, but often do not recover political trust unless the government brings forth solid and vivid evidence to back its refutation or win the endorsement of public figures broadly perceived to be independent. But because such high-quality and strong rebuttals are hard to come by, rumors will erode political support in an authoritarian state. These findings have rich implications for studies of rumors and misinformation in general, and authoritarian information politics in particular.


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 579-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamia Karim

In 2011, the government of Bangladesh began an investigation into the financial dealings of the Grameen Bank that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. This disciplining of a world-renowned institution and its founder by the state reconfigures the altered relationship between the state and NGOs in Bangladesh. This article investigates this about-face between the state and NGOs from the 1990s, when their relationship was characterized as ‘partners in development’, to the late 2000s when the state saw the leading NGOs and their leaders as potential political adversaries. In Bangladesh, the former relationship of a weak state vis-à-vis the powerful, western-funded NGO has been recalibrated. Under the present condition of authoritarian rule, the state is willing to accept the role of the NGO as a development actor but not as a political contender. This article examines this shifting relationship between the state and NGOs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Paul Goode

In recent years, the Russian government has promoted patriotism as a means to unify society and secure the legitimacy of Putin’s regime. This paper considers the effectiveness of this campaign by examining everyday understandings of patriotism among Russian citizens. Drawing on in-depth interviews and focus groups conducted in two regions in 2014–2015, patriotism is lived and experienced among ordinary Russians as a personal, normative, and apolitical ideal that diverges significantly from official patriotic narratives. At the same time, Russians are convinced that the majority of fellow citizens are patriotic in the ways envisioned by the government. As a result, the government’s use of patriotism is more effective in raising barriers to collective action than cultivating legitimacy. At the same time, everyday forms of patriotism encourage citizens to sacrifice public choice and to tolerate authoritarian rule.


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