scholarly journals Economic analysis of implementing VMI model using game theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vojtěch Stehel ◽  
Marek Vochozka ◽  
Tomas Kliestik ◽  
Vladimir Bakes
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Comprehensive Picture ◽  
The Individual

Research background: The article deals with implementing VMI between the supplier and customer. To assess whether the system will be implemented, the evolution game theory is used. The contribution is based on the limitations of the study of the evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres et al., 2014) and its later extension, The evolutionary game theory approach to modelling VMI policies (Torres & García-Díaz, 2018). It aims is to complement the studies and provide a comprehensive picture of the issue. Purpose of the article: The main objective of the contribution is to respond to the question whether the VMI system will be introduced between the supplier and customer. Methods: In the first phase, the matrix is analysed from the point of view of the game meaning and its limit parameters. The limit parameters are set taking into account the economic reality. The only examined states of the matrix are those where the result is not obvious. For the purposes of the contribution, we work with a 5-year period. A new software capable of calculating evolutionary focus and their stability is created. Sensitivity analysis is carried out for the individual parameters that affect the system behaviour. Findings & Value added: Value added is a complex description of the system and complementation of previous studies in this field. VMI is confirmed. The results obtained can be used for practical management, so that the managers are able to identify what the actual costs are and what the probability of introducing the sys-tem is. At the same time, they can identify the parameters that can be influenced by them and observe their impact on the shift of the system introduction probability.

scholarly journals Evolutionary game theory modelling to represent the behavioural dynamics of economic shutdowns and shield immunity in the COVID-19 pandemic

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (9) ◽  
pp. 201095 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. M. Ariful Kabir ◽  
Jun Tanimoto
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Economic Cost ◽  
Complex Model ◽  
Emergency Relief ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Behavioural Dynamics ◽  
At Home

The unprecedented global spread of COVID-19 has prompted dramatic public-health measures like strict stay-at-home orders and economic shutdowns. Some governments have resisted such measures in the hope that naturally acquired shield immunity could slow the spread of the virus. In the absence of empirical data about the effectiveness of these measures, policymakers must turn to epidemiological modelling to evaluate options for responding to the pandemic. This paper combines compartmental epidemiological models with the concept of behavioural dynamics from evolutionary game theory (EGT). This innovation allows us to model how compliance with an economic lockdown might wane over time, as individuals weigh the risk of infection against the certainty of the economic cost of staying at home. Governments can, however, increase spending on social programmes to mitigate the cost of a shutdown. Numerical analysis of our model suggests that emergency-relief funds spent at the individual level are effective in reducing the duration and overall economic cost of a pandemic. We also find that shield immunity takes hold in a population most easily when a lockdown is enacted with relatively low costs to the individual. Our qualitative analysis of a complex model provides evidence that the effects of shield immunity and economic shutdowns are complementary, such that governments should pursue them in tandem.

An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to Modeling VMI Policies

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 10737-10742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fidel Torres ◽  
Cesar Garcia-Diaz ◽  
Naly Rakoto-Ravalontsalama
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theory Approach

AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY APPROACH TO MARKET COMPETITION AND COOPERATION

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (supp01) ◽  
pp. 1250044 ◽  
Author(s):  
ADRIAN VASILE ◽  
CARMEN EUGENIA COSTEA ◽  
TANIA GEORGIA VICIU
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Market Potential ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Additional Information

Evolutionary game theory can be attested as a practical apparatus in providing additional information on the workings of the open market and on the blueprint for dynamics in economic phenomena. Through an interdisciplinary approach to different game scenarios, the dependencies among market forces are observed, thus, being capable of offering insight on the incentives for adopting different behaviors. This paper takes use of the different factors that form the payoff of certain strategies which can be adopted by companies, and determines the prerequisites for cooperation or competition while all together constructing settings and predictions on the evolution of the phenomena. Determining the evolutionary stable strategy for different scenarios and looking at the way in which the probability of encountering a certain behavior is constructed, provide the possibility to determine the outcome of an ongoing evolutionary process. By studying the monotony of the probability function in respect to each of the factors that contribute to the payoffs, the study indicates that there is a positive relation between the percentage of population playing competitive strategies and market potential, costs, and risks of penalty for cooperation and a negative relation between this percentage and the disputed market share and supplementary winnings from arrangements.

scholarly journals The contribution of evolutionary game theory to understanding and treating cancer

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wölfl ◽  
Hedy te Rietmole ◽  
Monica Salvioli ◽  
Frank Thuijsman ◽  
Joel S. Brown ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cancer Progression ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Cancer Biology ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Great Promise ◽  
Full Potential ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Game Theoretic

AbstractEvolutionary game theory mathematically conceptualizes and analyzes biological interactions where one’s fitness not only depends on one’s own traits, but also on the traits of others. Typically, the individuals are not overtly rational and do not select, but rather, inherit their traits. Cancer can be framed as such an evolutionary game, as it is composed of cells of heterogeneous types undergoing frequency-dependent selection. In this article, we first summarize existing works where evolutionary game theory has been employed in modeling cancer and improving its treatment. Some of these game-theoretic models suggest how one could anticipate and steer cancer’s eco-evolutionary dynamics into states more desirable for the patient via evolutionary therapies. Such therapies offer great promise for increasing patient survival and decreasing drug toxicity, as demonstrated by some recent studies and clinical trials. We discuss clinical relevance of the existing game-theoretic models of cancer and its treatment, and opportunities for future applications. We discuss the developments in cancer biology that are needed to better utilize the full potential of game-theoretic models. Ultimately, we demonstrate that viewing tumors with an evolutionary game theory approach has medically useful implications that can inform and create a lockstep between empirical findings, and mathematical modeling. We suggest that cancer progression is an evolutionary game and needs to be viewed as such.

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