Liberalism and Conservatism in the Writings of Aurel C. Popovic

2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Andrei Sabin Faur ◽  

"In our study we wanted to analyze how the Romanian political activist and ideologist Aurel C. Popovici (1863-1917) perceived liberalism and conservatism, two of the most important ideologies of the nineteenth century. For this purpose, we studied three of his main writings: Principiul de naţionalitate (The Nationality Principle), Statele Unite ale Austriei Mari (The United States of Great Austria) and Naţionalism sau democraţie: o critică a civilizaţiunii moderne (Nationalism or Democracy: a Critical Approach to Modern Civilization). We studied the way in which the renowned Banatian author perceived liberalism, but also the way he percieved several main principles of this ideology: the defense of liberty, the sovereignty of the people, representative government, the refusal of absolutism and pluralism. By analyzing these topics in Aurel C. Popovici’s writings, we identified several paradoxes of his thinking, which we tried to explain by appealing to other sources, like personal letters or memoirs belonging to friends or admirers. Keywords: liberalism, conservatism, Aurel C. Popovici, democracy, Austria-Hungary, nationalism "

2003 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 873-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
COLIN KIDD

Scotland's Unionist culture has already become a world we have lost, investigation of which is hampered by the misleading notion of a ‘Celtic fringe’. Nineteenth-century Lowland Scots were not classified as Celts; indeed they vociferously projected a Teutonic racial identity. Several Scots went so far as to claim not only that the Saxon Scots of the Lowlands were superior to the Celts of the Highlands, but that the people of the Lowlands came from a more purely Anglian stock than the population of southern England. For some Scots the glory of Scottish identity resided in the boast that Lowlanders were more authentically ‘English’ than the English themselves. Moreover, Scottish historians reinterpreted the nation's medieval War of Independence – otherwise a cynosure of patriotism – as an unfortunate civil war within the Saxon race. Curiously, racialism – which was far from monolithic – worked at times both to support and to subvert Scottish involvement in empire. The late nineteenth century also saw the formulation of Scottish proposals for an Anglo-Saxon racial empire including the United States; while Teutonic racialism inflected the nascent Scottish home rule movement as well as the Udal League in Orkney and Shetland.


1996 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Anderson

In 1855, the first ‘coloured’ minstrel troupe, the Mocking Bird Minstrels, appeared on a Philadelphia stage. While this company did not stay together long, it heralded a change in the ‘face’ of minstrelsy in the United States. Many other black minstrel troupes would quickly follow, drawing attention away from the white minstrels who had until then dominated the scene. However, the white minstrel show had already iconized a particular representation of the ‘Negro’, which ultimately paved the way for black anti-minstrel attitudes at the end of the nineteenth century. The minstrel show existed in two guises: the white-in-blackface, and the black-in-blackface. The form and content of the minstrel shows changed over time, as well as audience perception of the two different types of performance. The black minstrel show has come to be regarded as a ‘reclaiming’ of slave dance and performance. It differs from white minstrelsy in that it gave theatrical form to ‘signifyin” on white minstrelsy in the manner in which slaves practised ‘signifyin” on whites in real life.


Author(s):  
Sven Beckert

This chapter begins by discussing the concept transnational labor history and the challenge it poses to labor historians. It then examines the worldwide crisis of cotton production touched off by the American Civil War, emancipation, and the subsequent frantic search for alternatives, including coolie and sharecropping labor systems. It shows that despite the variety of labor regimes, cotton cultivators everywhere faced essentially similar challenges of labor in the global age: market fluctuations, state coercion, inescapable debt and contract regimes, and political marginalization. These were the people who would grow ever-larger amounts of cotton, from India to Central Asia, from Egypt to the United States, and the new labor regimes in which they found themselves symbolized one of the most significant changes of the nineteenth century.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jason Frank

When collective protest develops in the streets and occupied squares, it becomes not simply a demand for democracy addressed to the disputed power but an affirmation of democracy effectively implemented. —Jacques Rancière As another cycle of collective protest reverberated around the globe in recent years, crowds again took to the streets and public squares of cities from Santiago to Beirut, from Hong Kong to Baghdad, claiming their elected representatives do not, in fact, represent them. In the United States, the largest protest movement in its history—the Movement for Black Lives—drew between fifteen to twenty-six million people into the streets of hundreds of different cities and towns, and did so in the middle of a global pandemic’s demand for social distancing. The local grievances which triggered these uprisings vary widely—an increase in the price of public transportation, a tax on a popular messaging service, a revised extradition law, searing examples of racist police violence—but all express dismay and disgust at the economic and political inequalities of the existing system of representative government and a common demand to return political power to the people themselves. “Our government is a government of thugs!” “Chile woke up!” “There are no rioters, only a tyrannical regime!” The figurative space opened up by a widespread crisis of democratic legitimacy once again filled the streets with multitudes banging pots and pans, occupying public buildings and squares, building barricades, and throwing improvised dance parties celebrating the coming fall of the regime. Amid the proliferation of ever-new technologies enabling virtual forms of assembly, political participation, and “preference ...


2021 ◽  
pp. 108-121
Author(s):  
Candace Bailey

Key questions for interpreting music in the United States during the nineteenth-century deal with the teachers rather than the pupils: where did they come from, what were their perceived social circles, and what qualified them to teach such a vast social array of the South’s young women? The people involved in teaching the majority of musically literate Americans remain curiously anonymous, as does their preparation and instruction. However, recognition of highly influential pedagogues exposes trends in circulation, changing musical tastes, and demands of proficiency—and thereby yields a more accurate view of music practices. Those who taught in private lessons in a pupil’s home theoretically transgressed a social wall because they were not on equal terms but occupied, if temporarily, a space reserved for those with approved standards of gentility....


1962 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Broomfield

Representative Government was an institution dear to the hearts of nineteenth-century Englishmen. It was their pride and, they affirmed, the source of their national strength that they lived under this form of constitution. They were eager that others, especially their colonies, should enjoy its benefits. There were few obstacles in the way of the establishment of representative institutions in the white colonies: the land was different but the people were the same. But in India neither the land nor the people resembled those of England. Nonetheless, the British determined to train an educated, Westernized elite which would make possible the establishment of representative institutions there.


1908 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. N. Judson

In the United States we have seen a revival of the ancient discussion concerning the line of demarcation between national and State authority under our complex federal system, but there is an underlying question which cannot have escaped the thoughtful observer involved in the growing popular distrust of the representative system whereon both federal and State governments are based. This tendency is being manifested in very material modifications in representative government, as understood by the founders of our government, and I therefore ask your attention to the consideration of The Future of Representative Government.This form of government, wherein the sovereign power of law-making is wholly delegated to deputies elected by the people, is of comparatively modern origin, and in the modern sense of the term it was unknown to the ancients. While its origin is obscure, we know that it was in England that representative government found its development in the form in which it was so greatly impressed upon the framers of our Constitution. Sir Henry Maine in his Popular Government says that it was virtually England's discovery of government by representation which caused parliamentary institutions to be preserved in England from the destruction which overtook them everywhere else, and to devolve as an inheritance upon the United States.


1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ged Martin

The movement for imperial federation has traditionally been regarded as a late nineteenth century phenomenon, which grew out of a supposed reaction against earlier ‘anti-imperialism’. J. E. Tyler set out to trace its growth ‘from its first beginnings… in and around 1868’. Historians were aware of the suggestions made before the American War of Independence that the colonies should send M.P.s to Westminster, but tended to dismiss them as of antiquarian rather than historical interest. A few also noted apparently isolated discussions of some Empire federal connexion in the first half of the nineteenth century, but no attempt was made to establish the existence of a continuous sentiment before 1870. C. A. Bodelsen did no more than list a series of examples he had discovered in the supposed age of anti-imperialism. In fact between 1820 and 1870 a debate about the federal nature of the Empire can be traced. Like the movement for imperial federation after 1870, there was only the vaguest unity of aim about the mid-century projects, and before 1870, as after, the idea was never consistently to the fore, but enjoyed short bursts of popularity. It is, however, fair to think of one single movement for a federal Empire throughout the nineteenth century. There is a clear continuity in ideas, in arguments, and in the people involved. Ideas of Empire federalism were influential, not so much for themselves as for their relationship to overall imperial thinking: to ignore the undercurrent of feeling for a united Empire is to distort the attitudes of many leading men. In the mid-nineteenth century general principles of imperial parliamentary union were argued chiefly from the particular case of British North America, the closest colonies to Britain and the most constitutionally advanced. This Canadian emphasis strengthened the analogies with the United States which occurred in any case.


2001 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eileen H. Tamura

Asian Americans have lived in the United States for over one-and-a-half centuries: Chinese and Asian Indians since the mid-nineteenth century, Japanese since the late nineteenth century, and Koreans and Filipinos since the first decade of the twentieth century (an earlier group of Filipinos had settled near New Orleans in the late eighteenth century). Because of exclusion laws that culminated with the 1924 Immigration Act, however, the Asian American population was relatively miniscule before the mid-twentieth century. As late as 1940, for example, Asian immigrants and their descendants constituted considerably less than 1 percent (0.0019) of the United States population. In contrast, in Hawai'i, which was then a territory and therefore excluded from United States population figures, 58 percent of the people in 1940 were of Asian descent.


2010 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 7-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Allen

William C. Burke, an African American emigrant in Liberia, wrote the following to an acquaintance in the United States on 23 September 1861: This must be the severest affliction that have visited the people of the United States and must be a sorce [sic] of great inconvenience and suffering and although we are separated from the seane [sic] by the Atlantic yet we feel sadly the effects of it in this country. The Steavens not coming out as usual was a great disappointment and loss to many in this country.Burke's lamentation about the impact of the American Civil War on the distant Atlantic shores of Africa underscores a problem—and opportunity—in Liberian historiography. Burke's nineteenth-century world extended past the distinct national boundaries that separated the United States and Liberia. Geographically, this was the vast littoral of the four continents—Africa, Europe, North America, and South America—abutting the Atlantic Ocean. But the Atlantic world, as historians now dubbed this sprawling transnational zone, was much more extensive. Societies near and faraway were also drawn into the web of socioeconomic activities in the basin. The creation of the Atlantic world spanned almost four centuries, from the late fifteenth to the waning decades of the nineteenth century. In this period, an unprecedented multitude of migrants crisscrossed the Atlantic creating a vast network. For example, by the nineteenth century, regular transatlantic packages such as the Mary Caroline Stevens whose delay Burke called “a great disappointment,” transported passengers, provisions, and dispatches between the United States and Liberia.


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