scholarly journals PERSPEKTIF FILOSOFIS KONSEP KEKUASAAN DISKRESI PEMERINTAH

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-60
Author(s):  
Krishna Djaya Darumurti

AbstrakArtikel ini menganalisis isu filosofis tentang konsep kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa teori hukum alam lebih memadai dibandingkan teori positivism yuridis dalam menjustifikasi dasar filosofis kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah. Dengan kekuasaan diskresi yang dimiliki, pemerintah adakalanya dapat bertindak menyimpangi undang-undang atau asas legalitas. Oleh karena itu, supaya terlegitimasi, tindakan demikian memerlukan justifikasi filosofis yang memadai. Teori hukum alam menjustifikasi kekuasaan diskresi pemerintah dengan mengajukan klaim bahwa diskresi adalah tuntutan hukum yang lebih tinggi dari hukum positif.AbstractThis article analyses the philosophical issue of the concept of discretionary power of the government. It is argued that natural law theory is better than legal positivism theory to justify the philosophical underpinning of the discretionary power of government. By its discretionary power, the government sometimes can take an action contrary to laws or legislation or principle of legality. To be legitimate, this action needs sufficient philosophical justification. Natural law theory justifies discretionary power of government by claiming that discretion is the demand of the higher law that is higher than the positive law.

Author(s):  
Corrado Roversi

Are legal institutions artifacts? If artifacts are conceived as entities whose existence depends on human beings, then yes, legal institutions are, of course, artifacts. But an artifact theory of law makes a stronger claim, namely, that there is actually an explanatory gain to be had by investigating legal institutions as artifacts, or through the features of ordinary artifacts. This is the proposition explored in this chapter: that while this understanding of legal institutions makes it possible to find common ground between legal positivism and legal realism, it does not capture all of the insights offered by these two traditions. An artifact theory of law can therefore be necessary in explaining the law, but it will not suffice to that end. This chapter also posits that legal artifacts bear a relevant connection to certain conceptions of nature, thus vindicating one of the original insights behind natural law theory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Jay Stone

Scott Shapiro offers an elaboration and defense of “legal positivism,” in whichthe official acceptance of a planfigures as the central explanatory notion. Rich in both ambition and insight,Legalitycasts an edifying new light on the structure of positive law and its officialdom. As a defense of positivism, however, it exhibits the odd feature that its main claims will prove quite acceptable to the natural lawyer. Perhaps this betokens – what many have begun to suspect anyway – that our usual tests for classifying legal theories (as positivist or not) are, in the present state of discussion, no longer credible. In any case, my hope in the following remarks is to suggest how certain ambiguities inLegalitymight easily be resolved in favor of PlanningNatural Law. The Planning Theory of Law, in other words, is not proprietary to positivism.


Author(s):  
Robert Adler

Natural Resources and Natural Law Part I: Prior Appropriation analyzed claims by some western ranchers, grounded in natural law, that they have property rights in grazing resources on federal public lands through prior appropriation. Those individuals advocated their position in part through civil disobedience and armed standoffs with federal officials. They also asserted that their duty to obey theistic natural law overrode any duty to obey the Nation’s positive law. Similar claims that individual religious beliefs override positive law have been made recently regarding a range of other controversial issues, such as same-sex marriage, public insurance for birth control, and the right to bear arms. Prior appropriation doctrine is consistent with secular natural law theory. Existing positive law, however, accepts prior appropriation for western water rights but rejects its application to grazing rights on federal public lands, for reasons consistent with secular natural law. Natural law doctrine allows citizens to advocate for change but requires them to respect the positive law of the societies in which they live. Separation of church and state also bars natural law claims based on religious doctrine unless those principles are also adopted in secular positive law. This sequel addresses claims from the opposite side of the political-environmental spectrum, that natural law provides one justification for the public trust doctrine, and that courts should enforce an atmospheric public trust to redress catastrophic global climate change. Although some religious groups have embraced environmental agendas supported by religious doctrine, public trust claims are secular in origin. Just as natural law provides support for prior appropriation, it supports the idea that some resources, such as water, wildlife, and air, should be held in common rather than made available for private ownership. From this perspective, the two doctrines merge into a single issue of resource allocation. Which resources are best made available for appropriation as private property, and which are best left in common? Natural law theory helps to explain the liberty and welfare goals that inform those choices. Positive law embraces the public trust doctrine with respect to some natural resources, and does not preclude its applicability to the atmosphere or other common resources.


Author(s):  
Michał Sopiński

This paper presents practical reasoning in the light of John M. Finnis’ new natural law theory. Finnis’ views were shaped by Aquinas’ thoughts on natural law but he was also strongly inspired by Germain Grisez’ new approach, so his theory could be named a new natural law theory. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of legal reasoning as practical reasoning, which Finnis intended mainly as a strong critique of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning based on the concept of the one right answer. According to the author of this paper, Finnis’ critical approach to Dworkin leads to a gradual extension of the former’s concept of legal reasoning to include positivistic aspects (rapprochement with Joseph Raz’ views) and institutional aspects (rapprochement with Neil MacCormick’s views). Therefore, Finnis’ theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the rapprochement between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary philosophy of law.


Ratio Juris ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-32
Author(s):  
Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco ◽  
Pilar Zambrano

1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Hittinger

Debates over natural law routinely confuse three quite different sets of issues. First, there are the properly philosophical questions of (i) whether a natural law exists, and (ii) whether positive laws are valid completely apart from their moral specifications. Second, there are questions that properly belong to political theory. These include, (iii) how a constitution ought to allocate responsibility to make natural justice effective, and (iv) how a particular system of positive law handles this issue. Third, assuming that a judiciary is limited by written law, it can still be asked whether this necessarily prohibits judicial uses of natural law theory. Questions at these different levels are sufficiently different that what it takes to solve a question at one level does not necessarily carry over to the others. It is vain, therefore, to search for a single method that brings closure on these issues.


Public Choice ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hartmut Kliemt

AbstractRejecting all knowledge claims concerning right and wrong in matters practical James Buchanan concurred with legal positivism that invalid law cannot be identified by its substantive content but only by an inherited defect in its factual creation. Beyond correct creation Buchanan proposed as a quasi-natural law constraint that unanimity in the shadow of individual veto power must at least be conceivable if a norm is to be law. The emerging hybrid conception of constitutional law is symptomatic for Buchanan’s never-ending but ultimately futile efforts to incorporate Kantian ideals of interpersonal respect into constitutional economics without imposing them as personal values.


2011 ◽  
Vol 38 (120) ◽  
pp. 5
Author(s):  
Marcelo Araújo

O objetivo deste texto é contribuir para uma compreensão da história do debate entre jusnaturalismo e positivismo legal. Esse debate teve sua origem no século XVII, mais especificamente no contexto do ceticismo moderno acerca dos fundamentos da legitimidade do exercício da autoridade política. As respostas de Hugo Grotius e René Descartes ao problema do ceticismo, como se pretende mostrar, contribuíram para a emergência do debate entre jusnaturalismo e positivismo legal.Abstract: This paper aims to develop a historical understanding of the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism. This debate has its roots in the 17th century, particularly in the context of the modern skepticism about the justification for the exercise of political authority. I intend to show that the answer given by both Hugo Grotius and René Descartes against the skeptical attack contributed to the emergence of the debate between natural law theory and legal positivism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Tri Mulyani ◽  
A Heru Nuswanto ◽  
Endah Pujiastuti

<p>Setiap negara hukum menuntut agar dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan harus didasarkan pada asas legalitas yaitu ketentuan undang-undang, termasuk juga Indonesia. Namun dalam hal melaksanakan tugas dan kewajiban penyelenggaraan pemerintahan agar dapat memberikan dan menjaga kualitas pelayanan publik serta mengusahakan kesejahteraan, di samping memberikan jaminan dan perlindungan bagi warga negara, maka tidak bisa hanya berpegang pada asas legalitas, karena semakin hari, perkembangan tuntutan pelayanan publik semakin kompleks dan beragam. Permasalahan demi permasalahan muncul dimasyarakat, dan pada kondisi seperti inilah muncul prinsip bahwa pemerintah tidak boleh menolak untuk memberikan pelayanan kepada masyarakat dengan alasan tidak ada peraturan perundang-undangan yang mengaturnya atau belum/tidak ada peraturan perundang-undangan yang dijadikan dasar kewenangan untuk melakukan perbuatan hukum. Oleh karena itu pemerintah diberikan kewenangan bebas melakukan tindakan/perbuatan tanpa harus terikat undang-undang yaitu <em>discresionary power</em>. Sehingga dalam penelitian ini akan dikaji lebih dalam tentang pentingnya penggunaan diskresi bagi pejabat pemerintah dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan. Metode penelitian yang dipergunakan diantaranya adalah jenis penelitian yuridis normatif, dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan konsep, spesifikasinya diskriptif analitis, pengumpulan data dengan studi kepustakaan dan akan dilakukan analisis secara kualitatif. Adapun hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa pentingnya penggunaan <em>discresionary power</em> bagi pejabat pemerintah dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintahan adalah sebagai alternatif untuk mengisi kekurangan dan kelemahan di dalam penerapan asas legalitas (<em>wetmatigheid van bestuur</em>), agar di samping pemerintah dapat melindungi dan menjamin kepastian hukum warga negara, pemerintah juga dapat memberikan pelayanan publik dan kesejahteraan bagi warga negara.</p><p><em>Each legal state requires that in the administration of the government should be based on the legality principle of the provisions of the law, including Indonesia. However, in terms of carrying out the duties and obligations of government administration in order to provide and maintain the quality of public services and prosperity, in addition to providing guarantees and protection for citizens, it can not just stick to the principle of legality, because the day, the increasingly complex demands of public services and diverse. Problems after problems arise in the community, and in such conditions the principle that the government should not refuse to provide services to the public on the grounds there is no legislation that regulate it or not / no legislation on which the authority to do legal action . Therefore the government is given free authority to perform actions / deeds without having to be bound by legislation that is discretion. So in this study will be studied more deeply about the importance of the use of discretion for government officials in the administration. The research method used is normative juridical research type, with approach of legislation and concepts, analytical descriptive specification, data collection with literature study and will be analyzed qualitatively. The results of the study indicate that the importance of discretionary power for government officials in the administration is an alternative to fill the shortcomings and weaknesses in the application of legality principle (wetmatigheid van bestuur), so that in addition to the government can protect and ensure legal certainty of citizens, the government can also provide public services and welfare for citizens. </em><em></em></p>


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