Acerca del supuesto fundamentalismo de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certez

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Basic Beliefs

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM

Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Haridimos Tsoukas
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
The Self ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sense Of Wonder

This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. —Plato, Theaetetus, §155d At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §253 Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity [ … ] The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection....

Making Sense of “Microaggression”

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-124
Author(s):  
Heather Stewart ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Family Resemblance ◽  
Feminist Standpoint ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
Standpoint Epistemology ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

Though philosophers are beginning to pay attention to the phenomenon of microaggressions, they are yet to fully draw on their training and skills in conceptual analysis to help make sense of what microaggression is. In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the concept of microaggression. I ultimately argue that ‘microaggression’ as a concept gets its meaning not by decomposing into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather by means of what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) has called “family resemblance.” That is to say, what unifies the concept of microaggression is a set of common, overlapping features that link related instances together, but are not necessarily all present in all cases. I identify and explain a common set of features that together form the basis for a family resemblance account of the concept. I then argue that despite the difficulty that microaggressions pose in terms of being reliably recognized and understood as such, some people, in virtue of their epistemic standpoint, are better suited to recognize these features and subsequently identify instances of micraoggression in practice. I argue this by drawing on the vast literature in feminist standpoint epistemology (Alcoff, 1993; Hill Collins, 1990, 2004; hooks, 2004; Harding, 2004, 2008; Wylie, 2013).

Repeatability and Methodical Actions in Uncertain Situations

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-376
Author(s):  
Michael Funk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Image Interpretation ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Methodological Aspects

In this paper Ludwig Wittgenstein is interpreted as a philosopher of language and technology. Due to current developments, a special focus is on lifeworld practice and technoscientific research. In particular, image-interpretation is used as a concrete methodical example. Whereas in most science- or technology-related Wittgenstein interpretations the focus is on the Tractatus, the Investigations or On Certainty, in this paper the primary source is his very late triune fragment Bemerkungen über die Farben (“Remarks about the Colours”). It is argued that Wittgenstein’s approach can supplement Don Ihde’s concept of material hermeneutics, and that Wittgenstein’s constructivist and pragmatist claims relate to current authors in the philosophy of technology like Peter Janich, Carl Mitcham or Jürgen Mittelstraß. Ludwig Wittgenstein enables a philosophical approach of transcendental grammars, techno-linguistic forms of life and technoscientific language games. In detail, several methodological aspects regarding relations between language and technology are summarized. Here concretely repeatability and methodical actions play major roles in uncertain situations of language and technology practice. It is shown that Wittgenstein is still underestimated in the philosophy of technology—although his thoughtful conceptualizations of language, social practice and technology bear important methodical insights for current technosciences like synthetic biology, robotics and many others.

scholarly journals WITTGENSTEIN E MOORE: SOBRE A CERTEZA

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 671
Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty

Neste ensaio será analisada a resposta fornecida por George Edward Moore ao questionamento do filósofo cético quanto à existência de objetos exteriores a nós. Num primeiro momento analisar-se-á a resposta oferecida por Moore e sua estrutura. Num segundo momento se faz a análise da efetividade que as respostas de Moore apresentam como soluções à dúvida cética. Após essas análises, passamos a considerar criticamente a empreitada de Moore segundo o ponto de vista da filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein exposta em sua obra On Certainty. Nossa conclusão é que as proposições apresentadas por Moore não servem de provas, uma vez que elas não são provenientes de investigações empíricas. Sendo assim, as alegadas proposições de Moore são de fato as estruturas que permitem que toda dúvida e investigação sejam lançadas. A partir disso, examinamos se as proposições de Moore podem ser consideradas conhecimento. Por fim, analisamos o status filosófico da dúvida cética que Moore pretende responder. Nossa intenção é mostrar que a dúvida cética não possui sentido e, por tal razão, apresenta-se como paradoxo ao nosso entendimento. Nossa conclusão é que a análise do ceticismo filosófico, tal como elaborado por Moore e Wittgenstein, possibilita-nos alcançar clareza quanto ao conjunto de proposições que fazem parte do sistema do qual as dúvidas e investigações podem ser levantadas.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
World View ◽  
On Certainty

Over half of Wittgenstein’s raw, unedited remarks in On Certainty were written in seven weeks ending two days before his death, and he often expresses dissatisfaction with his progress. Unsurprisingly, they are rife with tensions. The author focuses on two topics centering on his crucial notion of “the propositions that are beyond doubt”: what it is for a proposition to have that status for someone, and whether Wittgenstein thinks we can defend our beliefs in such propositions. The author argues that his struggles can be seen to be leading him to views much like Quine’s. Three points of agreement stand out: (i) One cannot be faulted either for retaining any particular belief or for taking any particular belief as fundamental if doing so does not violate (iii). (ii) One can be wrong about the truth of any proposition. (iii) One’s world view must be kept squared with experience.

scholarly journals EVIDÊNCIAS E CIRCUNSTÂNCIAS – LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN E A CERTEZA

2015 ◽  
pp. 92
Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
George Moore

Neste ensaio apresento algumas considerações quanto à determinada passagem da obra On Certainty de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Meu objetivo ao apresentar estas considerações é analisar o argumento de Wittgenstein quanto às diferenças entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação. Wittgenstein usa como exemplo para discutir a relação entre evidências e circunstâncias o caso de contradição entre George Moore e que ele denomina por "os católicos". O interessante nesta discussão é que Wittgenstein afirma que Moore seria contraditado pelos católicos e não "negado". A partir da contextualização desta discussão tento mostrar que existe uma ligação entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação e as circunstâncias particulares de onde retiramos estas evidências. Antes de incidir em relativismo quanto ao conhecimento, Wittgenstein nos mostra que as evidências são orientadas por nossa imagem de mundo. Para discutir este argumento apresento, primeiramente, uma contextualização da questão; num segundo passo discuto a contradição entre Moore e os Católicos. Minha intenção é mostrar que a contradição ocorre entre duas imagens de mundo. Por fim discuto e analiso a expressão "teria de me resignar" usada por Wittgenstein no que diz respeito à diferentes imagens de mundo que podem entrar em conflito.

scholarly journals Nel tempo e nello spazio. Linguaggio e natura nella filosofia di Ludwig Wittgenstein

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alice Morelli
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Liberal Naturalism ◽  
In Virtue Of

The paper focuses on some naturalistic aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein has often been considered a radical anti-naturalist philosopher, mainly because he does not endorse the thesis of the continuity between philosophy and science. However, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy incorporates a kind of naturalism without naturalization, i.e., a liberal naturalism, in virtue of the relation between human nature and language. It will be concluded that Wittgenstein’s liberal naturalism provides an example of a naturalistic perspective on language which avoids the limits of an intellectualist approach without leading to scientism: this is meant to express the irreducibility of naturalism to the mere scientific version.

scholarly journals The Animal in Epistemology

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
Basic Beliefs

In this paper, I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge certainties,’ showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional, and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement—worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein’s ‘third masterpiece.’ As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams, and Crispin Wright.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Davidovic
Keyword(s):  
Linguistic Practice ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Basic Beliefs

The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein?s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein?s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type.

scholarly journals Om at forstå Bibelen i den moderne verden

2011 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 258-275
Author(s):  
Gerd Theissen
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Religious Experiences ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Four Dimensions ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The Bible ◽  
Canonical Dimension ◽  
Mystery Of Being ◽  
Basic Beliefs

The article gives an outline of New Testament hermeneutics based on a hermeneutic of religion. Religions are sign worlds constructed by human beings. They refer to transcendence, a foundational story, imply moral imperatives, and form a community. The Bible is the basis of the Christian sign world that is constructed by two axioms (monotheism and Christology) and many basic beliefs. The Bible interprets and initiates religious experience. The basic religious experiences are: an amazement of the mystery of being, an experience of absolute confidence and of responsibility (cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein). These experiences pervade all four dimensions of the Bible: a kerygmatic message based in transcendence, a historical reference to the history Jesus, an ethical impact, and a canonical dimension, i.e. a relationship to churches. In modern times this implies a relationship to other religions. The article suggests therefore an edition of the Bible with an inter-religious appendix.

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