Introduction

Author(s):  
Haridimos Tsoukas

This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. —Plato, Theaetetus, §155d At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §253 Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity [ … ] The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection....

Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-376
Author(s):  
Michael Funk ◽  

In this paper Ludwig Wittgenstein is interpreted as a philosopher of language and technology. Due to current developments, a special focus is on lifeworld practice and technoscientific research. In particular, image-interpretation is used as a concrete methodical example. Whereas in most science- or technology-related Wittgenstein interpretations the focus is on the Tractatus, the Investigations or On Certainty, in this paper the primary source is his very late triune fragment Bemerkungen über die Farben (“Remarks about the Colours”). It is argued that Wittgenstein’s approach can supplement Don Ihde’s concept of material hermeneutics, and that Wittgenstein’s constructivist and pragmatist claims relate to current authors in the philosophy of technology like Peter Janich, Carl Mitcham or Jürgen Mittelstraß. Ludwig Wittgenstein enables a philosophical approach of transcendental grammars, techno-linguistic forms of life and technoscientific language games. In detail, several methodological aspects regarding relations between language and technology are summarized. Here concretely repeatability and methodical actions play major roles in uncertain situations of language and technology practice. It is shown that Wittgenstein is still underestimated in the philosophy of technology—although his thoughtful conceptualizations of language, social practice and technology bear important methodical insights for current technosciences like synthetic biology, robotics and many others.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 671
Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi

Neste ensaio será analisada a resposta fornecida por George Edward Moore ao questionamento do filósofo cético quanto à existência de objetos exteriores a nós. Num primeiro momento analisar-se-á a resposta oferecida por Moore e sua estrutura. Num segundo momento se faz a análise da efetividade que as respostas de Moore apresentam como soluções à dúvida cética. Após essas análises, passamos a considerar criticamente a empreitada de Moore segundo o ponto de vista da filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein exposta em sua obra On Certainty. Nossa conclusão é que as proposições apresentadas por Moore não servem de provas, uma vez que elas não são provenientes de investigações empíricas. Sendo assim, as alegadas proposições de Moore são de fato as estruturas que permitem que toda dúvida e investigação sejam lançadas. A partir disso, examinamos se as proposições de Moore podem ser consideradas conhecimento. Por fim, analisamos o status filosófico da dúvida cética que Moore pretende responder. Nossa intenção é mostrar que a dúvida cética não possui sentido e, por tal razão, apresenta-se como paradoxo ao nosso entendimento. Nossa conclusão é que a análise do ceticismo filosófico, tal como elaborado por Moore e Wittgenstein, possibilita-nos alcançar clareza quanto ao conjunto de proposições que fazem parte do sistema do qual as dúvidas e investigações podem ser levantadas.


2021 ◽  
pp. 193-202
Author(s):  
Michael R. Dove

This epilogue presents some conclusions, beginning with a comparison between Claude Lévi-Strauss's story of Amazonian natives who drown captives to see if they are human, and the story of hunters who journey to the pig village to probe their own humanity. The latter story is self-reflexive and thus perspectivist in a way the former one is not. Key to this perspectivism is the relationship between sign and thing. These are mimetic relations, in which one thing is similar but not identical to another. There is “slippage,” and this becomes a source of insight when comparing the self and the “other.” The mythic journey to the village of the pig people can be compared to the first trip into space and the view of Earth afforded thereby: the space trip does not actually distance us from ourselves as much as the mythic trip does. The journey from human reality to pig reality reprises an ancient “reversal” in roles, from hunter to hunted, which has been an important wellspring of metaphoric thinking. The universal human value of being able to look back at ourselves from a different place was noted by philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who also noted the difficulty of doing so — a dilemma of the human consciousness, which the material in this book addresses.


Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen

Over half of Wittgenstein’s raw, unedited remarks in On Certainty were written in seven weeks ending two days before his death, and he often expresses dissatisfaction with his progress. Unsurprisingly, they are rife with tensions. The author focuses on two topics centering on his crucial notion of “the propositions that are beyond doubt”: what it is for a proposition to have that status for someone, and whether Wittgenstein thinks we can defend our beliefs in such propositions. The author argues that his struggles can be seen to be leading him to views much like Quine’s. Three points of agreement stand out: (i) One cannot be faulted either for retaining any particular belief or for taking any particular belief as fundamental if doing so does not violate (iii). (ii) One can be wrong about the truth of any proposition. (iii) One’s world view must be kept squared with experience.


Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi

Neste ensaio apresento algumas considerações quanto à determinada passagem da obra On Certainty de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Meu objetivo ao apresentar estas considerações é analisar o argumento de Wittgenstein quanto às diferenças entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação. Wittgenstein usa como exemplo para discutir a relação entre evidências e circunstâncias o caso de contradição entre George Moore e que ele denomina por "os católicos". O interessante nesta discussão é que Wittgenstein afirma que Moore seria contraditado pelos católicos e não "negado". A partir da contextualização desta discussão tento mostrar que existe uma ligação entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação e as circunstâncias particulares de onde retiramos estas evidências. Antes de incidir em relativismo quanto ao conhecimento, Wittgenstein nos mostra que as evidências são orientadas por nossa imagem de mundo. Para discutir este argumento apresento, primeiramente, uma contextualização da questão; num segundo passo discuto a contradição entre Moore e os Católicos. Minha intenção é mostrar que a contradição ocorre entre duas imagens de mundo. Por fim discuto e analiso a expressão "teria de me resignar" usada por Wittgenstein no que diz respeito à diferentes imagens de mundo que podem entrar em conflito.


Dialogue ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-679
Author(s):  
MARKUS KILLIUS

InThe Language Animal, Charles Taylor’s struggle to provide a theoretical framework for his narration of the self finally becomes obvious. About 30 years after he wrote his great and fascinatingSources of the Self, Taylor closes the gap between the self as a radical being-in-the-world and its analytical premises. Even if the main topic of Taylor’s new book may seem to be only a comparison of what he calls ‘HHH-theory’ and ‘HLC-theory,’ there are two other authors, the combination of whose ideas clarifies not only his approach to language but also to his concept of ‘reality’ as such: Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein.


Konturen ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 216
Author(s):  
Martin Klebes

In their philosophical work Ludwig Wittgenstein and Søren Kierkegaard both reflect on suicide as a response to existential despair. While Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of The Sickness unto Death, rejects the contemplation of suicide as an outright barrier to an “awakening” of the self to its own sinful condition, Wittgenstein’s diary notes betray a different attitude towards such thinking; while he largely concurs with Kierkegaard’s characterization of despair, Wittgenstein strikes a less confident pose concerning the possibility of a leap into faith that would all at once overcome any thought of suicide.


2021 ◽  
pp. 75-103
Author(s):  
Samuel Andrew Shearn

This chapter gathers Tillich’s academic work from 1909 to 11, including two dissertations on Schelling and his lecture on certainty and the historical Jesus. Schelling provided Tillich and his modern-positive tradition with a way of thinking about Christianity in the light of the history of religions, after the challenge of Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) to separate historical and dogmatic method. Tillich notes Schelling’s insistence that humanity is God-positing regardless of unbelief. It is also significant that Tillich affirms the notion of an undoubtable condition of thought, whether as Schelling’s concept of ‘unpreconceivable being’ or Fichte’s I (das Ich). With Schelling, Tillich sees a wider application for justification than the ethical sphere. However, it is first in the Kassel lecture on the historical Jesus that he connects the idealist notion that knowledge is limited to the self-certainty of the subject with the claim that autonomy is justification in the area of thought. This is expressed as the rejection of the misunderstanding that faith is an intellectual work. This could have been the influence of his Lutheran tradition, encouraged by Schelling. The chapter argues it emerged from Tillich’s engagement with Wilhelm Herrmann (1846–1922).


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucio Tonello ◽  
Luca Giacobbi ◽  
Alberto Pettenon ◽  
Alessandro Scuotto ◽  
Massimo Cocchi ◽  
...  

AbstractAutism spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects can present temporary behaviors of acute agitation and aggressiveness, named problem behaviors. They have been shown to be consistent with the self-organized criticality (SOC), a model wherein occasionally occurring “catastrophic events” are necessary in order to maintain a self-organized “critical equilibrium.” The SOC can represent the psychopathology network structures and additionally suggests that they can be considered as self-organized systems.


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