scholarly journals EVIDÊNCIAS E CIRCUNSTÂNCIAS – LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN E A CERTEZA

2015 ◽  
pp. 92
Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
George Moore

Neste ensaio apresento algumas considerações quanto à determinada passagem da obra On Certainty de Ludwig Wittgenstein. Meu objetivo ao apresentar estas considerações é analisar o argumento de Wittgenstein quanto às diferenças entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação. Wittgenstein usa como exemplo para discutir a relação entre evidências e circunstâncias o caso de contradição entre George Moore e que ele denomina por "os católicos". O interessante nesta discussão é que Wittgenstein afirma que Moore seria contraditado pelos católicos e não "negado". A partir da contextualização desta discussão tento mostrar que existe uma ligação entre evidências para a verdade de uma afirmação e as circunstâncias particulares de onde retiramos estas evidências. Antes de incidir em relativismo quanto ao conhecimento, Wittgenstein nos mostra que as evidências são orientadas por nossa imagem de mundo. Para discutir este argumento apresento, primeiramente, uma contextualização da questão; num segundo passo discuto a contradição entre Moore e os Católicos. Minha intenção é mostrar que a contradição ocorre entre duas imagens de mundo. Por fim discuto e analiso a expressão "teria de me resignar" usada por Wittgenstein no que diz respeito à diferentes imagens de mundo que podem entrar em conflito.

Acerca del supuesto fundamentalismo de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certez

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Basic Beliefs

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM

Introduction

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Haridimos Tsoukas
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
The Self ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Sense Of Wonder

This sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher. —Plato, Theaetetus, §155d At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §253 Philosophy is the self-correction by consciousness of its own initial excess of subjectivity [ … ] The task of philosophy is to recover the totality obscured by the selection....

Repeatability and Methodical Actions in Uncertain Situations

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 352-376
Author(s):  
Michael Funk ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Social Practice ◽  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Image Interpretation ◽  
Primary Source ◽  
Language Games ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Methodological Aspects

In this paper Ludwig Wittgenstein is interpreted as a philosopher of language and technology. Due to current developments, a special focus is on lifeworld practice and technoscientific research. In particular, image-interpretation is used as a concrete methodical example. Whereas in most science- or technology-related Wittgenstein interpretations the focus is on the Tractatus, the Investigations or On Certainty, in this paper the primary source is his very late triune fragment Bemerkungen über die Farben (“Remarks about the Colours”). It is argued that Wittgenstein’s approach can supplement Don Ihde’s concept of material hermeneutics, and that Wittgenstein’s constructivist and pragmatist claims relate to current authors in the philosophy of technology like Peter Janich, Carl Mitcham or Jürgen Mittelstraß. Ludwig Wittgenstein enables a philosophical approach of transcendental grammars, techno-linguistic forms of life and technoscientific language games. In detail, several methodological aspects regarding relations between language and technology are summarized. Here concretely repeatability and methodical actions play major roles in uncertain situations of language and technology practice. It is shown that Wittgenstein is still underestimated in the philosophy of technology—although his thoughtful conceptualizations of language, social practice and technology bear important methodical insights for current technosciences like synthetic biology, robotics and many others.

scholarly journals WITTGENSTEIN E MOORE: SOBRE A CERTEZA

2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (39) ◽  
pp. 671
Author(s):  
Arturo Fatturi
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty

Neste ensaio será analisada a resposta fornecida por George Edward Moore ao questionamento do filósofo cético quanto à existência de objetos exteriores a nós. Num primeiro momento analisar-se-á a resposta oferecida por Moore e sua estrutura. Num segundo momento se faz a análise da efetividade que as respostas de Moore apresentam como soluções à dúvida cética. Após essas análises, passamos a considerar criticamente a empreitada de Moore segundo o ponto de vista da filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein exposta em sua obra On Certainty. Nossa conclusão é que as proposições apresentadas por Moore não servem de provas, uma vez que elas não são provenientes de investigações empíricas. Sendo assim, as alegadas proposições de Moore são de fato as estruturas que permitem que toda dúvida e investigação sejam lançadas. A partir disso, examinamos se as proposições de Moore podem ser consideradas conhecimento. Por fim, analisamos o status filosófico da dúvida cética que Moore pretende responder. Nossa intenção é mostrar que a dúvida cética não possui sentido e, por tal razão, apresenta-se como paradoxo ao nosso entendimento. Nossa conclusão é que a análise do ceticismo filosófico, tal como elaborado por Moore e Wittgenstein, possibilita-nos alcançar clareza quanto ao conjunto de proposições que fazem parte do sistema do qual as dúvidas e investigações podem ser levantadas.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bredo Johnsen
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
World View ◽  
On Certainty

Over half of Wittgenstein’s raw, unedited remarks in On Certainty were written in seven weeks ending two days before his death, and he often expresses dissatisfaction with his progress. Unsurprisingly, they are rife with tensions. The author focuses on two topics centering on his crucial notion of “the propositions that are beyond doubt”: what it is for a proposition to have that status for someone, and whether Wittgenstein thinks we can defend our beliefs in such propositions. The author argues that his struggles can be seen to be leading him to views much like Quine’s. Three points of agreement stand out: (i) One cannot be faulted either for retaining any particular belief or for taking any particular belief as fundamental if doing so does not violate (iii). (ii) One can be wrong about the truth of any proposition. (iii) One’s world view must be kept squared with experience.

Doctor Maurice O'Connor Drury, Wittgenstein's pupil

2000 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Wallace
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Trinity College ◽  
Close Contact ◽  
Clinical Work ◽  
Bertrand Russell ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Hospital Doctor ◽  
Trinity College Dublin ◽  
George Moore

Doctor Maurice O'Connor Drury worked for most of his life in Saint Patrick's Hospital, Dublin. While going about his routine clinical work at that hospital, Doctor Drury quietly maintained a close, lifelong friendship with the man regarded as perhaps the greatest philosopher of the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein.Few realised that before studying medicine at Trinity College, Dublin, ‘Con’ Drury had read philosophy at Cambridge, where he came into close contact with some of the great minds of philosophy this century; Bertrand Russell, George Moore and Gilbert Ryle.Con Drury is importan t not just because of his own philosophical work but because, through his enduring friendship with the deeply troubled philosopher, he challenged the portraye d image of Wittgenstein as a ‘cantankerous, arrogant and tormented genius’.

Hard Objects in George Oppen's Discrete Series

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 496-517
Author(s):  
Ned Hercock
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Discrete Series ◽  
Human Experience ◽  
John Ruskin ◽  
Gerard Manley Hopkins ◽  
Marcel Duchamp ◽  
The World ◽  
Production History ◽  
History Of

This essay examines the objects in George Oppen's Discrete Series (1934). It considers their primary property to be their hardness – many of them have distinctively uniform and impenetrable surfaces. This hardness and uniformity is contrasted with 19th century organicism (Gerard Manley Hopkins and John Ruskin). Taking my cue from Kirsten Blythe Painter I show how in their work with hard objects these poems participate within a wider cultural and philosophical turn towards hardness in the early twentieth century (Marcel Duchamp, Adolf Loos, Ludwig Wittgenstein and others). I describe the thinking these poems do with regard to industrialization and to human experience of a resolutely object world – I argue that the presentation of these objects bears witness to the production history of the type of objects which in this era are becoming preponderant in parts of the world. Finally, I suggest that the objects’ impenetrability offers a kind of anti-aesthetic relief: perception without conception. If ‘philosophy recognizes the Concept in everything’ it is still possible, these poems show, to experience resistance to this imperious process of conceptualization. Within thinking objects (poems) these are objects which do not think.

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