scholarly journals Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Davidovic

The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein?s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein?s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type.

Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM


1977 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-12
Author(s):  
Franklin B. Krohn ◽  
Donald P. Rogers

The study reported here describes the procedures used in conducting an audience analysis, the results of the analysis, and recommendations to commercial banks in communicating with black businesspeople. The audience analysis included: (1) relationship of the audience (black businesspeople) to the communicator (commercial banks); (2) the relationship of the audience to the subject and purpose of the message; (3) the basic beliefs and attitudes of the audience, and (4) the characteristics of the audience. Questionnaires and interviews were used to gather data from 380 black businesspeople. Based upon the results, eleven specific conclusions for commercial banks to use as guidelines in communicating with black businesspeople were drawn.


Author(s):  
Valeria D. Alperovich

Introduction. This article presents a study that is devoted to the problem of relationship of a subject’s perceptions of other people and the phenomenon of the “world image” of a personality. This problem is relevant for humanities scholars in different countries of the world in conditions of exacerbation of intercultural and interethnic conflicts. Materials and Methods. An empirical study was carried out with the purpose of a comparative analysis of the features of the “world image” in people who differ in metaphorical perceptions of “friends” and “foes”. The subject of the research was the metaphors of “friend” and “foe”, the basic beliefs of the person and the types of the “world image” presented in narratives. The following methods were applied: metaphor content analysis, testing, narrative analysis, methods of mathematical statistics (quartiles, Kruskal – Wallis H-test, regression analysis). Results. The scientific novelty of the conducted study is the original development of parameters for the analysis of narrative “world images” of the personality. For the first time, interconnections of different types of metaphors of “friends” and “foes” as partners in communication and various parameters of the narrative “world image” of the subject are revealed. It is concluded that the attribution of positive or negative and ambivalent socio-psychological metaphorical characteristics for “friends” and “foes” is associated with a positive or ambivalent “world image” of the “conceptual” or “perceptual” type. Conclusion. The results of the study generally indicate that the subject’s metaphorical ideas about “friends” and “foes” affect the subject’s “world image”.


Dialogue ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-662
Author(s):  
David A. Givner

The subject of this study is an ambiguity which is deeply rooted in Berkeley's arguments against matter. By a is shift between two meanings of the term ‘sensible’, he is able to construct a simple “refutation” of matter. Berkeley then attempts to show that this argument is irrefutable. The ambiguity of the original argument is, however, contained in the train of supporting arguments. My purpose in bringing attention to this ambiguity is not just to reveal a mistake in Berkeley's arguments against matter. This particular mistake, I believe, deserves scrutiny not only because it is a mistake, but also because it explains the strategy and order of Berkeley's arguments against matter. Furthermore, if this explanation is correct, then some light can be cast on some puzzling features of Berkeley's philosophy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 75-103
Author(s):  
Samuel Andrew Shearn

This chapter gathers Tillich’s academic work from 1909 to 11, including two dissertations on Schelling and his lecture on certainty and the historical Jesus. Schelling provided Tillich and his modern-positive tradition with a way of thinking about Christianity in the light of the history of religions, after the challenge of Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) to separate historical and dogmatic method. Tillich notes Schelling’s insistence that humanity is God-positing regardless of unbelief. It is also significant that Tillich affirms the notion of an undoubtable condition of thought, whether as Schelling’s concept of ‘unpreconceivable being’ or Fichte’s I (das Ich). With Schelling, Tillich sees a wider application for justification than the ethical sphere. However, it is first in the Kassel lecture on the historical Jesus that he connects the idealist notion that knowledge is limited to the self-certainty of the subject with the claim that autonomy is justification in the area of thought. This is expressed as the rejection of the misunderstanding that faith is an intellectual work. This could have been the influence of his Lutheran tradition, encouraged by Schelling. The chapter argues it emerged from Tillich’s engagement with Wilhelm Herrmann (1846–1922).


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

In this paper, I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge certainties,’ showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional, and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement—worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein’s ‘third masterpiece.’ As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams, and Crispin Wright.


1815 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Murray

An argument which I had stated against the Huttonian Theory of the Earth, in so far as it relates to the operation of a central heat, was honoured some time ago with a reply by a distinguished Member of the Society. Respect for the opinion of Mr Playfair led me to consider attentively the reasoning he employed; and still feeling some confidence in the grounds on which the original argument rests, I propose to offer a few observations with regard to it. The question farther involves the consideration of the mode in which heat is distributed at the surface of the globe. This, when minutely investigated, presents a very perfect arrangement, by which the escape of caloric is prevented, while its equal distribution is more effectually attained; and the subject, under this point of view, may have some interest, independent of its relation to any controversial discussion.


PMLA ◽  
1935 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 1320-1327
Author(s):  
Colbert Searles

THE germ of that which follows came into being many years ago in the days of my youth as a university instructor and assistant professor. It was generated by the then quite outspoken attitude of colleagues in the “exact sciences”; the sciences of which the subject-matter can be exactly weighed and measured and the force of its movements mathematically demonstrated. They assured us that the study of languages and literature had little or nothing scientific about it because: “It had no domain of concrete fact in which to work.” Ergo, the scientific spirit was theirs by a stroke of “efficacious grace” as it were. Ours was at best only a kind of “sufficient grace,” pleasant and even necessary to have, but which could, by no means ensure a reception among the elected.


1966 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 363-371
Author(s):  
P. Sconzo

In this paper an orbit computation program for artificial satellites is presented. This program is operational and it has already been used to compute the orbits of several satellites.After an introductory discussion on the subject of artificial satellite orbit computations, the features of this program are thoroughly explained. In order to achieve the representation of the orbital elements over short intervals of time a drag-free perturbation theory coupled with a differential correction procedure is used, while the long range behavior is obtained empirically. The empirical treatment of the non-gravitational effects upon the satellite motion seems to be very satisfactory. Numerical analysis procedures supporting this treatment and experience gained in using our program are also objects of discussion.


1966 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 159-161

Rule: I'd like at this point to bring up the subject of cables and wireways around the telescope. We've touched upon this twice during previous sessions: the cable wrap up problem, the communications problem, and data multiplexing problem. I think we'll ask Bill Baustian if he will give us a brief run down on what the electrical run problems are, besides doubling the system every year.


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