scholarly journals The Animal in Epistemology

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Keyword(s):  
On Certainty ◽  
Crispin Wright ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Michael Williams ◽  
Basic Beliefs

In this paper, I briefly summarize the nature of Wittgenstein’s ‘hinge certainties,’ showing how they radically differ from traditional basic beliefs in their being nonepistemic, grammatical, nonpropositional, and enacted. I claim that it is these very features that enable hinge certainties to put a logical stop to justification, and thereby solve the regress problem of basic beliefs. This is a ground-breaking achievement—worthy of calling On Certainty Wittgenstein’s ‘third masterpiece.’ As I go along, I question some differing interpretations and respond to some objections from fellow-readers of On Certainty: Duncan Pritchard, Michael Williams, and Crispin Wright.

Acerca del supuesto fundamentalismo de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certez

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Basic Beliefs

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM

Epistemic infinitism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Aikin
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Series ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Particular Solution ◽  
Basic Beliefs ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Epistemic Regress Problem ◽  
Do So

If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason can’t just be any old reason. You’ve got to rationally hold it as a good reason. In order to do so, you must have another reason. And that reason needs another. And so a regress of reasons ensues. This is a rough-and-ready picture of the epistemic regress problem. Epistemic infinitism is the view that justifying reasons are infinite, and so it is a particular solution to the regress problem. Consider, also, that justification comes in degrees – some beliefs are better justified than others. Moreover, it seems that people can know things better than others. Call this the gradability phenomenon. Epistemic infinitism is the view that for someone to be justified maximally is for that person to have an infinite series of supporting reasons. Epistemic infinitisms admit of a wide variety. Differences between versions of infinitism arise according to two factors for the view: one dialectical, the other ecumenical. The dialectical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of what philosophical problems or questions they answer. Infinitisms are designed to either provide models for how to solve the epistemic regress problem or address the phenomenon of the gradability of justification and knowledge. Infinitisms will differ depending on which issue they are designed to address, and an infinitism designed to address one issue may not be the same as one designed to address another. The ecumenical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of how consistent the view is with other competing theories about how to address the regress problem and the gradability phenomenon. With the regress problem, infinitism’s main competitor theories are foundationalism, the view that there are basic beliefs for which there is no need for further reason, and coherentism, the view that justifying reasons come in large mutually supporting packages. For the most part, infinitism is taken to be a form of noncoherentist antifoundationalism about justification, because the infinitist holds that reasons must be infinitely long chains of nonrepeating reasons. However, there are versions of infinitism consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism faces a variety of challenges, and two of particular importance are whether infinitism is actually a form of scepticism and whether infinitism is a complete theory of justification.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM: NEO-WITTGENSTEINIAN AND MODERATE NEO-MOOREAN

Episteme ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-457
Author(s):  
Joshua Stuchlik
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Knowledge ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Radical Skepticism ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Epistemological Disjunctivism ◽  
Epistemic Modesty ◽  
Rational Evaluation

ABSTRACTDuncan Pritchard proposes a biscopic solution to the problem of radical skepticism, which consists in epistemological disjunctivism and a theory about the limits of rational evaluation inspired by Wittgenstein's On Certainty. According to the latter theory, we cannot have rationally grounded knowledge of the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, a consequence that Pritchard finds attractive insofar as he thinks that claims to know the falsity of radical skeptical hypotheses are epistemically immodest. I argue that there is room for a neo-Moorean to dispute Pritchard's argument for the Wittgensteinian proposal and I raise some doubts about its underlying motivation. Finally, I put forward an alternative, which I call “moderate neo-Moorean epistemological disjunctivism.” While this theory contends that we possess rationally grounded anti-skeptical knowledge, it also allows for a degree of epistemic modesty, by conceding that perceptual knowledge never amounts to knowledge that is absolutely certain.

Faith and Reason: A Response to Duncan Pritchard

Philosophy ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-247
Author(s):  
Roberto di Ceglie
Keyword(s):  
Religious Belief ◽  
Faith And Reason ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Divine Grace ◽  
Duncan Pritchard ◽  
Theology And Philosophy

AbstractIn a recent essay Duncan Pritchard argues that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between religious belief and ordinary or non-religious belief. Both of them – so he maintains in the footsteps of Wittgenstein's On certainty – are ultimately grounded on a-rational commitments, namely, commitments unresponsive to rational criteria. I argue that, while this view can be justified theologically, it cannot be advanced philosophically as Pritchard assumes.I offer an account of Aquinas's reflection on faith and reason to show that the theologian – not the philosopher – is entitled to deal with a-rational commitments, because the truths of faith can be seen as simply intellectual – like the rational statements considered by the philosopher – but also as decisions made by way of divine grace. I also suggest that Pritchard's thesis may be re-proposed on a new basis, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on knowledge, certainty and scepticism

2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Davidovic
Keyword(s):  
Linguistic Practice ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
Original Argument ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Basic Beliefs

The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein?s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein?s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type.

Dr. William Michael Williams

BMJ ◽  
1913 ◽  
Vol 1 (2731) ◽  
pp. 973-973 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Michael Williams

Triggers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer McKitrick
Keyword(s):  
Stimulus Condition ◽  
Dormant State ◽  
Regress Problem

A disposition’s trigger is its circumstances of manifestation or stimulus condition. Examples of triggers include striking, stretching, and submerging in water. Some argue that no dispositions have triggers. However, such a view leaves it unclear how dispositions can be testable or action guiding. Furthermore, triggers are events, and events involve an object acquiring a property. This leads to a regress problem for pandispositionalism, the view that all properties are dispositions. Some dispositions need a stimulus in order to manifest, and some do not. Dispositions that manifest spontaneously and those that are constantly manifesting do not have triggers. However, some dispositions have a latent or dormant state, and only manifest in certain circumstances.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document