scholarly journals Modderklip Revisited: Can Courts Compel the State to Expropriate Property where the Eviction of Unlawful Occupiers is not Just and Equitable?

Author(s):  
Jackie Dugard

This article examines whether, to give effect to the section 26 constitutional right to adequate housing, courts can (or should) compel the state to expropriate property in instances when it is not just and equitable to evict unlawful occupiers from privately-owned land (unfeasible eviction). This question was first raised in the Modderklip case, where both the Supreme Court of Appeal (Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA)) and Constitutional Court (President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 5 SA 3 (CC)). dodged the question, opting instead to award constitutional damages to the property owner for the long-term occupation of its property by unlawful occupiers. It is clear from cases such as Ekurhuleni Municipality v Dada 2009 4 SA 463 (SCA), that, mindful of separation of powers concerns, courts have until very recently been unwilling to order the state to expropriate property in such circumstances. At the same time, it is increasingly evident that the state has failed to fulfil its constitutional obligations to provide alternative accommodation for poor communities. In this context, this article argues that there is a growing need for the judiciary to consider, as part of its role to craft effective remedies for constitutional rights violations, the issue of judicial expropriation. It does so, first, through an analysis of the relevant jurisprudence on evictions sought by private landowners and, second, through an in-depth engagement of the recent Western Cape High Court case, Fischer v Persons Listed on Annexure X to the Notice of Motion and those Persons whose Identity are Unknown to the Applicant and who are Unlawfully Occupying or Attempting to Occupy Erf 150 (Remaining Extent) Phillipi, Cape Division, Province of the Western Cape; Stock v Persons Unlawfully Occupying Erven 145, 152, 156, 418, 3107, Phillipi & Portion 0 Farm 597, Cape Rd; Copper Moon Trading 203 (Pty) Ltd v Persons whose Identities are to the Applicant Unknown and who are Unlawfully Occupying Remainder Erf 149, Phillipi, Cape Town 2018 2 SA 228 (WCC).    


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nomthandazo Ntlama

The adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter “the Constitution”), provided an opportune moment for the courts, especially the Constitutional Court to ensure an appropriate balance in the development of the principles and values of the doctrine of separation of powers vis-à-vis those of judicial review. The Constitution is framed in a manner that entrenches a system of checks and balances (this is deduced from the manner in which the various chapters of the Constitution are structured, dealing with the roles of the legislature, executive and the judiciary). This system gives the general public a legislative and executive authority that is accountable to them subject to judicial review by an independent judiciary. The system of checks and balances affirms the limited power of the legislative and executive authorities which is confined within the constraints of constitutional values and principles. The importance of checks and balances is similarly endorsed by Edwards as a system that has ushered in a new process of the regulation of state authority in the new dawn of democracy. This system envisages a move away from a culture of authority of the apartheid rule to one of justification of the new constitutional dispensation. He substantiates his argument by pointing out that the new process of regulating state authority has enabled the courts to educate other branches of government through principled and robust articulations of the foundational and constitutional values of the Constitution in a democratic society. Against this background, the purpose of this note is to provide a brief overview of the Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa (2008 (10) BCLR 968, hereinafter “Merafong”) judgment. The particular emphasis on this judgment is its potential to defer the judicialauthority (which the author refer to as a “political doctrine”) to the state. The objective is to analyse this doctrine and evaluate it against the development of substantive principles of judicial review. This purpose is motivated by Chaskalson CJ’s argument in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa (2000 (3) BCLR 241). Chaskalson CJ in this case held that the Constitutional Court cannot allow itself to be diverted from its main function as the final andindependent arbiter in the contest between the state and its citizens. In Merafong, the court created an impression of having misconstrued this purpose and the objectives it has to fulfil. This note is limited to the “political approach” which the court emphasisedwithout much thought, and attempt to address the question of public involvement in legislative processes raised in this case. It alsoacknowledges that the court has affirmed its independence as the guardian of the Constitution in the regulation of state authority and advancement of the principles of judicial review, but its lack of consistency in its adopted approach is a worrying factor and a causefor concern for the regulation of state authority.



2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 604
Author(s):  
Faiq Tobroni

This paper has three key issues. The first issue discusses the arguments constructed by applicant of judicial review (JR) to assess the constitutional rights’ violations caused by the application of Article 2 (1) UUP. The second issue discusses on how the Constitutional Court (MK) seated position of state associated marital affairs in the rejection of JR. The third issue discusses model of freedom of ijtihad (legal thought) on interfaith marriage as the impact of MK’s Decision. Based on    the discussion, regarding to the first issue, the applicant of JR assess the application of Article 2 (1) UUP has legitimized the state as the sole interpreters of religious teachings for a requirement validity of the marriage. According to the applicant,  the role is used by the state (The Office for Religious Affairs/KUA) to not accept interfaith marriage. This refusal led to the violation of some other constitutional rights. Furthermore, as the findings of the second issue, MK’s decision has placed   the real position of state not as interpreters of religious teachings, but merely to accommodate the results of religious scholars’s ijtihad regarding marriage into the state law. Thus, it is not true that the state has violated the constitutional right to more intervene the religious life of citizens. Last findings as the third issue, MK’s decision has affected the model of ijtihad freedom on interfaith marriage. Actually interfaith marriage can still be served through the Civil Registry Office (KCS). KCS could be an alternative way to facilitate the interfaith marriages for all religions in Indonesia. Special for KUA, the institution reject to record interfaith marriage.   In this way, it only accommodates freedom of ijtihad within the limits of ijtihad jama’i. KUA just accomodates ijtihad by institutions such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and other similar institutions that reject interfaith marriage. Special for marriage in muslim community, ijtihad jama’i is better than ijtihad fardiy because the second could trigger the liberalization of marriage laws (temporary marriages, polygamy more than four, underage marriages and denial of recording).



2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 364
Author(s):  
Yanzah Bagas Nugraha ◽  
Dwi Andayani Budisetyowati

The establishment of the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia so called Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD-RI) at least has two objectives. The first is to enhance justice for the people in the region. Secondly, to expanding and increasing the participation of local communities in national life. The process to form this state institution is done by amending the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. However, in doing that  amendment there was an internal conflict within the body of DPD-RI involving the old and the new leaders of this institution last year. The length of leadership tenure which was initially made 5 years was amended to became 2.5 years. The different length of leadership tenure was then canceled by the Supreme Court and it was decided to be the same as other institution such as The People’s Consultative Assembly and The House of Representative in that the leadership tenure should be in accordance with the electoral cycle of 5 years. However, although the regulation of DPD-RI has been canceled, the Supreme Court keeps sending its representative to guide the oath of position of the new DPD-RI leadership. The only regulation that has been introduced by the state was regulation toward conflict between state institutions and this conflict can merely be resolved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the state to seek solution to solve this problem to prevent the same thing happened to other state institution in the future.



2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 858
Author(s):  
Muhammad Reza Winata ◽  
Intan Permata Putri

Jaminan konstitusi terkait hak konstitusional untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan dalam Pasal 28D ayat (2) UUD NRI 1945 dan hak konstitusional untuk membentuk keluarga dalam Pasal 28B ayat (1) UUD 1945 telah dibatasi dengan adanya ketentuan Pasal 153 ayat (1) huruf f Undang-Undang No 13 Tahun 2003 tentang Ketenagakerjaan. Keberadaan perjanjian kerja menghalangi hak pekerja untuk menikah dalam satu institusi karena pekerja harus mengalami pemutusan hubungan kerja untuk dapat melaksanakan haknya membentuk keluarga yang sebenarnya dijamin dalam konstitusi dan peraturan perundang- undangan. Pengujian Pasal 153 ayat (1) huruf f UU No 13 Tahun 2003 dalam Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 13/PUU-XV/2017 telah menyatakan frasa "kecuali telah diatur dalam perjanjian kerja, peraturan Perusahaan, atau perjanjian kerja bersama" bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. Artikel ini hendak menjawab kekuatan mengikat dan akibat hukum putusan, sekaligus Penegakan putusan dengan memetakan penyelesaian terkait peraturan perundang-undangan dan perjanjian kerja yang tidak tidak sesuai dengan putusan dan bertentangan dengan prinsip kebebasan berkontrak. Penelitian ini didasarkan pada penelitian kualitatif, dimana sumber analisis yakni Putusan MK terkait permasalahan yang diangkat, peraturan perundang-undangan, buku dan artikel ilmiah. Artikel ini hendak memetakan penyelesaian yang sesuai terkait kepada perjanjian kerja yang tidak menjamin hak pekerja yang dijamin dalam konstitusi, serta bertentangan dengan prinsip kebebasan berkontrak. yakni: pertama, penyelarasan peraturan perundang undangan di bawah Undang-undang judicial review di Mahkamah Agung, kedua, penyelesaian perselisihan hak melalui Pengadilan Hubungan Industrian yang akan menguji penegakan putusan dalam perjanjian kerja, peraturan perusahaan, atau perjanjian kerja bersama.The constitutional guarantee regarding constitutional rights to obtain employment in Article 28 D paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the constitutional rights to form a family in Article 28 B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution has been limited by the provisions of Article 153 paragraph (1) letter f Law No. 13 of 2003 concerning Labor. The existence of a work agreement prevents the right of workers to get married in one institution because workers must experience termination of employment to be able to exercise their rights to form a family which is actually guaranteed in the constitution and legislation. Testing Article 153 paragraph (1) letter f of Law No. 13 of 2003 in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 13/PUU-XV/2017 has stated the phrase "except as stipulated in work agreements, company regulations, or collective labor agreements" contrary to the 1945 Constitution. This article is about to answer the binding and consequent legal power of the decision, as well as Enforcement of decisions by mapping out solutions related to legislation and work agreements that are not incompatible with decisions and are contrary to the principle of freedom of contract. This research is based on qualitative research, where the source of analysis is the Constitutional Court Decision related to the issues raised, legislation, scientific books, and articles. This article intends to map appropriate solutions related to work agreements that do not guarantee workers’ rights guaranteed in the constitution, as well as contrary to the principle of freedom of contract. namely: first, alignment of legislation under the judicial review law in the Supreme Court, secondly, settlement of rights disputes through the Industrial Relations Court which will test enforcement of decisions in work agreements, company regulations, or collective labor agreements.



2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
I Dewa Gede Palguna

Constitutional complaint is one of important issues to be dealt with by severral countries issues adopting constitutional court in their national legal system and the Federal Constitutional Court Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) is considered by expert as one of the most advance mechanism among countries in dealing with the issue. Generally speaking, constitutional complaint can be described as a complaint or lawsuit filed by an individual citizen who deems his or her constitutional right (s) has been violates by act or omission of public institution or public official. Mostly, such a complaint can only be filed it theere is no other legal remedy available or all legal remedies available have been exhausted. The Constitutional Court of The Republic of Indonesia however is not entrusted with authority to hear constitutional complaint case not withstanding the fact that statistical data on judicial review cases filed by many petitioners before the Court were substantially constitutional complaint issues. It means that, empirically giving the Court to hear constitutional complaint case is necessarily pivotal and theoritically, the Court has the very foundation to be entrusted withq such authority. Considering the complex mechanism to amend the Constitution of 1945, which exhaustively deserible the court’s authorities, this article offers the lawmaker a theoretical insight tio give the Court a limited authority to hear constitutional complaint case by the way of amending the law on Constitutional Court.



Author(s):  
Ari Wibowo ◽  
Michael Hagana Bangun

The provision of legal aid is one way to realize access to law and justice for the poor people provided by the state on the mandate of the constitution. Several regulations regarding legal aid have been issued by the state through the Act and its implementing regulations as well as from the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court through the Supreme Court Regulations and the Constitutional Court's decisions. Legal aid is the constitutional right of every citizen to guarantee legal protection and guarantee equality before the law stipulated in Law Number 16 of 2011, the State is responsible for recognizing and protecting the human rights of every individual without differing backgrounds so that everyone has the right to be treated equally before the law is contained in Article 28D of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. For the poor who experience legal problems in the form of injustice, they can request legal assistance from legal aid institutions that are regulated in legislation. The purpose of providing legal aid is to guarantee and fulfill the right for Legal Aid Recipients to gain access to justice, to realize the constitutional rights of all citizens in accordance with the principle of equality in law, to ensure the certainty that the implementation of Legal Aid is carried out equally across the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. , and to create an effective, efficient and accountable court.



AN-NISA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 372-383
Author(s):  
Ismail Aris

This article shows that the constitution or the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia can not be regarded as children's constitution which adopts the principles of child protection under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also shows that Indonesia is not serious about the theme of child protection discourse such as Ecuador, Egypt, Finland and South Africa in protecting, fulfilling and respecting and explicitly specifying the rights of children in its constitution. Based on the argument above, it is very urgent for Indonesia to do constitutionalism the rights of the child. Based on the principles that adopted by the convention on the right of the child as a solution as an effort to save and protect the rights of the child from negligence and neglect of the State to protect and fulfill the human rights and constitutional rights of the child. The effort of constitutionalism is also considered as a strengthening effort in the formation of legislation in the future as well as the basis or test stone of the Constitutional Court in handling the future judicial review of the Law which violates the norm on the protection of children's rights under the Constitution. In addition, it is urgent for constitutionalism and incorporates the idea of constitutional complaints in the Constitutional Court through the Constitution. Thus, as a basis for constitutional protection of the child if the State has neglect to protect the human rights and constitutional rights of the child by conducting constitutional complaint in the Constitutional Court, in order for the State to fulfill its constitutional obligations which have been regulated under the constitution.



Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Razaana Denson ◽  
Glynis van der Walt

In Hassam v Jacobs NO (Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa and Women’s Legal Trust as Amici Curiae) ([2009] ZACC 19), the Constitutional Court was faced with an application for the confirmation of constitutional invalidity of section 1(4)(f) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 (hereinafter “the ISA”). The application was made pursuant to the decision of the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town in Hassam v Jacobs NO ([2008] 4 All SA 350 (C)), where it was held that the word “spouse” as utilized in the ISA could be extended to include parties in a de facto polygynous Muslim marriage. The impugned provisions of the ISA were held to exclude widows of polygynous Muslim marriages in a discriminatory manner from the protection offered by the ISA. The Western Cape High Court therefore declared section 1(4)(f) of the ISA to be inconsistent with the Constitution as it makes provision for only one spouse in a marriage entered into in accordance with the tenets Muslim rites to be an heir. The decision of Western Cape High Court was referred to the Constitutional Court in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, Act 108 of 1996.



Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Magabe T Thabo ◽  
Kola O Odeku

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 creates a system in which there is a separation of the powers exercised by the different branches of the State. It also creates a system of checks and balances. The exercise of a power by one arm of state is checked by another to ensure that there is no abuse of state power. Organs of state ought to respect each other and the powers allocated to them by the Constitution. To this end, no organ of state should encroach upon the domain of the other organs. However, the courts wield enormous power because they are the ultimate guardians and custodians of the Constitution in South Africa. Courts have the power to declare any law or conduct unconstitutional. Where decisions have been taken by other arms of the State on matters falling within their exclusive domain and such decisions violate the Constitution, courts have a duty to intervene in order to make organs of state act within constitutional bounds. However, courts should not be overzealous and should not encroach upon the powers of the other arms of the State when exercising their judicial power and authority. Against this backdrop, this article analyses how the South African courts have cautioned themselves to exercise self-restraint in order not to usurp or encroach upon the powers of the other arms of the State while exercising their judicial authority and power.



Author(s):  
Christa Rautenbach

This edition of PER consists of eight contributions; six articles and two notes. In the first article, Angelo Dubeanalyses the interaction amongst African States that eventually led to the development of universal jurisdiction regulations within their individual legal systems to determine if one can say that there is indeed an African signature in those legal rules. Anél Ferreira-Snyman deals with the rapid development of space technology and space flight which has rendered article IV of the Outer Space Treaty dealing with the military use of outer space outdated and in dire need of change. Moses Phooko's article investigates whether the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with cases involving allegations of human rights violations. Analogous to the situation of Chinese people in South Africa who chose to be defined as "Black People" in terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 as well as the Broad Based Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, Enyinna Nwauche examines the possibility that people living under a system of customary law may change their legal system by choosing another one. The last two articles, written in two parts by Andre Louw, deals with theEmployment Equity Act 55 of 1998. In the first part, he critically examines the organising principle of the affirmative provisions of this Act and assesses if it is in line with the constitutional requirements for a legitimate affirmative action programme or measure. In the second part, he critically evaluates the Constitutional Court judgment inSouth African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard 2014 6 SA 123 (CC), and highlights what he thinks the biggest areas of disappointment of this judgment are within the context of South Africa’s equality jurisprudence.In the first of two notes, Zsa-Zsa Boggenpoel analyses the Constitutional Court's use of the common law remedy ofmandament van spolie in Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security 2014 5 SA 112 (CC). In the second note and last contribution of this edition, Petronell Kruger discusses the case of Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2011 5 SA 87 (WCC), which dealt with the challenges faced by persons with disabilities relating to access to education in South Africa.



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