scholarly journals Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Preferences

Author(s):  
Sefi Erlich ◽  
Noam Hazon ◽  
Sarit Kraus

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work we concentrate on negotiation with ordinal preferences over a finite set of outcomes. We study an intuitive protocol for bilateral negotiation, where the two parties make offers alternately. We analyze the negotiation protocol under different settings. First, we assume that each party has full information about the other party's preference order. We provide elegant strategies that specify a sub-game perfect equilibrium for the agents. We further show how the studied negotiation protocol almost completely implements a known bargaining rule. Finally, we analyze the no information setting. We study several solution concepts that are distribution-free, and analyze both the case where neither party knows the preference order of the other party, and the case where only one party is uninformed.

Author(s):  
G.Y. Fan ◽  
O.L. Krivanek

Full alignment of a high resolution electron microscope (HREM) requires five parameters to be optimized: the illumination angle (beam tilt) x and y, defocus, and astigmatism magnitude and orientation. Because neither voltage nor current centering lead to the correct illumination angle, all the adjustments must be done on the basis of observing contrast changes in a recorded image. The full alignment can be carried out by a computer which is connected to a suitable image pick-up device and is able to control the microscope, sometimes with greater precision and speed than even a skilled operator can achieve. Two approaches to computer-controlled (automatic) alignment have been investigated. The first is based on measuring the dependence of the overall contrast in the image of a thin amorphous specimen on the relevant parameters, the other on measuring the image shift. Here we report on our progress in developing a new method, which makes use of the full information contained in a computed diffractogram.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sri Wahyuni Muklis ◽  
Sifrid Sonny Pangemanan ◽  
Lidia Mawikere

Funding product “Murabahah” is one of upscale for syariah banking. IAI (Indonesia Accountant Association) has published Accountant funding standard statement (PSAK) No. 102, which admission, transparency, measuring and explanation from “Murabahah” transaction. the other purpose from this research is to know adjustment of “Murabahah” in PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri, Manado Branch with PSAK No. 102. Descriptive theory is been used for this research, which is the data has been gathered, arranged, interpret, and analysed, so it can give full information or picture about “Murabahah” funding in PT. Bank Syariah Mandiri, Manado Branch, where this presentation has been standardized based from standard accountant funding statement No. 102.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. e0245849
Author(s):  
Rosemary J. Marsh ◽  
Martin J. Dorahy ◽  
Chandele Butler ◽  
Warwick Middleton ◽  
Peter J. de Jong ◽  
...  

Amnesia is a core diagnostic criterion for Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), however previous research has indicated memory transfer. As DID has been conceptualised as being a disorder of distinct identities, in this experiment, behavioral tasks were used to assess the nature of amnesia for episodic 1) self-referential and 2) autobiographical memories across identities. Nineteen DID participants, 16 DID simulators, 21 partial information, and 20 full information comparison participants from the general population were recruited. In the first study, participants were presented with two vignettes (DID and simulator participants received one in each of two identities) and asked to imagine themselves in the situations outlined. The second study used a similar methodology but with tasks assessing autobiographical experience. Subjectively, all DID participants reported amnesia for events that occurred in the other identity. On free recall and recognition tasks they presented a memory profile of amnesia similar to simulators instructed to feign amnesia and partial information comparisons. Yet, on tests of recognition, DID participants recognized significantly more of the event that occurred in another identity than simulator and partial information comparisons. As such, results indicate that the DID performance profile was not accounted for by true or feigned amnesia, lending support to the idea that reported amnesia may be more of a perceived than actual memory impairment.


Author(s):  
Ioanna Roussaki ◽  
Ioannis Papaioannou ◽  
Miltiades Anagnostou

In the artificial intelligence domain, an emerging research field that rapidly gains momentum is Automated Negotiations (Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2007) (Buttner, 2006). In this framework, building intelligent agents (Silva, Romão, Deugo, & da Silva, 2001) adequate for participating in negotiations and acting autonomously on behalf of their owners is a very challenging research topic (Saha, 2006) (Jennings, Faratin, Lomuscio, Parsons, Sierra, & Wooldridge, 2001). In automated negotiations, three main items need to be specified (Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings, 1998) (Rosenschein, & Zlotkin, 1994): (i) the negotiation protocol & model, (ii) the negotiation issues, and (iii) the negotiation strategies that the agents will employ. According to (Walton, & Krabbe, 1995), “Negotiation is a form of interaction in which a group of agents, with conflicting interests and a desire to cooperate try to come to a mutually acceptable agreement on the division of scarce resources”. These resources do not only refer to money, but also include other parameters, over which the agents’ owners are willing to negotiate, such as product quality features, delivery conditions, guarantee, etc. (Maes, Guttman, & Moukas, 1999) (Sierra, 2004). In this framework, agents operate following predefined rules and procedures specified by the employed negotiation protocol (Rosenschein, & Zlotkin, 1994), aiming to address the requirements of their human or corporate owners as much as possible. Furthermore, the negotiating agents use a reasoning model based on which their responses to their opponent’s offers are formulated (Muller, 1996). This policy is widely known as the negotiation strategy of the agent (Li, Su, & Lam, 2006). This paper elaborates on the design of negotiation strategies for autonomous agents. The proposed strategies are applicable in cases where the agents have strict deadlines and they negotiate with a single party over the value of a single parameter (single-issue bilateral negotiations). Learning techniques based on MLP and GR Neural Networks (NNs) are employed by the client agents, in order to predict their opponents’ behaviour and achieve a timely detection of unsuccessful negotiations. The proposed NN-assisted strategies have been evaluated and turn out to be highly effective with regards to the duration reduction of the negotiation threads that cannot lead to agreements. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the second section, the basic principles of the designed negotiation framework are presented, while the formal problem statement is provided. The third section elaborates on the NN-assisted strategies designed and provides the configuration details of the NNs employed. The fourth section presents the experiments conducted, while the fifth section summarizes and evaluates the results of these experiments. Finally, in the last section, conclusions are drawn and future research plans are exposed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-294
Author(s):  
Gianna Lotito ◽  
Matteo Migheli ◽  
Guido Ortona

Abstract We inquire experimentally whether asymmetric information in competitive settings and competition per se influence individual social behaviour. Participants perform a task and are remunerated according to two schemes, a non-competitive and a competitive one, then they play a standard public goods game. In the first scheme participants earn a flat remuneration, in the other they are ranked according to their performance and remunerated accordingly. Information about ranking and income before the game is played varies across three different treatments. We find that competition per se does not affect the amount of contribution. The time spent to choose how much to contribute is negatively correlated with the decision of cooperating fully. The main result is that full information about the relative performance in the competitive environment enhances the cooperation, while partial information reduces it.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-148
Author(s):  
Frieder Lempp

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new agent-based simulation model of bilateral negotiation based on a synthesis of established theories and empirical studies of negotiation research. The central units of the model are negotiators who pursue goals, have attributes (trust, assertiveness, cooperativeness, creativity, time, etc.) and perform actions (proposing and accepting offers, exchanging information, creating value, etc). Design/methodology/approach Methodologically, the model follows the agent-based approach to modeling. This approach is chosen because negotiations can be described as complex, non-linear systems involving autonomous agents (i.e. the negotiators), who interact with each other, pursue goals and perform actions aimed at achieving their goals. Findings This paper illustrates how the model can simulate experiments involving variables such as negotiation strategy, creativity, reservation value or time in negotiation. An example simulation is presented which investigates the main and interaction effects of negotiators’ reservation value and their time available for a negotiation. A software implementation of the model is freely accessible at https://tinyurl.com/y7oj6jo8. Research limitations/implications The model, as developed at this point, provides the basis for future research projects. One project could address the representation of emotions and their impact on the process and outcome of negotiations. Another project could extend the model by allowing negotiators to convey false information (i.e. to bluff). Yet another project could be aimed at refining the routines used for making and accepting offers with a view to allow parties to reach partial settlements during a negotiation. Practical implications Due to its broad scope and wide applicability, the model can be used by practitioners and researchers alike. As a decision-support system, the model allows users to simulate negotiation situations and estimate the likelihood of negotiation outcomes. As a research platform, it can generate simulation data in a cost- and time-effective way, allowing researchers to simulate complex, large-N studies at no cost or time. Originality/value The model presented in this paper synthesizes in a novel way a comprehensive range of concepts and theories of current negotiation research. It complements other computational models, in that it can simulate a more diverse range of negotiation strategies (distributive, integrative and compromise) and is applicable to a greater variety of negotiation scenarios.


1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 1493-1517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leo Breiman

The theory behind the success of adaptive reweighting and combining algorithms (arcing) such as Adaboost (Freund & Schapire, 1996a, 1997) and others in reducing generalization error has not been well understood. By formulating prediction as a game where one player makes a selection from instances in the training set and the other a convex linear combination of predictors from a finite set, existing arcing algorithms are shown to be algorithms for finding good game strategies. The minimax theorem is an essential ingredient of the convergence proofs. An arcing algorithm is described that converges to the optimal strategy. A bound on the generalization error for the combined predictors in terms of their maximum error is proven that is sharper than bounds to date. Schapire, Freund, Bartlett, and Lee (1997) offered an explanation of why Adaboost works in terms of its ability to produce generally high margins. The empirical comparison of Adaboost to the optimal arcing algorithm shows that their explanation is not complete.


Author(s):  
Andrea Moro

Understanding the nature and the structure of human language coincides with capturing the constraints which make a conceivable language possible or, equivalently, with discovering whether there can be any impossible languages at all. This book explores these related issues, paralleling the effort of a biologist who attempts at describing the class of impossible animals. In biology, one can appeal for example to physical laws of nature (such as entropy or gravity) but when it comes to language the path becomes intricate and difficult for the physical laws cannot be exploited. In linguistics, in fact, there are two distinct empirical domains to explore: on the one hand, the formal domain of syntax, where different languages are compared trying to understand how much they can differ; on the other, the neurobiological domain, where the flow of information through the complex neural networks and the electric code exploited by neurons is uncovered and measured. By referring to the most advanced experiments in Neurolinguistics the book in fact offers an updated descriptions of modern linguistics and allows the reader to formulate new and surprising questions. Moreover, since syntax - the capacity to generate novel structures (sentences) by recombining a finite set of elements (words) - is the fingerprint of all and only human languages this books ultimately deals with the fundamental questions which characterize the search for our origins.


Author(s):  
J. G. Basterfield ◽  
L. M. Kelly

Suppose N is a set of points of a d-dimensional incidence space S and {Ha}, a ∈ I, a set of hyperplanes of S such that Hi ∈ {Ha} if and only if Hi ∩ N spans Hi. N is then said to determine {Ha}. We are interested here in the case in which N is a finite set of n points in S and I = {1, 2,…, n}; that is to say when a set of n points determines precisely n hyperplanes. Such a situation occurs in E3, for example, when N spans E3 and is a subset of two (skew) lines, or in E2 if N spans the space and n − 1 of the points are on a line. On the other hand, the n points of a finite projective space determine precisely n hyperplanes so that the structure of a set of n points determining n hyperplanes is not at once transparent.


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