scholarly journals Integrating Learning with Game Theory for Societal Challenges

Author(s):  
Fei Fang

Real-world problems often involve more than one decision makers, each with their own goals or preferences. While game theory is an established paradigm for reasoning strategic interactions between multiple decision-makers, its applicability in practice is often limited by the intractability of computing equilibria in large games, and the fact that the game parameters are sometimes unknown and the players are often not perfectly rational. On the other hand, machine learning and reinforcement learning have led to huge successes in various domains and can be leveraged to overcome the limitations of the game-theoretic analysis. In this paper, we introduce our work on integrating learning with computational game theory for addressing societal challenges such as security and sustainability.

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Li ◽  
Leyi Shi ◽  
Haijie Feng

A honeypot is a decoy tool for luring an attacker and interacting with it, further consuming its resources. Due to its fake property, a honeypot can be recognized by the adversary and loses its value. Honeypots equipped with dynamic characteristics are capable of deceiving intruders. However, most of their dynamic properties are reflected in the system configuration, rather than the location. Dynamic honeypots are faced with the risk of being identified and avoided. In this paper, we focus on the dynamic locations of honeypots and propose a distributed honeypot scheme. By periodically changing the services, the attacker cannot distinguish the real services from honeypots, and the illegal attack flow can be recognized. We adopt game theory to illustrate the effectiveness of our system. Gambit simulations are conducted to validate our proposed scheme. The game-theoretic reasoning shows that our system comprises an innovative system defense. Further simulation results prove that the proposed scheme improves the server’s payoff and that the attacker tends to abandon launching attacks. Therefore, the proposed distributed honeypot scheme is effective for network security.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 2597-2601
Author(s):  
Dan Li

The transfer and the management of the tacit knowledge is one of the most important issues in the knowledge transferring context to create organizational competitive advantage in the fast growing competitive world. As we know, organization tacit knowledge transferring is a dynamic game process, this research applies evolutionary game theory to analyze the tacit knowledge transferring activities among organizations and the stability balance issue in organization knowledge transferring. Based on the theory of games, this paper constructs the evolutionary game process model for organization tacit knowledge transferring. And through the equilibrium point of the model, the different knowledge transferring bodies game replicated dynamics and stability are analyzed. With this model, the reason why tacit knowledge is hard to be transferred and the path of tacit knowledge transferring is analyzed.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
GORDON R. MUNRO

ABSTRACTThis paper is not concerned with advances in game theory. Rather, the paper is concerned with the relevance, if any, of game theory to a major resource management issue, namely the management of internationally shared fishery resources. It is argued that the economics of the management of such resources cannot, in fact, be understood, other than through the lens of game theory. The paper discusses several elementary game theory concepts that are of utmost policy relevance, but which are, as of yet, poorly understood by most policy makers. The paper does, in addition, discuss a key policy problem in the management of shared fishery resources that demands a game-theoretic analysis. The required analysis, however, has yet to be developed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 317-320
Author(s):  
Kaushik Basu

The closing chapter of the book describes to two variants of the game of Sudoku that the author developed during his game theory lectures to undergraduates at Cornell University, Ithaca, USA. These two-player games, based on similar rules as Sudoku, are called Duidoku and Ultimate Duidoku. The chapter also contains a game-theoretic analysis of Ultimate Duidoku.


2011 ◽  
Vol 393-395 ◽  
pp. 1247-1250
Author(s):  
Yue Ying Lv

Ecological restoration is not only a natural process, but also economic process of inputs and outputs. In this paper, using game theory, we identify the potential outcome by the extent of restoration of ecosystem services and processes, hoping to further analysis of the effects of economic behaviors in ecological restoration process.


2014 ◽  
Vol 981 ◽  
pp. 209-212
Author(s):  
Qing Feng Zhang ◽  
Sheng Wang ◽  
Dan Liao

—This paper proposed an incentive mechanism of resource pricing and sharing to achieve the maximum of profits, which based on game theory. Firstly, we proved the Cournot equilibrium sharing within different price and cost functions to achieve the maximum profits. Secondly, we analyze and solve the Cournot equilibrium sharing, the unit profit and the total profits. Finally, simulation show that the proposed model relationships among the number of providers, different of price and cost functions, the maximum profits parameter, the unit profit and the total profits.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Takayuki Oishi

In practice, collusive bidders' rings in English auctions with a single object frequently distribute collusive gains among ring members via sequences of re-auctions called knockouts. The present paper introduces a model of sequences of knockouts under the situation in which each bidder has information on his evaluation and the order of the evaluations of all bidders for the object. The present paper examines the distributive function of sequences of knockouts from the viewpoint of cooperative game theory. Each sequence of knockouts yields an element of the core, two particular sequences yielding the Shapley value and the nucleolus respectively. The present paper highlights the sequence of knockouts yielding the nucleolus.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1016 ◽  
pp. 19-22
Author(s):  
Qi Yu Chen ◽  
Zhi Heng Wu ◽  
Liang Chuan Luo ◽  
Ji Gang Tong

As one of the new models of service of integrated manufacturing system, Cloud manufacturing (CM) is a service oriented, customer centric, demand driven manufacturing model.Application providers offer manufacturing services through the network, to make the cooperation among the participants of CM more effective. The behaviors of participants have great effect to the development of CM, especially in the beginning of its application.In this paper, we make analysis on interaction among all the participants of CM based on game theory, and give some suggestions to promote the application of CM.


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