scholarly journals SENGKETA EUROPEAN UNION DAN REPUBLIK INDONESIA PASAL 26 RED II DAN WTO

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (01) ◽  
pp. 59-80
Author(s):  
Steve Andrianto
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Gatt 1994

Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji apakah Pasal 26 RED II Uni Eropa yang memicu kontroversi dari Indonesia konsisten dengan Perjanjian WTO yang telah diratifikasi oleh Indonesia dan Uni Eropa pada tahun 1995. Kajian ini juga bertujuan untuk melihat tindakan apa saja yang dapat diambil Indonesia. sebagai negara anggota WTO berdasarkan Perjanjian WTO. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Pasal 26 RED II tidak sesuai dengan beberapa ketentuan dalam Perjanjian WTO, yaitu Pasal III GATT 1994, Pasal XI GATT 1994, dan Pasal XX GATT 1994. Sebagai anggota WTO, Indonesia di bawah Dispute Settlement Understanding of WTO dapat mengajukan pengaduan ke Dispute Settlement Body of WTO. Dalam hal Uni Eropa menolak untuk melaksanakan rekomendasi dari DSB, Indonesia dapat mengambil tindakan pembalasan.

EUROPEAN UNION IN WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (XX) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Małgorzata Czermińska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Trade Conflicts ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Descriptive Method

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as a forum for co-operation, currently for as many as 164 countries, and in addition, it allows for the resolution, also amicably, of trade conflicts between parties, consequently, settling disputes between them. One of essential provisions of the Uruguay Round (UR) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) included the introduction of a new dispute settlement mechanism, that is to say, the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which became effective on 1 January 1995. Member States of the European Union were not only actively involved in developing the rules of the international trade system, but they also influenced, to a large extent, the form of both such rules and of ongoing trade negotiations, as well as they assumed and still assume responsibility for the final arrangements. Hence, their role in the multilateral trade system is both active and passive. This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and show the role which the European Union serves in this system. The Article employs an analytical and descriptive method. It draws on sources from the national and international literature and WTO’s databases.

European Communities – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by China (EC–Fasteners (China) (Article 21.5–China), DS397)

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 703-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Carlson
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Antidumping Duties

This compliance proceeding under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) concerned measures taken by the European Union to implement the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in EC–Fasteners (China). In EC–Fasteners (China), the DSB found, inter alia, that a European Communities measure imposing definitive antidumping duties on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners from China was inconsistent with certain aspects of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA). The European Union's measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB consisted, inter alia, of an anti-dumping review investigation regarding fasteners from China (the Review Investigation) conducted by the Commission of the European Union (the Commission). The conduct of the Commission in the Review Investigation was the focus of this compliance proceeding.

Invocation of National Security Exceptions under GATT Article XXI: Jurisdiction to Review and Standard of Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 695-712
Author(s):  
Chao Wang
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
International Law ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Good Faith ◽  
The Self ◽  
Detailed Interpretation ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
In Transit ◽  
Gatt 1994

Abstract The invocation of national security exceptions under Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 has long been viewed as “self-judging”. In the landmark case of Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, the panel of the WTO’s dispute settlement body (DSB) addressed two important but previously considered ambiguous issues. First, the Panel confirmed its jurisdiction to review its members’ invocation of Article XXI of GATT 1994. Second, offering a detailed interpretation of Article XXI, especially paragraph (b) and its subparagraph (iii), the panel distinguished the objective requirements from the self-judging features, and held that it has the jurisdiction to determine whether the objective requirements of Article XXI have been satisfied when a member invokes the national security exception, and the member’s discretion is also expected to be limited by its good faith obligation, which, as an established principle of international law, shall apply to both the member’s definition of the essential security interests and its connection to the measures being taken.

From Washington with Love—Investor–State Arbitration and the Jurisdictional Monopoly of the Court of Justice of the European Union

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 425-453
Author(s):  
Philip Strik
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Forum Shopping ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Dispute ◽  
The Eu

AbstractWhile investor–State arbitration is to a large extent detached from the EU legal order, EU law has recently started to be invoked in investor-State arbitration proceedings. In the context of intra-EU bilateral investment treaties, the Commission has expressed the view that investor-State arbitration gives rise to a number of ‘arbitration risks’ for the EU legal order. Not only can it solicit investors to engage in forum-shopping, but it can also result in questions of EU law not being litigated in Member State or Union courts. This chapter explores the extent to which the compatibility of investor–State arbitration with the EU legal order is in issue. It examines the main features of investor-State arbitration as concerns its interplay with the EU legal order, as well as the Court of Justice’s case law on issues of compatibility between systems of international dispute settlement and the EU legal order. The chapter highlights that the way in which investor–State arbitral tribunals handle issues of EU law, as well as the involvement of interested parties, may foster the synergy between investor–State arbitration and the EU legal order.

scholarly journals Passive European Union Influence

2021 ◽  
pp. 134-157
Author(s):  
Tobias Lenz
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Statistical Association ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Primary Documents ◽  
National Governments

This chapter traces the European Union’s passive influence in the establishment of the Mercosur Permanent Review Tribunal in 2004. This is an useful case to study passive EU influence because the Tribunal’s establishment constitutes an unlikely case from the perspective of existing explanations of dispute settlement design and it is representative of a statistical association presented in Chapter 4. Through a detailed process tracing exercise that reconstructs the institutional preferences and strategies of national governments and the process of international bargaining on the basis of primary documents, interviews with policy-makers and secondary sources, it shows how the European Union, through its passive influence on the institutional preferences of Uruguay, the bloc’s smallest member state, shaped the design of the Tribunal. In the absence of passive EU influence, the chapter concludes, the Tribunal would have been less institutionalized.

7 Immunity, 7.8 Western European Union v Siedler, Belgian Court of Cassation, 21 December 2009

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schmitt Pierre
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
International Organization ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Reasonable Alternative ◽  
European Court ◽  
Alternative Means ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Settlement Mechanism

In this decision, the Belgian Court of Cassation adopted a far-reaching interpretation of the Waite and Kennedy jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and its ‘reasonable alternative means’ test to assess if the immunity of an international organization was permissible with regard to the protection of ECHR rights. Not only did the Court of Cassation verify the existence of an internal dispute-settlement mechanism within the WEU—the internal appeals commission—but it also examined its quality with regard to fair trail requirements. Pursuant this check, the Court considered that the commission was not sufficiently independent and consequently rejected the immunity of the organization. Moreover, the Court ruled that, in case of rejection of immunity, the internal law of the organization was to be applied to the dispute, as opposed to domestic law.

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