scholarly journals Innate mechanism or acquired instrument: nature of language as basis for understanding cognitive abilities of human beings

Author(s):  
O. V. Gorodovich ◽  

The article contains a critical review of modern problems of Universal Grammar theory by Noam Chomsky. It examines the origins of the theory, the process of its development, the transition to the ‘Second Cognitive Revolution’ and some recent objections to Chomsky’s hypothesis about the innate status of our knowledge of language.

My approach to the study of language is based on the assumption that knowledge of language can be properly characterized by means of a generative grammar, i.e. a system of rules and principles that assigns structural descriptions to linguistic expressions. On this view, the basic concepts are those of ‘grammar’ and ‘knowledge of grammar’. The concepts of language’ and ‘knowledge of language’ are derivative: they involve a higher level of abstraction from psychological mechanisms and raise additional (though not necessarily important) problems. Of central concern, from this point of view, will be to determine the biological endowment that makes it possible for a grammar of the required sort to develop in human beings provided that they are exposed to some appropriate body of experience. This biological endowment may be regarded as a function that maps a body of experience into a particular grammar. The function itself is commonly referred to as universal grammar (u.g.) and can be expressed, in part, as a system of principles that determine the class of accessible particular grammars and their properties. Recent work suggests that u.g. consists, on the one hand, of a theory of so-called core grammar and, on the other, of a theory of permissible extensions and modifications of core grammar. Given the intricate internal structure of u.g., it can account for the superficially highly diverse grammars and languages that do in fact exist. Thus, what appear to be quite different systems of knowledge may arise from relatively little experience. A number of subsystems of u.g. have now been explored, each with its distinctive properties and possibilities of variation. Some current proposals concerning these systems are sketched, and some consequences considered with regard to the nature and acquisition of cognitive systems (including systems of knowledge) more generally.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-315
Author(s):  
Halina Święczkowska ◽  
Beata Piecychna

Abstract The present study deals with the problem of the acquisition of language in children in the light of rationalist philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. The main objective of the paper is to present the way Gerauld de Cordemoy’s views on the nature of language, including its socio-linguistic aspects, and on the process of speech acquisition in children are reflected in contemporary writings on how people communicate with each other. Reflections on 17th-century rationalist philosophy of mind and the latest research conducted within the field of cognitive abilities of human beings indicate that between those two spheres many similarities could be discerned in terms of particular stages of the development of speech and its physical aspects.


2014 ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Binoy Barman

Noam Chomsky, one of the most famous linguists of the twentieth century, based his linguistic works on certain philosophical doctrines. His main contribution to linguistics is Transformational Generative Grammar, which is founded on mentalist philosophy. He opposes the behaviourist psychology in favour of innatism for explaining the acquisition of language. He claims that it becomes possible for human child to learn a language for the linguistic faculty with which the child is born, and that the use of language for an adult is mostly a mental exercise. His ideas brought about a revolution in linguistics, dubbed as Chomskyan Revolution. According to him, the part of language which is innate to human being would be called Universal Grammar. His philosophy holds a strong propensity to rationalism in search of a cognitive foundation. His theory is a continuation of analytic philosophy, which puts language in the centre of philosophical investigation. He would also be identified as an essentialist. This paper considers various aspects of Chomsky’s linguistic philosophy with necessary elaborations.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/pp.v51i1-2.17681


2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Berlinski ◽  
Juan Uriagereka

Jean-Roger Vergnaud’s famous 1977 letter to Noam Chomsky and Howard Lasnik assumed that case is obligatory. As Juan Uriagereka and David Berlinski argue, Vergnaud’s case filter was a vindication of the principles and parameters approach to language. Case is an aspect of Universal Grammar itself.


in a cognitive environment if the environment provides sufficient evidence for its adoption, and as we all know, mistaken assumptions are sometimes very well evidenced. Anything that can be seen at all is visible, but some things are much more visible than others. Similarly, we have defined ‘manifest’ so that any assumption that an individual is capable of constructing and accepting as true or probably true is manifest to him. We also want to say that manifest assumptions which are more likely to be entertained are more manifest. Which assumptions are more manifest to an individual during a given period or at a given moment is again a function of his physical environment on the one hand and his cognitive abilities on the other. Human cognitive organisation makes certain types of phenomena (i.e. perceptible objects or events) particularly salient. For instance, the noise of an explosion or a doorbell ringing is highly salient, a background buzz or a ticking clock much less so. When a phenomenon is noticed, some assumptions about it are standardly more accessible than others. In an environment where the doorbell has just rung, it will normally be strongly manifest that there is someone at the door, less strongly so that whoever is at the door is tall enough to reach the bell, and less strongly still that the bell has not been stolen. The most strongly manifest assumption of all is the assumption that the doorbell has just rung, the evidence for which is both salient and conclusive. We will have more to say, in chapter 3, about the factors which make some assumptions more manifest than others in a given situ-ation. For the moment it is the fact rather than the explanation that matters. Our notion of what is manifest to an individual is clearly weaker than the notion of what is actually known or assumed. A fact can be manifest without being known; all the individual’s actual assumptions are manifest to him, but many more assumptions which he has not actually made are manifest to him too. This is so however weakly the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘assumption’ are construed. In a strong sense, to know some fact involves having a mental representation of it. In a weaker sense, to say that an individual knows some fact is not necessarily to imply that he has ever entertained a mental representation of it. For instance, before read-ing this sentence you all knew, in that weak sense, that Noam Chomsky never had breakfast with Julius Caesar, although until now the thought of it had never crossed your mind. It is generally accepted that people have not only the know-ledge that they actually entertain, but also the knowledge that they are capable of deducing from the knowledge that they entertain. However, something can be manifest without being known, even in this virtual way, if only because some-thing can be manifest and false, whereas nothing can be known and false. Can something be manifest without being actually assumed? The answer must again be yes. Assumptions are unlike knowledge in that they need not be true. As with knowledge, people can be said to assume, in a weak sense, what they are capable of deducing from what they assume. However, people do not assume, in any sense, what they are merely capable of inferring non-demonstratively – that is, by some creative process of hypothesis formation and confirmation – from what they assume. Although it presumably followed non-demonstratively from what you

2005 ◽  
pp. 147-147

Author(s):  
Maria-Teresa Guasti

Humans acquire language naturally, namely without specific instruction, by being exposed to it and by interacting with other human beings. According to the generativist enterprise, humans are endowed with a system of knowledge on the form of possible human languages (Universal Grammar). Evidence consistent with this assumption is provided in the chapter, by illustrating crucial phenomena ranging from the acquisition of phonology, to morphosyntax, syntax, formal semantics, and pragmatics. Infants’ brain organization is tuned to speech stimuli and presents left hemisphere specialization, from the first days of life, if not already in the mother’s womb. Infants set apart languages at two days of age, based on durational or rhythmic properties. Toddlers combine words by respecting the basic word order and are very sensitive to the hierarchical organization of sentences, both when it comes to the syntactic structure and when it comes to the interpretation of sentences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
YOSEP SETIAWAN

Educational institution is an institution of the brain industry. Therefore, education is a vehicle for mental exercise. With education will be able to sharpen the brain to form human beings quality. Qualified people are intelligent human beings comprehensive and competitive savvy are reflected in personal moral, creative, and productive and full responsibility in living our daily lives. But the spotlight and complaints against educational institutions still occur, various perceived problems among students learn the lower interest. Students tend to subjects who tested nationally (National Examination), the methods used by teachers in teaching the more commonly used methods of lecture and question and answer, sometimes the discussion so that the lessons seem monotonous and less innovative, subjects received more students cederung nature doctrine in the form of memorization alone and rarely developed in the context of everyday life so that lessons just more leads to mastery of concepts and tend to train cognitive abilities-intellectual, not a lot of touching the realm of other intelligence in accordance with the potential of the students. The other problem is the tendency of the still rampant behavior is not commendable at this time in various forms, for example, students commit suicide because they do not pass the exam, involved in drugs, fighting between students, the behavior of cheating, careless, style punky, smoking, going out, and so become a reason for choosing this topic as study materials. The problem is what strengthens the belief writers to examine and assess the importance of the development of multiple intelligence through integrative learning-based game in an attempt to develop students' potential intelligence to realize a comprehensive and intelligent smart students competitive. This paper formulated into some discussion that begins with an introduction that lists reasons for the importance of this issue is discussed, and then forwarded to the review of the concept of multiple intelligence. Followed by a study on the definition, purpose and benefits of the games, the development of multiple intelligence through integrative learning-based games and ending with examples of games in integrative learning process.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-498
Author(s):  
Jongkuk NAM

This article aims to critically review de Mussis’s report of the events at Caffa. De Mussi says in his account that Tartars catapulted their dead compatriots infected by the plague into the besieged city of Caffa in order to contaminate the Genoese defending the city and that some Genoese galleys fleeing from the city transported the disease to Western Europe. Some historians interpret his report of Tartars catapulting plague-infected bodies as an act of biological warfare, and others do not trust his account as a reliable historical record, while some works rely on his account, even though they do not interpret it as evidence of biological warfare. This article tries to determine whether his account is true or not, and explain historical contexts in which it was made. De Mussi was not an eye-witness of the war between the Tartars and the Genoese in the years of 1343 to 1437 in Caffa, contrary to some historians’ arguments that he was present there during the war. In addition, he understands and explains the disease from a religious perspective as does most of his contemporary Christians, believing that the disease was God's punishment for the sins of human beings. His account of the Tartars catapulting their compatriot’s bodies may derive from his fear and hostility against the Tartars, thinking that they were devils from hell and pagans to be annihilated. For de Mussi, the Genoese may have been greedy merchants who were providing Muslims with slaves and enforcing their military forces. Therefore, he thought that the Tartars and the Genoese were sinners that spread the disease, and that God punished their arrogance. His pathological knowledge of the disease was not accurate and very limited. His medical explanation was based on humoral theory and Miasma theory that Christians and Muslims in the Mediterranean World shared. De Mussi's account that Caffa was a principal starting point for the disease to spread to Western Europe is not sufficiently supported by other contemporary documents. Byzantine chronicles and Villani's chronicle consider not Caffa but Tana as a starting point. In conclusion, most of his account of the disease are not true. However, we can not say that he did not intentionally lie, and we may draw a conclusion that his explanation was made under scientific limits and religious prejudice or intolerance of the medieval Christian world.


What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading? These and other questions are addressed in this volume by leading cognitive scientists as they examine the work of one of cognitive science’s most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor. Newly commissioned chapters by Noam Chomsky, Tom Bever, Merrill Garrett, Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Zenon Pylyshyn, Janet Fodor, Randy C. Gallistel, Ernie Lepore, Mary C. Potter, Lila R. Gleitman, and others, put in perspective Fodor’s contribution to cognitive science by focusing on three main themes: the nature of concepts, the modularity of language and vision, and the language of thought. This is a one-of-a-kind series of essays on cognitive science and on Fodor. In this volume, Chomsky contrasts his view of modularity with that of Fodor’s; Bever discusses the nature of consciousness, particularly regarding language perception; Garrett reassesses his view of modularity in language production; Pylyshyn presents his view of the connection between visual perception and conceptual attainment; Gallistel proposes what the biological bases of the computational theory of mind might be; and Piattelli-Palmarini discusses Fodor’s views on conceptual nativism. These and many other key figures of cognitive science are brought together, for the first time, to discuss their work in relation to that of Fodor’s, who is responsible for advancing many of cognitive science’s most important hypotheses. This volume—for students and advanced researchers of cognitive science—is bound to become one of the classics in the field.


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