scholarly journals How is Privacy perceived in German Police Law?

MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Bradtke

By December 2018, Germany’s biggest state, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) introduced its revised police law (PolG NRW). The PolG NRW enables previously forbidden surveillance practices to combat terrorism in Germany. Discussion surrounding the PolG NRW revolved around surveillance practices enabled through the law. By using a privacy taxonomy, developed by Daniel J. Solove (2010) this thesis has categorised, analysed and evaluated six sections of the PolG NRW with regards to infringements upon privacy. This thesis (1) identifies potentially harmful activities for personal privacy within the PolG NRW and (2) chases back shortcomings to an incomplete understanding of privacy. Thereby, this thesis suggests that future policy crafting must consider processes that follow the collection of information as potentially harmful activities. By limiting privacy risks to information gathering, activities that belong to information processing and distribution remain largely unregulated, putting the individual at serious risk.

MaRBLe ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Bradtke

By December 2018, Germany’s biggest state, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) introduced its revised police law (PolG NRW). The PolG NRW enables previously forbidden surveillance practices to combat terrorism in Germany. Discussion surrounding the PolG NRW revolved around surveillance practices enabled through the law. By using a privacy taxonomy, developed by Daniel J. Solove (2010) this thesis has categorised, analysed and evaluated six sections of the PolG NRW with regards to infringements upon privacy. This thesis (1) identifies potentially harmful activities for personal privacy within the PolG NRW and (2) chases back shortcomings to an incomplete understanding of privacy. Thereby, this thesis suggests that future policy crafting must consider processes that follow the collection of information as potentially harmful activities. By limiting privacy risks to information gathering, activities that belong to information processing and distribution remain largely unregulated, putting the individual at serious risk.


1977 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 112-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. O. Köhler ◽  
G. Wagner ◽  
U. Wolber

The entire field of information processing in medicine is today already spread out and branched to such an extent that it is no longer possible to set up a survey on relevant literature as a whole. But even in narrow parts of medical informatics it is hardly possible for the individual scientist to keep up to date with new literature. Strictly defined special bibliographies on certain topics are most helpful.In our days, problems of optimal patient scheduling and exploitation of resources are gaining more and more importance. Scientists are working on the solution of these problems in many places.The bibliography on »Patient Scheduling« presented here contains but a few basic theoretical papers on the problem of waiting queues which are of importance in the area of medical care. Most of the papers cited are concerned with practical approaches to a solution and describe current systems in medicine.In listing the literature, we were assisted by Mrs. Wieland, Mr. Dusberger and Mr. Henn, in data acquisition and computer handling by Mrs. Gieß and Mr. Schlaefer. We wish to thank all those mentioned for their assistance.


Law and World ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-144

The Article concerns the legal issues, connected with the situation, when a person (or group of people) disobey requirements of the Law or other State regulations on the basis of religious or nonreligious belief. The Author analyses almost all related issues – whether imposing certain obligation on individuals, to which the individual has a conscientious objection based on his/her religious beliefs, always represents interference with his/her religion rights, and if it does, then what is subject of the interference – forum integrum or forum externum; whether neutral regulation, which does not refer to religion issues at all, could ever be regarded as interference into someone’s religious rights; whether opinion or belief, on which the individual’s objection and the corresponding conduct is based, must necesserily represent the clear “manifest” of the same religion or belief in order to gain legal protection; what is regarded as “manifest” of the religion or other belief in general and whether a close and direct link must exist between personal conduct and requirements of the religious or nonreligious belief; what are the criteria of the “legitimacy” of the belief; to what extent the following factors should be taken into consideration : whether the personal conduct of the individual represents the official requirements of corresponding religion or belief, what is the burden which was imposed on the believer’s religious or moral feelings by the State regulation, also, proportionality and degree of sincerity of the individual who thinks that his disobidience to the Law is required by his/her religious of philosofical belief. The effects (direct or non direct) of the nonfulfilment of the law requirement (legal responsibility, lost of the job, certain discomfort, etc..) are relevant factors as well. By the Author, all these circumstances and factors are essencial while estimating, whether it arises, actually, a real necessity and relevant obligation before a state for making some exemptions from the law to the benefi t of the conscientious objectors, in cases, if to predict such an objection was possible at all. So, the issues are discussed in the prism of the negative and positive obligations of a State. Corresponding precedents of the US Supreme Court and European Human Rights Court have been presented and analysed comparatively by the Author in the Article. The Article contains an important resume, in which the main points, principal issues and conclusion remarks are delivered. The Author shows, that due analysis of the legal aspects typical to “Conscientious objection” is very important for deep understanding religious rights, not absolute ones, and facilitates finding a correct answer on the question – how far do their boundaries go?


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


2021 ◽  
pp. 016344372110158
Author(s):  
Opeyemi Akanbi

Moving beyond the current focus on the individual as the unit of analysis in the privacy paradox, this article examines the misalignment between privacy attitudes and online behaviors at the level of society as a collective. I draw on Facebook’s market performance to show how despite concerns about privacy, market structures drive user, advertiser and investor behaviors to continue to reward corporate owners of social media platforms. In this market-oriented analysis, I introduce the metaphor of elasticity to capture the responsiveness of demand for social media to the data (price) charged by social media companies. Overall, this article positions social media as inelastic, relative to privacy costs; highlights the role of the social collective in the privacy crises; and ultimately underscores the need for structural interventions in addressing privacy risks.


1917 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emile Boutroux
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

2007 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 380-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura H. Korobkin

This essay investigates Harriet Beecher Stowe's interpolation of State v. Mann, a harsh 1829 North Carolina proslavery decision, into her 1856 novel Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp. The essay argues that Stowe's use of State v. Mann continues a conversation about slavery that had been carried on through its text for many years in abolitionist writings. Bringing State v. Mann's circulation history into view shows Stowe engaging the antislavery establishment as well as the legal system, borrowing and imitating its techniques for handling proslavery materials. If her novel is infiltrated and structured by the many legal writings that it assimilates, its fictive world in turn infiltrates, interprets, and alters the significance of the writings she employs, so that proslavery legal writings are made to testify strongly against the slave system that they originally worked to maintain and enforce. Stowe's hybrid text dominates the law while smoothly assimilating it into an interpretive fictive context. Simultaneously, Stowe's typographical cues remind readers of State v. Mann's ongoing, destructive extratextual legal existence. By linking fictive context to legal content, Stowe's novel suggests that slave law must be read and interpreted as a unit that includes the individual suffering it imposes. Misreading State v. Mann as revealing its author's belief in the immorality of slavery, Stowe constructs a fictional judge who upholds slave law despite his personal beliefs. By absorbing, imitating, and besting the strategies and the reach of both legal and abolitionist writings, Dred implicitly stakes a claim for the superior power of political fiction to act in the world.


Author(s):  
Jessica Lake

This chapter examines cases in which a right to privacy was invoked by women to protest against violations of their bodies or the bodies of their newborn babies. This chapter offers a history of the right to privacy that charts the ways in which the law traditionally “protected” women’s bodies by treating them as male property and confining them to the home. The advent of the camera, its ability to penetrate physical and temporal boundaries, and its creation of movable as well as moving images, brought into question the efficacy of laws such as trespass and nuisance (grounded in physical structures) to protect personal privacy. To highlight the new invasions inflicted by the camera, I compare the cases of DeMay v Roberts and Feeney v Young, which involved the optic violation of a woman’s reproductive body by a stranger’s eyes and a camera respectively. Using a series of medical cases, I argue that many women invoked a right to privacy to protest against the transformation of their bodies (and the bodies of their dead deformed infants) into voyeuristic spectacles of “monstrosity”.


Author(s):  
Steve Cornelius

Our modern society has become transfixed with celebrity. Business people and marketers also endeavour to cash in on the popularity enjoyed by the stars and realise the value of associating merchandise or trademarks with the rich and famous. This leads to difficulties when the attributes of a person are apparently used without consent, which poses new questions to the law: should the law protect the individual against the unlawful use of his or her image? If so, to what extent should such protection be granted? These were some of the questions which the court had to answer in Wells v Atoll Media (Pty). The judgment in Wellshas redefined the right to identity and provided some clarity on what the infringement of that right would amount to. When the attributes of a person are used without consent, the right to identity can be violated in one of four ways. A person's right to identity can be infringed upon if the attributes of that person are used without permission in a way which cannot be reconciled with the true image of the individual concerned, if the use amounts to the commercial exploitation of the individual, if it cannot be reconciled with generally accepted norms of decency, or if it violates the privacy of that person.


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