Advances in Research on the Model of Intuitive Morality and Exemplars (MIME)

Author(s):  
Allison Eden ◽  
Ron Tamborini ◽  
Melinda Aley ◽  
Henry Goble

This chapter describes the model of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), which examines connections between moral judgment and exposure to narrative media. The MIME explicates distinct, a priori–defined domains of moral intuitions that cut across cultural boundaries and identifies underlying processes that shape related social perceptions to describe how media and moral judgment are intertwined. The model’s dual-process perspective suggests some moral judgments are determined by quick gut reflexes and others by reflective deliberation. The MIME’s multistage process contains short-term and long-term components. The short-term component describes how exemplars that prime moral intuitions affect the appraisal of media content, which then prompts selective exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions. The long-term component describes how aggregate patterns of exposure to media that upholds primed intuitions encourages further (mass) production of content featuring those intuitions. This reciprocal process describes how media systems and audiences influence the salience of one another’s moral intuitions.

1969 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-169
Author(s):  
Andrés Dapuez

Latin American cash transfer programs have been implemented aiming at particular anticipatory scenarios. Given that the fulfillment of cash transfer objectives can be calculated neither empirically nor rationally a priori, I analyse these programs in this article using the concept of an “imaginary future.” I posit that cash transfer implementers in Latin America have entertained three main fictional expectations: social pacification in the short term, market inclusion in the long term, and the construction of a more distributive society in the very long term. I classify and date these developing expectations into three waves of conditional cash transfers implementation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 353-358
Author(s):  
Anjali Dhanda, MD ◽  
Edwin A. Salsitz, MD, DFASAM

Objective: Studies dating back to 1964 consistently support the effectiveness of methadone as a maintenance treatment for opioid use disorder (OUD), and since 2003, the effectiveness of buprenorphine. Short-term detoxification has not proven to be an effective treatment, as it results in high relapse rates when compared with maintenance treatment with an opioid agonist therapy (OAT). The question about the duration of maintenance treatment for OUD has been debated with recommendations ranging from a minimum of 1 year, 2 years, to indefinitely. Other factors such as misconceptions, regulations, and insurance barriers also have an impact on the duration dilemma of OAT.Design: There were no a priori criteria for article inclusion and this is not a structured literature review. It is a review of articles of convenience from 1964 to 2018.Main outcome measure: This paper aims to address the dilemma of the ideal duration of OAT and to discuss the factors that could affect this decision.Results: Sustained OAT has had significantly better long-term outcomes than short-term detoxification or time limited maintenance. Optimal outcomes are dependent on adequate treatment duration.Conclusions: Addiction is a chronic brain disease and its treatment should be similar to the treatment of other chronic medical and psychiatric diseases. Long-term, sometimes lifetime, continuation of OAT for the treatment of OUD results in optimal outcomes when measuring morbidity and mortality. The accumulated evidence does not support any arbitrary limitation to the duration of OAT. 


Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.


Author(s):  
Soham Bandyopadhyay ◽  
Ioannis Georgiou ◽  
Bibire Baykeens ◽  
Conor S Gillespie ◽  
Marta de Andres Crespo ◽  
...  

Abstract Background:Currently, we can only speculate on what the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have been on medical students and interim foundation year doctors. In order to support them appropriately both now and, in the future, it is imperative that we understand the impact it has had upon them. This study assessed the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on medical students and interim foundation year doctors across the United Kingdom (UK), and the support that they received and sought. Methods:A prospective, observational, multicentre study was conducted. All medical students and interim foundation year doctors were eligible to participate. The data analysis was carried out as detailed a priori in the protocol. Findings:A total of 2075 individuals participated in the SPICE-19 survey from 33 medical schools. There was a significant (p < 0.0001) decrease in participants’ mood when comparing their mood before the pandemic to during the pandemic. Social distancing and more time at home/with family were the factors that negatively and positively respectively impacted the mood of the greatest number of participants. All areas of life included in the survey were found to have been significantly more negatively impacted than positively impacted (p < 0.0001). 931 participants wanted more support from their university. Participants were mainly seeking support with exam preparation, course material, and financial guidance. Discussion:Medical and foundation schools need to prepare adequate and effective support. If no action is taken, there may be a knock-on effect on workforce planning and the health of our future workforce. When medical students return to their universities, there is likely to be need for enhanced wellbeing support, adaptations in the short-term and long-term strategies for medical education, and provision of financial guidance.


2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Christensen ◽  
David Rees ◽  
Jeff Barnes

Recent highly-publicized scandals involving accounting ethical failures have renewed recommendations to include ethics education in the accounting curriculum. Hundreds of studies confirm that the ability of students to recognize ethical dilemmas and make moral judgments improves during the college years. However, pre-existing conditions that may influence the improvement are unclear. Using a pretest-posttest control group design and a survey instrument of 25 ethics vignettes, we measured the effect of ethics education on the moral judgment of 81 accounting students over one semester. Results showed that the effectiveness of short-term accounting ethics education is influenced by prior participation in church and service activities. Students with participation showed significant improvement in moral judgment; students without participation did not improve. These results suggest that accounting students with prior church and service activities are more likely to be influenced by ethics education.


1974 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 939-945 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Rywick ◽  
Paul Schave

Based on a dual-process theory of memory, it was hypothesized that the primacy effects often observed in impression-formation studies are due to a reliance on information in long-term, as opposed to short-term, memory storage. Variables which have been shown to affect either long-term or short-term memory were therefore manipulated in two impression-formation experiments. It was found that a delay following stimulus presentation (which reduces short-term memory) had no effect on impressions while inclusion of an irrelevant task during stimulus presentation (which reduces long-term memory) significantly reduced the degree of impression primacy.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Hanno Sauer

The field of moral psychology has become increasingly popular in recent years. In this chapter, we focus on two interrelated questions. First, how do peoplemake moral judgments? We address this question by reviewing the most prominent theories in moral psychology that aim to characterize, explain and predict people’s moral judgments. Second, how should people’s moral judgments be evaluated in terms of their rationality? This question is approached by reviewing the debate on the rationality of moral judgments and moral intuitions, which has been strongly influenced by findings in moral psychology but also by recent advances in learning theory. To appear in: Knauff, M. &amp; Spohn, W. (in press). The Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léo Fitouchi ◽  
Jean-Baptiste André ◽  
Nicolas Baumard

Why do many human societies condemn apparently harmless and pleasurable behaviors, such as lust, gluttony, drinking, drugs, gambling, or even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, hedonic restraint, sobriety, decency and piety as cardinal moral virtues? While existing accounts consider this puritanical morality as an exception to the cooperative function of moral intuitions, we propose that it stems, like other moral concerns, from moral intuitions targeting cooperative challenges. Specifically, we argue that it emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that the latter is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn and praise behaviors which, although not intrinsically cooperative or uncooperative, are perceived as affecting people’s propensity to cooperate, by modifying their ability to resist short-term impulses conflicting with cooperative motivations. Drinking, drugs, unruly feasts, dances, and immodest clothing are condemned as stimulating people’s short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g. adultery, violence, economic free-riding). Immoderate indulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g. lust, masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as addictively reinforcing short-term impulses, thus making harder the self-control of future temptations to cheat. Moralizations of ascetic temperance, daily self-discipline, and pious ritual observance are perceived as nurturing the self-restraint consubstantial to a cooperative character, able to resist selfish temptations when the latter arise. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account, and discuss its implications regarding the cross-cultural variations and cultural evolution of puritanical norms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 340-341
Author(s):  
Min Ju Kang ◽  
Michael Glassman

AbstractIn this commentary we explore Knobe's ideas of moral judgments leading to moral intuitions in the context of the moral thought and moral action debate. We suggest that Knobe's primary moral judgment and the setting of a continuum with a default point is in essence a form of cultural capital, different from moral action, which is more akin to social capital.


2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bertram F. Malle

Research on morality has increased rapidly over the past 10 years. At the center of this research are moral judgments—evaluative judgments that a perceiver makes in response to a moral norm violation. But there is substantial diversity in what has been called moral judgment. This article offers a framework that distinguishes, theoretically and empirically, four classes of moral judgment: evaluations, norm judgments, moral wrongness judgments, and blame judgments. These judgments differ in their typical objects, the information they process, their speed, and their social functions. The framework presented here organizes the extensive literature and provides fresh perspectives on measurement, the nature of moral intuitions, the status of moral dumbfounding, and the prospects of dual-process models of moral judgment. It also identifies omitted questions and sets the stage for a broader theory of moral judgment, which the coming decades may bring forth.


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