Mandatory Dividend Policy, Growth, Liquidity and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Chile

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (03) ◽  
pp. 2050025 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sakthi Mahenthiran ◽  
David Cademartori ◽  
Tom Gjerde
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
American Economic Review ◽  
Market Liquidity ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Dividend Smoothing ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Pros And Cons ◽  
Retained Earnings

Chilean publicly listed companies are required by law to pay out a minimum 30% of distributable earnings after taxes as dividends on common stock. The study extends Lintner’s [Lintner, J (1956). Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividend retained earnings and taxes. American Economic Review, 46, 97–113.] model of dividend smoothing and Banerjee [Banerjee, S, VA Gatchev and PA Spindt (2007). Stock market liquidity and firm dividend policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 42(2), 369–398.] logistic model of the likelihood of a firm paying a dividend to investigate the signaling, liquidity, corporate governance, and information risk-based theories of dividends. The results show that Chilean firms’ excess dividends are smoothed in relation to the prior period level of excess dividends, and lagged earnings do not drive excess dividends even though the mandatory minimum dividend is defined in terms of lagged earnings. This insight establishes that dividend decisions regarding the size of the excess dividend and the likelihood of paying an excess dividend are distinct from the mandatory dividend payment. Additionally, the size of excess dividends and their likelihood are higher at firms with higher growth opportunities, a result consistent with the use of excess dividends as a signaling device. Results also demonstrate that greater transparency is associated with a greater likelihood of paying an excess dividend, but transparency does not drive policy regarding the size of the excess dividend. Moreover, the corporate governance mechanism creditor monitoring influences the size of excess dividends but not the likelihood of paying excess dividends. These results have implications for securities regulators evaluating the pros and cons of a mandatory dividend policy to protect minority shareholders in emerging markets.

Board Effectiveness: An Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Score

Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Performance Orientation ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Ethical Governance

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.

scholarly journals The Effect of the Board Composition on Dividends: The Case of Brazilian and Chilean Family Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-60
Author(s):  
Guadalupe C. Briano-Turrent ◽  
Karen Watkins-Fassler ◽  
Martha L. Puente-Esparza
Keyword(s):  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
The Family ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Based on the agency theory, this paper analyzes whether family firms pay more dividends compared to no-family firms and identifies whether the board composition affects the dividend policy. Brazil and Chile have established mandatory dividends, retain lower cash holdings, pay higher dividends compared with other markets in the region. The sample of study is composed by 853 observations from 49 Brazilian and 32 Chilean top publicly listed firms in terms of market capitalization over the 11-year period from 2004 to 2014. Using an unbalanced panel data, results indicate that family controlled firms distribute more dividends and board composition namely; board size and the proportion of women on the board have a significant and positive impact on the dividend policy of the firm. By contrast, COB-CEO duality has a negative effect. Thus, dividend policy constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism in mitigating the family’ expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth.

Agency Costs of Controlling Shareholders' Share Collateral with Taiwan Evidence

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anlin Chen ◽  
Lanfeng Kao ◽  
Yi-Kai Chen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Legal Regulation ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

Controlling shareholders' share collateral is a new source of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights leading to minority shareholder expropriation. However, controlling shareholders' share collateral is not forbidden and has not received particular restriction leading to its popularity in the capital markets. Neglecting the potential agency costs resulting from controlling shareholders' share collateral would hurt the interests of creditors and minority shareholders. We need legal regulation on controlling shareholders' share collateral to reinforce corporate governance mechanism to protect the interests of creditors and minority shareholders.

scholarly journals DEBT POLICY AS CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM IN CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mutamimah .
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Empirical Examination ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
Debt Policy ◽  
Market Indicator

This research aims to test the debt policy as a mechanism to reduce agency conflict among majority and minority shareholders. This test aims to answer the problems to what extend debt can be used as corporate governance mechanism in a sense of reducing agency conflict. This research is important since most of company ownership structure in Indonesia is categorized concentrated structure, where its make a conflict between majority and minority shareholders. The populations of the research are companies that go public in the Indonesian capital market until the year of 2003. These samples of this research consist of 40 companies that are selected based on nonprobability technique with purposive sampling method. They were divided into two groups, high concentrated ownership structure and low concentrated ownership structure. In processes testing the hypothesis, 2 indicators were used, i.e. market indicator and accounting indicator. Event study analysis was used for market indicator, whereas multiple regression analysis was used for accounting indicator. Based on empirical examination result, it is generally concluded that debt policy cannot be used as mechanism to reduce agency conflict among majority and minority shareholders, both at high and low concentrated ownership structure. This is because of average company debt are higher than average industry debt. Debt policy tend be used as a tool of expropriation to minority shareholders. The expropriation is higher at high concentrated ownership structure rather than at low concentrated ownership structure and the difference is significant.

Board Effectiveness: An Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Score

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Sustainable Growth ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Performance Orientation ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Ethical Governance

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.

scholarly journals PENGARUH MEKANISME CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN UKURAN PERUSAHAAN TERHADAP KINERJA KEUANGAN (Survei Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI )

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 010-031
Author(s):  
Animah Animah ◽  
Lukman Effendy ◽  
Alamsyah M. Thahir ◽  
Erna Widiastuty
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Performance ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Sampling Technique ◽  
Partial Least Square ◽  
Least Square ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms,  firm size of financial performance. The Population of this research is the company manufacturing  in BEI. The sampling technique used is purposive sampling. The analytical tool used is using partial least  square program. The independent variables in this research are corporate governance mechanism,  firm size  while the dependent variable is the performance of the financial. The result of the research shows that firm size  influence to financial performance, while other variables such as corporate governance mechanisms have no effect negative  to financial performance.

scholarly journals Impact of corporate governance index on firm performance: evidence from Pakistani manufacturing sector

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 163-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faisal Javaid
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Inconsistent Result ◽  
Governance Index ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Relationship

Corporate governance is considered to have significant impact on the growth and development perspective of an economy. Sound corporate governance practices leads the economy towards the achievement of higher performance, provide sources for capital investment by increasing the creditability of shareholders. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance in terms of accounting as well as market performance i.e.to be measured by Return on asset, Return on equity and Tobin’s Q. The theoretical base to conduct the study is the demand of separation of ownership and control characterize as agency theory. The previous studies have yielded inconsistent result. To achieve the purpose 58 textile sector companies were selected listed in the Karachi stock exchange and data was taken from annual reports of the companies for the period of 2009 to 2013. Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression estimation using pooled, fixed effect, random effect and Hausman specification test were carried out after developing a composite index based on 21 proxies. The result entails that corporate governance index (CGI) and firm performance has positive and significant association but the relationship for each specific index is dependent upon the measure of firm performance. The result also shows that companies having strong corporate governance mechanism has greater chances to acquire finance. The implication of study demands that the reform effort should be directed towards the improvement in internal corporate governance mechanism and regulatory framework for the governance system.

scholarly journals Corporate governance mechanism and performance of insurers in Pakistan

Green Finance ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 243-262
Author(s):  
Muhammad Junaid ◽  
◽  
Ye Xue ◽  
Muzzammil Wasim Syed ◽  
Muhammad Ziaullah ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
And Performance

Investor protection: effects of takeover convergence

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jyoti Dixit ◽  
Poonam Singh ◽  
Arunima Haldar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Emerging Economy ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Global Standards ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism

Purpose Takeovers play a critical role as an external corporate governance mechanism to ensure investor protection. There is a long-standing debate on whether the convergence of corporate governance to global standards can enable emerging economies to ensure investor protection. This paper aims to analyse the evolution of the takeover code, namely, Securities Exchange Board of India’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers (2011) in India from the lens of investor protection. It then compares the takeover provisions in India, the USA, the UK, Singapore and Australia to examine the extent of convergence and its implications for investor protection. Design/methodology/approach Using a cross-national comparative analysis of takeover mechanisms in common law countries, the study analyses the extent and relevance of convergence in form. The focus of the comparison is on regulations governing offer size, offer price, creeping acquisition and initial trigger limit for the mandatory open offer. Findings The findings suggest that certain provisions such as the initial trigger threshold for the mandatory offer and the offer prices of the Indian takeover code are converging with the standards in common law countries. However, the offer price determination based on market prices may not reflect true market value in an inefficient market like India. Other provisions such as creeping acquisition and offer size are not only diverging from the international standards but are also inconsistent with the key objective of investor protections of the Indian regulator. Research limitations/implications Indian takeover regulation needs to converge to higher global standards to ensure adherence to improved investor protection. This needs to be done for the initial trigger limit for mandatory bid and offer prices, after accounting for the differences in institutional structure. The Indian regulators need to revisit provisions on the initial trigger, creeping acquisition to converge to the broader principle of investor protection. Originality/value This technical paper provides a comprehensive depiction of takeover mechanisms in an emerging economy context as a means of investor protection. Further using a comparative lens, it analyses the relevance of convergence of takeover laws. Thus, advances the theoretical knowledge of limited extant work on external corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy context.

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