scholarly journals Examining defences to state-sponsored cyber-operations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Hadeel Salman

<p>In recent years there has been a rise in state-sponsored cyberattacks. There is a continuing debate among scholars, states and international institutions on how the UN Charter can apply to cyber-operations. My dissertation seeks to understand how the UN Charter can apply and what are the appropriate responses open to victim states that have been subject to a cyberattack. More specifically, the dissertation will outline the conditions required to satisfy a state’s right to self-defence in cyberspace and note the limitations of responding to a state-sponsored cyberattack. It will highlight possible reforms and standards required to address the emerging threat of cyberspace. The dissertation is particularly concerned with cyberspace in the context of jus ad bellum. It will not discuss the notion of cyberwar or the principles of jus ad bello.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hadeel Salman

<p>In recent years there has been a rise in state-sponsored cyberattacks. There is a continuing debate among scholars, states and international institutions on how the UN Charter can apply to cyber-operations. My dissertation seeks to understand how the UN Charter can apply and what are the appropriate responses open to victim states that have been subject to a cyberattack. More specifically, the dissertation will outline the conditions required to satisfy a state’s right to self-defence in cyberspace and note the limitations of responding to a state-sponsored cyberattack. It will highlight possible reforms and standards required to address the emerging threat of cyberspace. The dissertation is particularly concerned with cyberspace in the context of jus ad bellum. It will not discuss the notion of cyberwar or the principles of jus ad bello.</p>


2015 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A. Green ◽  
Christopher P.M. Waters

For self-defence actions to be lawful, they must be directed at military targets. The absolute prohibition on non-military targeting under the jus in bello is well known, but the jus ad bellum also limits the target selection of states conducting defensive operations. Restrictions on targeting form a key aspect of the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. In most situations, the jus in bello will be the starting point for the definition of a military targeting rule. Yet it has been argued that there may be circumstances when the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello do not temporally or substantively overlap in situations of self-defence. In order to address any possible gaps in civilian protection, and to bring conceptual clarity to one particular dimension of the relationship between the two regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between the two ‘war law’ regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war.


Author(s):  
Isabel V. Hull

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.


Author(s):  
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

This chapter examines the rules and principles that govern a naval or aerial blockade or some other form of interference with foreign vessels and aircraft in the absence of an explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. After clarifying the concept of blockade under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, it considers blockades authorized as military enforcement measures. It also discusses some unresolved or even contested issues regarding the legality of blockades, with reference to blockades in situations other than international armed conflict and the principle of proportionality in relation to humanity. The scope of interdiction operations and its legal bases under international treaties are analysed next, together with maritime interdiction operations and the applicability of prize law during non-international armed conflicts. Finally, the chapter explores the right of individual or collective self-defence as a basis for interdiction operations.


Author(s):  
Michael Glennon

This chapter examines the limitations of traditional rules and institutions with respect to the use of force. It considers international cooperation in managing the use of force, and whether and when the use of force is justified, within the framework of the jus ad bellum. The chapter discusses three factors that help to explain why the rules and institutions that regulate the use of force have not been effective. First is the weakness of international law’s secondary rules concerning consent, obligation, and causation. Second is the weaknesses in the UN Charter rules due to deficiencies in the wording of the rules themselves, especially with regard to pre-emptive self-defence. Third is the weakness in compliance resulting from the UN Security Council’s dysfunctionality, in part due to the UN’s professed reliance upon the principle of sovereign equality.


Author(s):  
Joerg Kammerhofer

This chapter examines the resilience of the treaty, and perhaps also customary, law on self-defence since 2001. It first considers ‘resilience’ in the context of the jus ad bellum and how law can be resilient vis-à-vis changing circumstance, opinions, interpretation, and state practice. It then looks at the indicators for and against resilience by analysing post-2001 developments, paying particular attention to three areas: jurisprudence, scholarly literature in international law, and state and institutional practice. The chapter also explains what ‘resilience’ can and cannot be, and how the law and its perceptions change—or remain the same. Two avenues on the question of what is resilient are evaluated: either the norm or its interpretation (perception) change. Finally, the chapter considers a number of cases in which the International Court of Justice has made pronouncements on and partial clarifications of important aspects of the law on self-defence since 2001.


2003 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 73-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Schmitt

The war in Iraq thrust international law into the global spotlight as has no conflict since Vietnam.Jus ad bellumdebates grew increasingly heated as the launch of hostilities in March 2003 approached. Did Security Council resolution 1441 authorise Operation Iraqi Freedom (hereafter, OIF)? Perhaps the attack was an exercise of self-defence against state-support to terrorism. Did the purported doctrine of ‘preemptive self-defence’, enunciated in the 2002 US National Security Strategy, offer a legal justification? What of humanitarian intervention, democratisation or regime change? Or was the sole normative basis the one formally asserted by the United States and United Kingdom — breach of a ceasefire set forth in a Security Council resolution adopted a dozen years earlier? Thejus ad bellumbrouhaha resurfaced in April 2005 with the revelation that British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith had issued a classified memorandum on the legality of hostilities that differed from the public justification he proffered, with OIF days away, just over a week later.


Author(s):  
Okimoto Keichiro

This chapter discusses the relationship between jus ad bellum (international law regulating the resort to force) and jus in bello (law of armed conflict). It examines state practice, international decisions, and expert opinions to determine how the relationship has been addressed in practice. The chapter considers the question of whether jus in bello applies equally to the unlawful and lawful parties to an armed conflict before turning to the legal implications of the cumulative requirements of the law of self-defence and international humanitarian law (IHL) imposed on a use of force in self-defence. Finally, it considers the legal implications of the concurrent application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and IHL with respect to use authorized under Chapter VII.


Author(s):  
Nicole Scicluna

This chapter explores the justness, legitimacy, and legality of war. While 1945 was a key turning point in the codification of jus ad bellum (i.e. international law on the use of force), that framework did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of historical political contingencies that meant that codification of the laws of war was contemporaneous, both geographically and temporally, with the solidification of the norms of sovereign nation-statehood and territorial integrity. The chapter focuses on the UN Charter regime and how it has shaped the politics of war since 1945. Importantly, the Charter establishes a general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. It also grants two exceptions to the prohibition: actions undertaken with Security Council authorization and actions taken in self-defence. Today, many of the most serious challenges to the Charter regime concern the definition and outer limits of the concept of self-defence. Another set of challenges to the Charter regime concerns the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. The chapter then looks at the development of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine.


2006 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 362-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaël Ronen

This article analysesjus ad bellumquestions arising from the 2006 war in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbollah. In particular, it examines Israel's claim to self-defence. Part 1 describes the scene of events and the actors. Part 2 explores whether the events of 12 July qualify, in themselves, as an armed attack. Part 3 concerns Hizbollah's and Lebanon's international responsibility for the attack. Part 4 examines whether Israel's actions complied with the legal requirements for a lawful act of self-defence.


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