ISRAEL, HIZBOLLAH, AND THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

This article analysesjus ad bellumquestions arising from the 2006 war in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbollah. In particular, it examines Israel's claim to self-defence. Part 1 describes the scene of events and the actors. Part 2 explores whether the events of 12 July qualify, in themselves, as an armed attack. Part 3 concerns Hizbollah's and Lebanon's international responsibility for the attack. Part 4 examines whether Israel's actions complied with the legal requirements for a lawful act of self-defence.

The Baltic states should adopt the self-defence pinpricks doctrine: the “accumulation of events” threshold as a deterrent to Russian hybrid warfare

Journal on Baltic Security ◽

10.1515/jobs-2017-0003 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 3 (1) ◽

pp. 11-24

Author(s):

Philippe Bou Nader

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Armed Attack ◽

Hybrid Warfare ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

Military Tactics ◽

Political Intervention ◽

The Baltic ◽

Actual Policy ◽

AbstractThis article addresses a key legal debate that the Baltic NATO members ought to engage in: what constitutes an “armed attack” and what interpretation should be made of this concept in order to deter recent Russian hybrid warfare strategies. These questions are considered in connection with a more general issue regarding the law of self-defence: the question of what constitutes an armed attack in international law. This article will try to present a broad definition and context of Russian hybrid warfare and how it is challenging traditional jus ad bellum paradigms. Too few policy-makers have paid detailed attention to the new Russian “lawfare” in Ukraine, using specific military and non-military tactics in order to blur the lines between “armed attack” and mere political intervention. Meanwhile, legal scholars detach their analysis from actual policy-serving considerations and tend to acquiesce to some very restrictive theories of the use force in self-defence. For some countries, like the Baltic ones, facing strategic exposure – because of both threatening neighbours and low military capacities – the jus ad bellum paradigm should not be construed as another layer of obstacle.

Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption

10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0030 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Ashley Deeks

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Cyber Attacks ◽

Weapons Of Mass Destruction ◽

Armed Attack ◽

Mass Destruction ◽

Technological Factors ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

The Future ◽

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally before it suffers an armed attack. More specifically, it considers whether pre-emption needs to be tamed. The discussion begins by sorting through the terminology used by states and scholars with respect to acts of self-defence in advance of an attack, with particular reference to three different terms: anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, and preventive self-defence. The chapter then outlines the basic positions in the historical debate about the legality of such self-defence before turning to three geopolitical and technological factors that put pressure on the doctrine of pre-attack self-defence: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber attacks. Finally, it evaluates the future of pre-emption, with emphasis on changes in the timing of a state’s right to use force in self-defence.

Military Targeting in the Context of Self-Defence Actions

Nordic Journal of International Law ◽

10.1163/15718107-08401002 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 84 (1) ◽

pp. 3-28 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

James A. Green ◽

Christopher P.M. Waters

Keyword(s):

Target Selection ◽

Jus In Bello ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

Conceptual Clarity ◽

Starting Point ◽

Definition Of ◽

The Relationship ◽

Self Defence ◽

Selection Of

For self-defence actions to be lawful, they must be directed at military targets. The absolute prohibition on non-military targeting under the jus in bello is well known, but the jus ad bellum also limits the target selection of states conducting defensive operations. Restrictions on targeting form a key aspect of the customary international law criteria of necessity and proportionality. In most situations, the jus in bello will be the starting point for the definition of a military targeting rule. Yet it has been argued that there may be circumstances when the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello do not temporally or substantively overlap in situations of self-defence. In order to address any possible gaps in civilian protection, and to bring conceptual clarity to one particular dimension of the relationship between the two regimes, this article explores the independent sources of a military targeting rule. The aim is not to displace the jus in bello as the ‘lead’ regime on how targeting decisions must be made, or to undermine the traditional separation between the two ‘war law’ regimes. Rather, conceptual light is shed on a sometimes assumed but generally neglected dimension of the jus ad bellum’s necessity and proportionality criteria that may, in limited circumstances, have significance for our understanding of human protection during war.

The invocation of the right to self-defence in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups: Implications for attribution

Leiden Journal of International Law ◽

10.1017/s0922156518000560 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 32 (01) ◽

pp. 91-110 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Erika de Wet

Keyword(s):

Due Diligence ◽

Armed Groups ◽

Armed Attack ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

International Court ◽

State Actors ◽

The Right ◽

United Nations Charter ◽

Territorial States ◽

AbstractThe right to self-defence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is increasingly being invoked in response to armed attacks conducted by armed groups located in a territory of another state, with or without the (direct) assistance of such a state. This article examines the implications of the invocation of the right to self-defence under these circumstances for the principles of attribution within thejus ad bellumparadigm. First, it illuminates how the threshold requirements for indirect armed attacks (that is, the state acting through a private actor) have been lowered since the 1986Nicaraguadecision of the International Court of Justice. In so doing, the article suggests that in order to prevent a complete erosion of the benchmarks of an indirect armed attack, the notions of ‘substantial involvement’ in an armed attack, ‘harbouring’, and ‘unwillingness’ should be interpreted as manifestations of due diligence. Thereafter, the article illustrates that there is also an increasing attribution of armed attacks directly to non-state actors, notably those located in areas over which territorial states have lost control. Such states could be depicted as being ‘unable’ to counter the activities of non-state actors. The article further submits that particularly in these instances, the principle of necessity within the self-defence paradigm can play an important role in curbing the potential for abuse inherent in the vague notion of ‘inability’, if interpreted in light of Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts.

11. Use of force

10.1093/he/9780192895684.003.0011 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 149-164

Author(s):

Ilias Bantekas ◽

Efthymios Papastavridis

Keyword(s):

United Nations ◽

Security Council ◽

Use Of Force ◽

United Nations Security Council ◽

Armed Force ◽

Collective Security ◽

Armed Attack ◽

Significant Achievement ◽

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the United Nations Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.

The Great War and International Law: German Justifications of Prevention and Pre-emptive Self-Defence

The Justification of War and International Order ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198865308.003.0010 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 183-206

Author(s):

Isabel V. Hull

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Military Leaders ◽

Preventive War ◽

Early Modernity ◽

European State ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

The Great War ◽

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.

11. Use of force

International Law Concentrate ◽

10.1093/he/9780198840978.003.0011 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 144-159

Author(s):

Ilias Bantekas ◽

Efthymios Papastavridis

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Security Council ◽

Use Of Force ◽

Armed Force ◽

Responsibility To Protect ◽

Collective Security ◽

Armed Attack ◽

Significant Achievement ◽

This chapter examines under what circumstances States may use armed force under customary international law and Arts 2(4) and 51 UN Charter. After noting that the use of armed force is generally prohibited and only limited to self-defence, and then only if the target State is under an armed attack, we show that several States have expanded the notion of armed attack. Besides self-defence, the Security Council may authorize the use of armed force through a process of collective security. Several examples of collective security are offered, as well as the ICJ’s position on what constitutes an armed attack. In recent years, the range of actors capable of undertaking an armed attack has included terrorists. Moreover, the development of the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is a significant achievement.

Blockades and Interdictions

10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0044 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

Keyword(s):

Armed Conflict ◽

Armed Conflicts ◽

International Treaties ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

Un Security Council ◽

Collective Self ◽

Rules And Principles ◽

Principle Of Proportionality ◽

The Right ◽

This chapter examines the rules and principles that govern a naval or aerial blockade or some other form of interference with foreign vessels and aircraft in the absence of an explicit authorization by the UN Security Council. After clarifying the concept of blockade under the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, it considers blockades authorized as military enforcement measures. It also discusses some unresolved or even contested issues regarding the legality of blockades, with reference to blockades in situations other than international armed conflict and the principle of proportionality in relation to humanity. The scope of interdiction operations and its legal bases under international treaties are analysed next, together with maritime interdiction operations and the applicability of prize law during non-international armed conflicts. Finally, the chapter explores the right of individual or collective self-defence as a basis for interdiction operations.

The Limitations of Traditional Rules and Institutions Relating to the Use of Force

10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0004 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Glennon

Keyword(s):

International Cooperation ◽

Use Of Force ◽

Jus Ad Bellum ◽

Sovereign Equality ◽

This chapter examines the limitations of traditional rules and institutions with respect to the use of force. It considers international cooperation in managing the use of force, and whether and when the use of force is justified, within the framework of the jus ad bellum. The chapter discusses three factors that help to explain why the rules and institutions that regulate the use of force have not been effective. First is the weakness of international law’s secondary rules concerning consent, obligation, and causation. Second is the weaknesses in the UN Charter rules due to deficiencies in the wording of the rules themselves, especially with regard to pre-emptive self-defence. Third is the weakness in compliance resulting from the UN Security Council’s dysfunctionality, in part due to the UN’s professed reliance upon the principle of sovereign equality.

Action Against Host States of Terrorist Groups

10.1093/law/9780199673049.003.0033 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Lindsay Moir

Keyword(s):

International Law ◽

Effective Control ◽

Armed Groups ◽

Armed Attack ◽

International Court Of Justice ◽

Court Of Justice ◽

International Court ◽

Terrorist Groups ◽

The Icj ◽

This chapter examines the problems that could arise when a state invokes self-defence to justify action against terrorist groups in another state. It first considers indirect armed attack against armed groups and the controversy surrounding the use of self-defence where armed groups are controlled by a foreign state, with particular reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisprudence. It then discusses the possibility that an armed attack could occur, permitting a forcible response in the context of international law, without attribution to a state by citing the Nicaragua case in which the ICJ pronounced that self-defence is permissible against a host state in effective control of an armed group. The chapter also looks at the case of Afghanistan and its relationship to Al Qaeda as an example of a state’s claims of self-defence against terrorism.