scholarly journals "Neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes": New Zealand's defence diplomacy in Asia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Fris

<p>Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to come across the term 'defence diplomacy'. The traditional function of armed forces has been to prepare for and undertake the use of force. As part of this role, armed forces have cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring potential enemies. In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future foes.  This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of broader foreign and security policy goals. Recognising that defence cooperation activities have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between 'old', meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly states, and 'new', meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies.  New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and the adoption of the concept by New Zealand. It looks at the way in which New Zealand has developed and managed its 'old' defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It then explores New Zealand’s 'new' defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Through these three case studies, the thesis examines key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of these key relationships. The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Fris

<p>Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to come across the term 'defence diplomacy'. The traditional function of armed forces has been to prepare for and undertake the use of force. As part of this role, armed forces have cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring potential enemies. In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future foes.  This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of broader foreign and security policy goals. Recognising that defence cooperation activities have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between 'old', meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly states, and 'new', meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies.  New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and the adoption of the concept by New Zealand. It looks at the way in which New Zealand has developed and managed its 'old' defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It then explores New Zealand’s 'new' defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Through these three case studies, the thesis examines key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of these key relationships. The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster.</p>


Significance This followed the approval of a white paper on Germany's security policy and the future of its armed forces on July 13. The fundamental suggestion of the white paper -- which sits atop the hierarchy of security strategy documents and drives medium-to-long-term strategy -- is that Berlin should take on greater responsibility for international peace and security and demonstrate leadership within the limits of its capabilities. Impacts Germany is considering opening its armed forces to non-German EU citizens and has abandoned a fixed upper limit of active forces. Closer coordination and joint exercises between the armed forces and police are likely, despite political resistance. The white paper commits Germany to a policy of deterrence and dialogue vis-a-vis Russia, with Moscow described as a security challenge.


2017 ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Miszczak

The aim of this article is to analyse the global and European foreign, security and defence policies of the Federal Republic of Germany and their implications for the broad international environment of Germany. Special attention is paid to the issues of Germany’s emancipation in the international order after the end of the East-West conflict, when it became clear that the regional conflicts and their transnational impact gained a new and multidimensional character for the German security policy. Given this evolution of the international system, Germany has gradually changed its former foreign and security policies. The state currently intends to take greater responsibility for international politics, which translates into a simultaneous increase in its political and economic power in the international arena. This new global role of the Federal Republic of Germany is manifested by the so-called White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr approved on 13 July 2016. This document presents primarily the hierarchy of threats in today’s world, their definitions and attempts to neutralize them in compliance with German interests. Instruments to ensure a smooth achievement of this goal include the modernization of the German armed forces, the creation of intervention troops and their participation in multinational military operations conducted by NATO and the European Union.


1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-532
Author(s):  
Christoph Bluth

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS STILL IN A STATE OF FLUX. LIKE the other former republics of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seeks to come to terms with being an independent state needing to define its national interests and foreign and security policy objectives.The principal element in the new frame of reference for Moscow is the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. For forty years, most of the territories controlled by Moscow were adjacent to territories protected by the United States, or else to China. The Russian Federation is now virtually surrounded by former Soviet republics, all with deep political, social and economic problems, and some of which are highly unstable and subject to violent civil conflicts. The territory of the Russian Federation itself, about 75 per cent of the territory of the former USSR with about 60 per cent of its population, is still not properly defined, given that significant sections of the borders are purely notional, and the degree of control that Moscow can exercise over the entire Federation is uncertain.


Author(s):  
Annegret Bendiek ◽  
Felix Schenuit

The strengthening of EU-Canada relations in the last years has revealed mutual interests in several policy fields. In times of increasingly tense relations with the US and weakening multilateralism, deepened and broadened bilateral cooperation is of particular importance for both, Canada and the EU. In order to better understand mutual interests and similar challenges, this article explores cooperation in the two different policy fields of foreign and security policy and climate change policy. This analysis of the current situation in international security and climate change policy points out key areas in which closer EU-Canada cooperation could be brought to bear fruits not only for their bilateral relationship but also the alliance for multilateralism in the short run and for years to come.


Author(s):  
Ian Hall

This chapter outlines, by way of background, the evolution of Indian foreign and security policy after the country became independent in 1947. It discusses Jawaharlal Nehru’s dominance in the first phase and the generation of a Nehruvian tradition of thought about India’s international relations. It then explores the shift to a more realist approach under Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, and the post-Cold War transformation of foreign policy, prompted by a looming crisis in India’s economic and diplomatic circumstances. It traces the emergence of a more confident policy of ‘multialignment’ during the 2000s, as India’s economy grew and its regional importance developed with it. In the conclusion, it outlines Modi’s approach, comparing and contrasting it to those pursued by his immediate predecessors, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.


Author(s):  
Malina Kaszuba

The transformation of the Russian foreign and security policy based on a more courageous use of military potential is a fact. Over the past several years, Russia has moved from articulating its interests to their enforcement with the use of military force. This article focuses on analyzing this process and identifying its potential consequences for global security. The conclusions drawn by the author, based on the conducted research, allow to state that the armed forces are and will be an important instrument of the Russian foreign and security policy. This does not mean, however, that the Russian Federation will strive for an armed conflict posing a threat to international security.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-64
Author(s):  
Krisztina Juhász

Abstract Hungary joined the European Union in 2004 but started to participate in EU crisis management operations well before. Since the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was a new policy area at that time, it was an extraordinary experience for Hungary to be integrated into a policy still under development. Aft er briefly detailing the foreign and security policy options Hungary faced right after the transition from communism, this paper analyses Hungary’s contribution to the CSDP. The CSDP is based on two pillars — one operational and the other related to capability-building. The paper first analyses Hungary’s participation in the civilian and military operations launched in the framework of the CSDP. Specifically, it explores the operations Hungary has joined, the kind of capacities it has contributed and the deficiencies and problems that have emerged in this sphere. Second, the paper addresses Hungary’s perspectives and aspirations regarding capability development. Specifically, it looks at how Hungary views the future of the CSDP, especially in light of the country’s participation in permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), the central element in the EU’s joint defence capability development. Methodologically, the paper employs qualitative content and discourse analysis, drawing on relevant secondary literature and analyses of official EU and Hungarian (legislative and non-legislative) documents. Surveying Hungary’s participation in EU crisis management operations since the beginning of the CSDP, the paper finds it has joined 42 per cent of civilian and 70 per cent of military operations. These have been in the immediate neighbourhood but also distant locations (Africa, Central Asia, and the Near East). At the same time, distinct challenges have hampered Hungary’s contribution to certain operations, such as a dearth of foreign language skills and a lack of strategic airlift and mobile logistics capabilities. The paper also finds that regional defence cooperation was not the central driver of cooperation within PESCO projects. Overall, Hungary is somewhere in the middle of the pack in terms of the number of PESCO projects it participates in.


Res Publica ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 34 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 371-405
Author(s):  
Liesbet Hooghe

The Twelve Member States agreed in December 1991 in Maastricht on an EconomicMonetary Union, including a single currency and an autonomous European central bank by the turn of the century, and on "an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe". The structure of the European Political Union resembles a temple with three pillars : more powers for the European Parliament on a wider ranger of policy issues (European Communities), a separate framework for a common foreign and security policy, and intergovernmental cooperation on justice and internal aff airs. The new Treaty wilt replace the Treaty of Rome only after ratification in all twelve member states. White EMU and EPU dominated the public agenda, the internal market programme was drawing to a close with nearly all White paper measures adopted. Emphasis shifted to implementation problems. The prolonged conflict between Commission, Parliament and Council on the 1992 budget gave a taste of increasing tensions on budgetary issues, especially between "northern" and "southern" interests. That divide wilt deepen with or without ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The budgetary battle of 1991 was partly on external relations. The external activities of the EC were all but successful in 1991: disparate conduct in the Gulf War, failure to contain conflict in Yugoslavia, near-collapse of negotiations with the EFTA countries, deadlock in Gatt-talks and the threat of a trade war between the three trade blocks. Ibe European Common Agricultural Policy remained a major stumblingblock in the Gatt-talks. The Commission proposed a radical reform package for CAP, fiercely opposed by France until the end of the year.


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