scholarly journals The Militarization of Russian foreign and security policy and its possible impact on global security

Author(s):  
Malina Kaszuba

The transformation of the Russian foreign and security policy based on a more courageous use of military potential is a fact. Over the past several years, Russia has moved from articulating its interests to their enforcement with the use of military force. This article focuses on analyzing this process and identifying its potential consequences for global security. The conclusions drawn by the author, based on the conducted research, allow to state that the armed forces are and will be an important instrument of the Russian foreign and security policy. This does not mean, however, that the Russian Federation will strive for an armed conflict posing a threat to international security.

1995 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 510-532
Author(s):  
Christoph Bluth

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IS STILL IN A STATE OF FLUX. LIKE the other former republics of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation seeks to come to terms with being an independent state needing to define its national interests and foreign and security policy objectives.The principal element in the new frame of reference for Moscow is the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. For forty years, most of the territories controlled by Moscow were adjacent to territories protected by the United States, or else to China. The Russian Federation is now virtually surrounded by former Soviet republics, all with deep political, social and economic problems, and some of which are highly unstable and subject to violent civil conflicts. The territory of the Russian Federation itself, about 75 per cent of the territory of the former USSR with about 60 per cent of its population, is still not properly defined, given that significant sections of the borders are purely notional, and the degree of control that Moscow can exercise over the entire Federation is uncertain.


Author(s):  
V. Bashynskyi ◽  
H. Pievtsov ◽  
P. Openko ◽  
A. Kozyr

The beginning of the XXI century was characterized by the emergence of a new type of war – information one, when victory is achieved not by destroying the armed forces and the economy of the enemy, but through the impact on his moral and psychological condition. In modern conflicts, methods based on the integrated application of political, economic, informational and other non-military measures based on military force are increasingly used. The combination of these methods is implemented in the concept of hybrid warfare, the leading idea of which consists in achieving political goals with minimal military influence on the enemy through the use of modern information technology based on "soft power" and "hard power". The peculiarity of such a war is that it is conducted in disguise using mostly non-linear tactics and is not aimed at capturing the entire territory of the country, although it is possible to take control of partial territories, but to obtain patronage over the state, which is achieved through influence on the population, politics, business, law-enforcement agencies. A striking example of the implementation of the concept of hybrid war is the actions of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - Russia) against Ukraine. At the same time, Russia's "hybrid policy" is not limited to Ukraine. It also covers Europe and the United States, the EU and NATO. In order to analyze the development of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia in the period up to 2035, an analysis was made on the development of the information aspect of relations between Ukraine and other influential regional and world actors on the development of the situation around Ukraine. In preparing the forecast, the tools of scenario analysis were used, namely: the analysis of the main influencing factors, which allowed determining the trends of regional development until 2035. This analysis makes it possible to develop a baseline scenario for the development of the situation, provided that the situation around Ukraine over time will not change significantly; the main factors that are difficult to predict and non-collinear are identified.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-191
Author(s):  
V V Sharabkhanov ◽  
K V Zhdanov ◽  
S M Zakharenko ◽  
N I L’vov ◽  
K V Kozlov ◽  
...  

The problems of the incidence of meningococcal disease and the epidemiological situation in the world, in the Russian Federation and in the Armed Forces are consecrated. In the past decade, there has been a global decline in the incidence of meningococcal disease, but there is still the possibility of new outbreaks and epidemics. From 1996 to 2016, a decrease in the incidence of meningococcal disease was also noted in Russia. In certain regions of the Russian Federation, an increase in incidence was recorded, which did not affect the general trend. Against this background, the idea was formed that in the coming years, thanks to a favorable epidemiological situation and the possibility of preventing meningococcal infection with the help of a vaccine, it is possible to achieve control of this infection. However, meningococcus showed all the classic properties of variability and fitness. Changes in the structure of circulating serogroups of meningococcus led to the formation of a non-immune layer of the population in the face of increasing pathogenicity of the dominant serogroups. The activity of the epidemic process is indirectly indicated by the high diversity of genetic and serological clonal complexes, serogroups and serotypes of the pathogen. The incidence of meningococcal disease over the past ten years in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can be assessed as low, but mortality has high values. The peak incidence was in 2010, but the maximum percentage of mortality was in 2017-18,2%. The increase in mortality from invasive forms of meningococcal infection, on the one hand, is associated with an increase in the total number of sources of this infection, on the other hand, with errors in early diagnosis and, as a consequence, in the incorrect provision of emergency care at the prehospital stage, which recur from year to year and are of a similar nature.


2020 ◽  
pp. 42-47
Author(s):  
Dariusz Materniak

The article is devoted to the consideration of the concept of "hybrid war", which is widespread in recent years, and currently has different interpretations. The characteristics of the phenomenon of hybrid warfare, which are operated by research, expert and leading military centers of the Russian Federation, which influence the decision-making or directly participate in them, are highlighted. It also presents conclusions that follow from the observation of Russian activities in Еastern Ukraine and points to the potential risks arising from such activities in the future. The article presents the most popular definitions of the phenomenon of hybrid war, appearing in Polish and American literature. It also takes into account the studies of Ukrainian authors dealing with this subject: in this case, directly related to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that has been ongoing since 2014. In this context, the definitions of the concept of hybrid war described in the text in terms of the official military institutions of the Russian Federation: the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, are also of particular importance. This approach, present in Russian definitions and approach, had a practical dimension in connection with the Russian armed aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, from 2014 until now. It describes the full set of actions and measures that the Russian Federation uses as part of hybrid operations and which (what can be assumed with high probability) will continue to be used in the future in relation to Ukraine and other countries that are or will be objects of Russian aggressive policy and actions. This problem is significant not only for Ukraine, but also for other countries in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the so-called "NATO's eastern flank".


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-130
Author(s):  
Oleksandr Skriabin ◽  
Boris Popkov ◽  
Inna Vanovska

Abstract The article reviews issues related to the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in eastern Ukraine (2014-2018), which became a form of repel and deterrence of Russian aggression, began in Crimea in February 2014 and subsequently continued in eastern regions of Ukraine. According to the nature and consequences of hostilities, the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict is divided into initial and two main periods, within which a number of stages are defined, distinguished qualitatively in the nature and content of hostilities. The article shows how this affected the change of forms of the Armed Forces of Ukraine employment in the anti-terrorist operation. During the initial (Crimean) period, units and subdivisions of the Ukrainian army were not actually used to repel hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation, but later, when the Russian leadership began using a similar scenario of aggression in the eastern regions of Ukraine, the state responded with the armed fight. The authors believe that despite the swiftness of the first period, its events were characterized by frequent changes in the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - from patrolling and guarding important facilities to offensive, raid and search operations. The second period, according to the authors, was characterized by the conduct of the Ukrainian army’s defensive actions with the active use of maneuvers in various dangerous areas.


2017 ◽  
pp. 165-220
Author(s):  
Ruslana Martseniuk

The article analyzes the main stages of military cooperation between Ukraine and the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) from the establishment of diplomatic relations after the collapse of the USSR and to this day. The reasons for the activation of the mentioned cooperation in the conditions of the crisis of the international security system, which is connected with Russian aggression and violation of international security agreements. Today, in order to counteract the armed aggression in the militarization of the Russian Federation, one of the most urgent areas for ensuring Ukraine’s military security is the following: effective use of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners and allies in the military sphere; implementation of standards and principles of NATO member states; involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the international operations of NATO and the EU. So today in the conditions of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine and the threat of security and tranquility in Europe, the Baltic countries provide Ukraine with military and economic assistance both within NATO and on a bilateral basis. This is the supply of ammunition that the Ukrainian Armed Forces needs in the forefront and assistance in the treatment and rehabilitation of our wounded soldiers and active assistance in providing professional advisers for military affairs and tactical medicine. The security dimension of relations between our countries is also the creation of a unique international military formation of LITPOLUKRBRIG, which practically allows us to work out our military interoperability and compatibility and is one of the largest and ambitious military cooperation projects.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 307-318
Author(s):  
Marek Delong

The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most eminent Russian politicians of the twentieth century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy have undergone a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been dominated by neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic options, whose representative was predominantly Primakov’s predecessor as the minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka’s government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up market reform, but called for the state’s participation to be increased. Yevgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. Primakov exerted a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin’s day. His political line was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense, and nothing indicates that this state of affairs has changed, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (72) ◽  
pp. 81-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dragan Đukanović

Abstract This paper analyses the Western Balkan countries’ relationship towards the instrument of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in the context of the measures undertaken by Brussels against the Russian Federation due to its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. In this regard, the author first points out to what extent the countries of the Western Balkans over the past few years, that is, after the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, harmonized their foreign policies with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Certainly, the most important foreign policy challenges for the Western Balkan countries in 2014 are imposing sanctions against the Russian Federation. Some Western Balkan countries (above all, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia), according to the author’s assessment, are stretched between their intentions to join the EU and thus harmonize their foreign policy with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on one hand, and on the other, to avoid disruption of existing relations with the Russian Federation


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