scholarly journals Niemcy w polityce globalnej (Biała Księga)

2017 ◽  
pp. 11-18
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Miszczak

The aim of this article is to analyse the global and European foreign, security and defence policies of the Federal Republic of Germany and their implications for the broad international environment of Germany. Special attention is paid to the issues of Germany’s emancipation in the international order after the end of the East-West conflict, when it became clear that the regional conflicts and their transnational impact gained a new and multidimensional character for the German security policy. Given this evolution of the international system, Germany has gradually changed its former foreign and security policies. The state currently intends to take greater responsibility for international politics, which translates into a simultaneous increase in its political and economic power in the international arena. This new global role of the Federal Republic of Germany is manifested by the so-called White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr approved on 13 July 2016. This document presents primarily the hierarchy of threats in today’s world, their definitions and attempts to neutralize them in compliance with German interests. Instruments to ensure a smooth achievement of this goal include the modernization of the German armed forces, the creation of intervention troops and their participation in multinational military operations conducted by NATO and the European Union.

Author(s):  
F. Trunov

The article discusses the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the struggle against new challenges of the world security sphere. In this regard the main focus is on the usage of German armed forces (Bundeswehr) for International Crisis Management (ICM), first of all – outside the NATO area. Although Germany has been taking part in this type of activities since 1991, only in 1994 German Bundestag formulated and approved the mechanism of parliamentary control over the Bundeswehr usage outside the NATO area. The author attempts to define the periods of this process and cover practical German involvement in ICM activities of the NATO, the European Union and the United Nations Organization. In this sense it is necessary to compare the forms and the average number of soldiers, which were used by Germany in ICM operations by each of these three international structures. It is also rather important to define the main regions (countries) where German troops were used in ICM activities, and the reasons for it. Yugoslavia was the first region where Bundeswehr served for stabilization of the situation in areas of internal military conflicts. By the year 2014, the main regions of the German International Crisis Management participation became Afghanistan and Horn of Africa.The article also examines the perspectives of the Federal Republic of Germany’s involvement in ICM, considering the current and possible future results of the Bundeswehr reform, while Bundesehr was and is the main country’s instrument in ICM.


2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas U. Berger

For decades Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany have gone to extraordinary lengths to cultivate as low a profile as possible on defense and national security policy matters. However, since the Gulf War, the Federal Republic has come under growing pressure from its allies to assume a greater international security role. Slowly, reluctantly it has acceded to these demands, albeit at the expense of considerable internal angst and turmoil. At the same time, German decision makers have sought to preserve as much as possible the old approach to security policy. Consequently, the long-standing German norms eschewing the use of military force have been gradually displaced, although not wholly replaced, by norms of multilateralism. Rather than a dramatic break with the past, the Federal Republic's actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan can be seen as the culmination of a series of incremental steps that had begun a decade ago.To substantiate these claims this paper will first briefly outline the origins of the Cold German national security practices and the peculiar constellation of domestic and international factors that shaped them. It will then consider in what ways these factors have both changed, and not changed, since the end of the Cold War and sketch the trajectory along which German defense and national security policies have evolved since 1991. Finally, the paper briefly examines the Federal Republic's response to the Kosovo and Afghan crises before offering some general conclusions about the likely future evolution of German security policy.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Justin Fris

<p>Read a recent Defence White Paper of any number of countries or look at the range of foreign relations one country has with others in the contemporary age, and one is likely to come across the term 'defence diplomacy'. The traditional function of armed forces has been to prepare for and undertake the use of force. As part of this role, armed forces have cooperated with those of other nations to enhance security by countering or deterring potential enemies. In the post-Cold War era however, a new form of defence relations has emerged; in contrast to, yet supplementing their traditional role, armed forces have been employed in building cooperative relationships between former and potential future foes.  This shift is explained by the concept of defence diplomacy; the concept identified by Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster that armed forces have a peacetime role in pursuit of broader foreign and security policy goals. Recognising that defence cooperation activities have a long history, Cottey and Forster differentiated defence diplomacy between 'old', meaning those traditional defence cooperation activities aimed at allies and friendly states, and 'new', meaning defence cooperation aimed at potential or former enemies.  New Zealand, like many other countries, has used the term since the 1990s to describe those aspects of the diplomatic relationship, specifically peacetime cooperative activities, performed by the Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force with the armed forces of other nations. This thesis explores the origins of defence diplomacy and the adoption of the concept by New Zealand. It looks at the way in which New Zealand has developed and managed its 'old' defence diplomacy in Asia through examining the example of the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It then explores New Zealand’s 'new' defence diplomacy with what are considered here as “non-like-minded” states such as China, Viet Nam and Indonesia. Through these three case studies, the thesis examines key dilemmas and problems of defence diplomacy that have arisen in the development of these key relationships. The thesis then concludes with an analysis of New Zealand’s defence diplomacy according to the framework established by Cottey and Forster.</p>


Author(s):  
G. Frey ◽  
A. Winderlich

The Search and Rescue Co-ordination Center Goch called me, some years ago, to the Stuttgart airport with the rescue helicopter of the Federal Armed Forces Rescue Center at Ulm. A single-engine sports plane, whose pilot was a student on his first solo flight, had tried a belly landing. Next to the runway, there were several fire-trucks, two ambulances and one emergency physician's car waiting. Our rescue helicopter stayed hovering for nearly one hour until the student pilot finally managed a belly landing. Safe on the ground, he was surrounded by firemen, paramedics and physicians, while we flew back to Ulm. We had not landed promptly I was told because of the landing taxes an army helicopter has to pay at a civilian airport! This episode prompted me to look for more information.The Federal Republic of Germany is obliged by international agreements to search for planes in distress—no matter what nationality—to save the passengers and, if possible, the equipment and to provide medical treatment for the survivors if necessary. This Search and Rescue (SAR) Service is executed according to the instructions given by the International Civil Aeronautical Organization (ICAO). In the Federal Republic, the SAR service is provided jointly by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport. The Ministry of defense provides the means and the Rescue Co-ordination Center. The Ministry of Transport provides the alarm services through the air traffic control offices.


Significance This followed the approval of a white paper on Germany's security policy and the future of its armed forces on July 13. The fundamental suggestion of the white paper -- which sits atop the hierarchy of security strategy documents and drives medium-to-long-term strategy -- is that Berlin should take on greater responsibility for international peace and security and demonstrate leadership within the limits of its capabilities. Impacts Germany is considering opening its armed forces to non-German EU citizens and has abandoned a fixed upper limit of active forces. Closer coordination and joint exercises between the armed forces and police are likely, despite political resistance. The white paper commits Germany to a policy of deterrence and dialogue vis-a-vis Russia, with Moscow described as a security challenge.


Author(s):  
Donald Abenheim ◽  
Carolyn Halladay

The German soldier and German politics in the second decade of the 21st century face the challenges of a deteriorating international system as well as the reappearance of integral nationalism at home and abroad. The security-building roles and missions of the German armed forces in the three decades since unity are being reoriented to alliance collective defense as well as security building amid great friction with sources near and far. These phenomena in their variety threaten the civic and multilateral tenets of German statecraft as well as fundamental military standards and defense organization since 1949, and in particular, since unification in 1990. Specifically, the constants of postwar German democratic civil–military relations—the citizen in uniform, both bound and empowered by Innere Führung, serving in arms in a force firmly located in European and alliance structures but with a low profile at home, undergirded by both legal and social preferences—have had to withstand multiple blows of late. Some of these blows have been a result of unintended consequences of various policies or nonpolicies articulated without sufficient regard for current context; some as a result of unforced errors by leaders relying on outdated assumptions; and some as intentional provocations amid a fraying political consensus. While the German defense establishment—civilian and uniformed—has thus far mostly mastered these circumstances, the strain on German democratic civil–military relations is unmistakable. Thus, Germany’s civil–military relations face the test that they have well surmounted in the past, that is, to have a good democracy and a good army at the same time. The Bundeswehr’s 2020 deployment amid the coronavirus crisis, alongside discussions about a corona dividend in times of exploding state deficits, seems to have boosted soldiers’ popularity, and thus has opened a new facet of civil–military relations. However, the Bundeswehr must be careful not to foster a self-image of camouflaged civilian service or to create an identity crisis of its Afghanistan veterans serving for months as attendants in retirement homes. The public debate and official reflection manifest at best a mediocre comprehension of the needs of the soldier and the imperative to find a usable past for soldiers asked to defend democracy against its many enemies, without falling prey to militarism and integral nationalism. Innere Führung remains the valid heritage of the German soldier, even—or perhaps especially—for those who are asked by duty and fate to risk their lives in combat.


2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (162) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Strutynski

This article focuses on the analysis of the new strategic concept of NATO (Lisbon 2010) and its effect on German foreign and security policy. During the Cold War, the (old) Federal Republic of Germany had done well to recognize its limited sovereignty while at the same time expanding its economic and political influence in NATO and the EC/EU. This approach has not fundamentally changed with the unification of Germany in 1990. Since then Germany has been developing its imperial ambitions cautiously, embedded in the aggressive NATO military pact and the militarization of the EU. The credo of the new Germany is the enforcement of both;, German economic and geo-strategic interests as a nation cannot be achieved alone, but only within the range of existing alliances.


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