scholarly journals Analysis of Russia’s Policy Behaviour after the Abolition of the INF Treaty

Author(s):  
Zheng Cui ◽  
Yajie Wang

The “Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles” (after this referred to as the “Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces — INF Treaty”), was an arms control treaty. This Treaty was abandoned after being extended for more than three decades. In the current context of competition among great powers, its abolition not only affects the military designs of the two countries but also impacts the reconstruction of regional and global strategic layouts, as well as the future of the global armament system. Against the background of significant changes in Russia’s strategic security environment during the post-INF Treaty period, Russia’s policy behaviour has exhibited a strong “security orientation”. That is, at the military level, it updates and upgrades its nuclear arsenals and continuously expands its deterrence options; at the diplomatic level, it has broken through the Western blockade by expanding Russia’s partner circle. In explanation of the reasons for the emergence of “security-oriented” behaviour characteristics in Russia, this paper argues that geopolitical narration plays a role in shaping Russia’s behaviour. On the other hand, the inertia of Russia’s policy behaviour is explained from the perspective of Russia’s national characteristics, primarily as defined by its national identity. Finally, this paper gives a brief prediction of the future trend of Russia’s behaviour and the arms control system in the post-INF Treaty period.

1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 115-117
Author(s):  
Herbert Scoville

In speaking about arms control negotiations in a multipolar world, it is necessary to bear in mind that we are not really in a multipolar world right now. But perhaps we are starting toward one, at least as far as nuclear power is concerned. Britain, France, and China possess only relatively small nuclear forces at present but they will grow in time and eventually will have to be taken into consideration at least in arms control negotiations involving nuclear weapons. France and Britain at the present do have a nuclear deterrent force which would deter an attack as far as the Soviets are concerned. The status of the Chinese nuclear force is very much more uncertain. It is possible that they now possess a very limited deterrent to an attack by the Soviet Union. Certainly there is no question that at the present time they do not have any means by which they can threaten, even in retaliation, a nuclear attack against the United States. As a consequence, the Chinese do not provide any direct threat to us and we can go ahead and negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union without any real consideration of Chinese participation. One need not conclude from the growing Chinese nuclear power that they must necessarily be brought into the SALT negotiations in the near future.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.


1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


Author(s):  
Amin Tarzi

Since its inception as a separate political entity in 1747, Afghanistan has been embroiled in almost perpetual warfare, but it has never been ruled directly by the military. From initial expansionist military campaigns to involvement in defensive, civil, and internal consolidation campaigns, the Afghan military until the mid-19th century remained mainly a combination of tribal forces and smaller organized units. The central government, however, could only gain tenuous monopoly over the use of violence throughout the country by the end of the 19th century. The military as well as Afghan society remained largely illiterate and generally isolated from the prevailing global political and ideological trends until the middle of the 20th century. Politicization of Afghanistan’s military began in very small numbers after World War II with Soviet-inspired communism gaining the largest foothold. Officers associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan were instrumental in two successful coup d’états in the country. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, ending the country’s sovereignty and ushering a period of conflict that continues to the second decade of the 21st century in varying degrees. In 2001, the United States led an international invasion of the country, catalyzing efforts at reorganization of the smaller professional Afghan national defense forces that have remained largely apolitical and also the country’s most effective and trusted governmental institution.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter examines US–Soviet relations during the Cold War as well as the question of the genuineness of efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve disarmament and resolve troublesome disputes. It begins with a discussion of the German question, noting that Germany’s future position was vital to the future of Europe and a particular concern of the Soviets. It then considers the progress of arms control and peace efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union, before concluding with an analysis of the relationship of arms control to the use of armaments in hot war and to some aspects of fighting the Cold War.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-132
Author(s):  
James Cameron

Most analyses of arms control during the Cold War focus on its role in maintaining strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, history shows that the superpowers' search for strategic stability is insufficient to explain the roots and course of negotiations. This essay argues that arms control was used as one tool in a broader strategy of war prevention, designed to contain a series of challenges to U.S. and Soviet dominance of the international system that both sides worried could upset bipolarity and increase the chances of conflict between them. At the same time, U.S. policy-makers balanced this joint superpower interest with Washington's extended deterrent commitment to its allies, which ultimately upheld the integrity of the system as a whole. The essay concludes that today's leaders should integrate arms control into a more comprehensive strategy of political accommodation fit for twenty-first-century conditions.


Worldview ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. 31-36
Author(s):  
Seymour Melman

After twenty-five years of a nuclear-military arms race, it is possible to define significant limits of military power for national security. These limits apply with special force to the nuclear superpowers. These same limits of military power also define new requirements for a disarmament process.Underlying the long discussion of disarmament among nations has been the understanding that lowered levels of armaments produce mutual advantage: the prospect of physical destruction is reduced; and the cost of armaments can be applied to constructive uses. The arms race from 1946 to 1971 between the United States and the Soviet Union has not improved the military security of either nation, and the economic cost to these two countries has exceeded $1,500 billion.


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