scholarly journals Narration as attraction. Mind-game films and postclassical spectacles

Panoptikum ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 109-129
Author(s):  
Barbara Szczekała
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Stimulation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Alternative Framework ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

The article is a theoretical proposal which aims to create an alternative framework for mapping postclassical cinema. This framework is based on establishing various modes of relations between narration and spectacle, especially those represented by mind-game films and post-plot films. Instead of considering narration and spectacle as opposition, I suggest redescribing their complementary dynamics. I argue that there is visible feedback between mind-game films and the cinema of digital attractions, which I see as complementary processes of making “spectacular mind games” and “mind-gaming the spectacles”. The article contains an analysis of similar types of cinematic experiences delivered by “narration” and “attractions” and indicates the mutual influences between these two phenomena. Both narration and attraction may bring similar, affective sensations: the notion of shock and dissonance, discomfort, astonishment, kinesthetic impulse or cognitive stimulation. As for the article’s conclusion: postclassical cinema variously reshapes the distribution of narration and attraction. Mind-game films are becoming cinematic spectacles. On the other hand, more and more “post-plot” blockbusters are introducing the “mind-gaming the spectacle” strategy, and are engaging viewers with “cognitive” attractions as well.

Intentionalität und Bewusstsein in der frühen Neuzeit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Salient Features ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Mind

How are we to explain the fact that we can refer to objects by means of mental acts? And what accounts for our being conscious of mental acts? René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz provide fascinating answers to these two central questions of the philosophy of mind. In this study, the concepts of both authors are analyzed in detail, compared with each other and related to current positions. The analyses show that Descartes represents a deflationary conception of consciousness (conscientia). Consciousness is "only" an aspect of intentionality that constitutes the essential feature of the Cartesian mind. The analyses of Leibniz unveil that he represents a far more complex and demanding conception of the mind in comparison to Descartes, which makes for a higher connectivity with contemporary convictions. The salient features of his position are the structural conception of intentionality and the distinction between two forms of consciousness (apperception and conscientia) that correspond to the phenomenal consciousness and the reflexive self-consciousness. In contrast to Descartes, Leibniz also assigns consciousness to non-rational animals in the form of apperception. Conscientia, on the other hand, is reserved for rational substances.

On the Veiling and Unveiling of Experience: A Comparison Between the Micro-Phenomenological Method and the Practice of Meditation

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-77
Author(s):  
Claire Petitmengin
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Phenomenological Method ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Buddhist Meditation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
The Mind

Abstract Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.

Locke’s Inclinations

2021 ◽  
pp. 159-176
Author(s):  
Stewart Duncan
Keyword(s):  
Substance P ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
The Other ◽  
Animal Minds ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Mind

Locke is officially agnostic about the nature of the human mind: he thinks we cannot know that materialism is true, but also that we cannot know that dualism is true. Despite this agnosticism, we can ask whether Locke thought one of those views was more likely than the other. The chapter considers arguments on both sides. A small number of texts suggest he thought dualism more likely. On the other hand, Lisa Downing has argued that Locke thought materialism more likely, on the basis of the similarities between human and animal minds. This chapter argues that the reasons she offers do not show us that Locke was inclined to materialism. Nevertheless, Locke did show the possibility of materialism, not just by saying it was possible, but by developing at length an account of the mind that did not depend upon its being an immaterial substance.

Reflections on the principle of continuity on the basis of Ibn al-Haytham's commentary on Proposition I.7 of Euclid's Elements

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalid Bouzoubaâ Fennane
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Explicit Formulation ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Euclid’S Elements ◽  
The Mind

After his refutation of the doubts concerning Proposition I.7 (in the Book of solving doubts), Ibn al-Haytham mentions three possible ways in which circles may intersect, submitting them to the following “intuitive” argument: one part of one of the two circles is situated inside of the other circle, and its other part is situated outside of it. One is therefore tempted to believe that the commentator accepts the principle of continuity in the case of circles, since his argument has the following meaning: if a circle is divisible into two parts (or, again, passes through two points), one of which (or one of the two points) is situated inside the other circle, and the other outside of it, then the two circles cut one another. The author of this article proposes to establish the limits of this belief, on the basis of the following reflections: 1). It will be noted first of all that what could be called the ‘principle of the intersection of circles’ does not constitute ipso facto a principle in the mind of Ibn al-Haytham: no allusion is made to it in the commentary on Proposition I.1, among others. 2) It will be established later on that if one accepts (according to the explanation of Ibn al-Haytham in his Commentary on the premisses) that a line is the result of the movement of a point, the principle of continuity should be considered by him as something which is obvious by itself, without being stated. This conclusion will be based on an analysis of the notion of continuity in its classical meaning, and on Ibn al-Haytham’s commentary on Proposition X.1. 3) On the other hand, we should note the presence of a ‘sketch’ of topological language, which Ibn al-Haytham develops for the notion of a circle (particularly in the Commentary): one could say in this context that his reflection constitutes an important, if not principal, stage in the process which was to lead to the explicit formulation of the principle of continuity.

scholarly journals Edward A. Milne’s Philosophy of Science: Between Aristotelianism and Popperism

2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-23
Author(s):  
Dariusz Dąbek
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Testing ◽  
Deductive Logic ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Aim Of Science ◽  
Deductive Method ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Main Ideas

This article seeks to show that E.A. Milne’s philosophy of science has its roots in the philosophy of Aristotle and it could be an inspiration for Popper’s philosophy. The similarities with Aristotle’s concept are as follows: 1) the aim of science is to explain phenomena by discovering general principles; 2) the mind is responsible for discovering them, although experience guides the search; 3) deducing detailed statements from general assumptions is the most important element of research. On the other hand, Milne’s proposal is consistent with Popper’s main ideas: 1) criticism of the principle of induction; 2) preference for the hypothetical-deductive method (assumptions should be bold hypotheses that require empirical testing to be accepted); 3) appreciation of falsification and confidence in the effectiveness of deductive logic.

Theatrical torture versus dramatic cruelty: subjection through representation or praxis1

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frans-Willem Korsten
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
The Other ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Political Event ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Early Modern Era ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
Peculiar Case

The distinction between the theatrical and the dramatic is pivotal for different modes of subjection in the early modern era. Institutionally speaking, society was organized ideologically, theatrically by the introjection of what was shown publicly to private, but equally collective, theatres of the mind. This could be described as a logic of torture. In contrast, and on the other hand, the dramatic application of punishment on ships, and the pain it involved, served what Robert Cover called a ‘balance of terror’, based on a logic of what Deleuze defined as ‘cruelty’. In order to clarify this distinction, and the implication it has for our ideas on gouvernmentalité, this chapter will propose a close reading of a painting by Lieve Verschuier that either depicts a peculiar case of keelhauling or, allegorically, the lynching of the brothers De Witt in 1672. Although the painting is clearly theatrical, formally speaking, it superimposes a dramatic logic on the traumatic political event of the lynching of the brothers De Witt. This will be considered in the chapter as one instance of a more general shift in the seventeenth century: a shift away from the theatrical logic of torture to the dramatic logic of cruelty.

The Solution

2020 ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Nicolas Bommarito
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Philosophical Question ◽  
Buddhist Practice ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

This chapter examines two general strands in Buddhism: philosophy and practice. Philosophy involves understanding the nature of the world and the mind. It involves careful examination, reasoning, and analysis of the world in general and the self in particular. Meanwhile, practice involves specific techniques to bring about a change in how we respond to the world. It aims at changing mental habits and ways of experiencing the world. These two aspects can, and often are, discussed separately. This is no surprise given how monumental each task is; people sometimes devote their entire lives to only one philosophical question or Buddhist practice. Nevertheless, these two aspects do inform each other. Philosophy helps to establish the aim of practice. Practice, on the other hand, can help one to have certain experiences which can, in turn, inform ideas about how the world works.

scholarly journals Is There a Metaphysics of Consciousness Without a Phenomenology of Consciousness? Some Thoughts Derived from Husserl's Philosophical Phenomenology

2010 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 141-154
Author(s):  
Eduard Marbach
Keyword(s):  
Subject Matter ◽  
A Priori ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Life Of The Mind ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Philosophical Phenomenology

AbstractThe paper first addresses Husserl's conception of philosophical phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl's view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of consciousness. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl's phenomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori science which has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates; metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, has to do with its reality or actuality, requiring an eidetic foundation in order to become scientifically valuable. Presuming that, if consciousness is to be the subject-matter of a metaphysics which is not simply speculative or based on prejudice, it is crucial to get the phenomenology of consciousness right, the paper then engages in a detailed descriptive-eidetic analysis of mental acts of re-presenting something and tries to argue that their structures, involving components of non-actual experiencing, pose a serious problem for a materialistic or physicalistic metaphysics of consciousness. The paper ends with a brief comment on Husserl's broader view of metaphysics, having to do with the irrationality of the transcendental fact, i.e. the constitution of the factual world and the factual life of the mind.

Nature and Imagination in Wordsworth's Meditation Upon Mt. Snowdon

PMLA ◽  
1937 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 835-847
Author(s):  
Newton P. Stallknecht
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Invisible

For Wordsworth imagination is the link between the visible and the invisible world. Esthetic enjoyment of things visible seems at times to bring the very life of the invisible before us. The more freely we plunge into the beauty of Nature, the more palpable becomes the Spirit of Nature. The grounds for such a belief are mystical and sheerly intuitive: we may not hope to reproduce them in argument. We can trace, however, the ways by which Wordsworth tried to describe such experience and to make it communicable. Throughout, he seems certain that in the apprehension of beauty, the human soul is never isolated, but is in contact with a spiritual urgency, which is the origin of beauty. On the other hand, the agony of Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, his utter loneliness of spirit, is in diametric opposition to any love or enjoyment of Nature. Here the mind is closed to any communion or inspiration. It is also without imaginative enjoyment. The Mariner's release from such isolation depends upon the reawakening of his esthetic sensitiveness. In this essay, we shall consider the relation which seems to pertain in Wordsworth's thought between imagination and our awareness of Nature as a mind or spirit. We shall find that for Wordsworth, the boundaries of the finite soul are not final but seem to expand or almost to disappear in the perception of beauty.

Musical Analysis: Hearing Is Believing?

1984 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Psychological Testing ◽  
The Other ◽  
Musical Analysis ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Perceptual Psychology ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Way

Written by a musician untrained in psychology, this article draws attention to problems arising from the separation of the disciplines of perceptual psychology and musical analysis. Psychologists are apt to make prescriptions about the nature of music based on a narrow and often primitive understanding of the medium. Musicians, on the other hand, are in the habit of basing analysis on sweeping assumptions about the nature of perception for which there is little experimental evidence. The author argues, however, that although it would be useful for such assumptions to be subjected to rigorous psychological testing, the assumptions themselves are not to be dismissed as evidence of the way the mind understands music.

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