Surveying the Transaction Cost Foundations of New Institutional Economics: A Critical Inquiry

2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1045-1072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giorgos Meramveliotakis ◽  
Dimitris Milonakis
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Critical Inquiry

Oliver E. Williamson,

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B. Whitford
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Antitrust Policy ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Policy Analysts ◽  
The Impact ◽  
First Time

This chapter comments on Oliver Williamson’s 1975 book,Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, a critical analysis of how firms operate in markets. Williamson describes a new way of understanding markets and hierarchies by using the term “New Institutional Economics” for the first time. This chapter examines Williamson’s approach and the impact of his book, first by discussing his arguments about markets and hierarchies in relation to what policy analysts sometimes call “the politics of ideas”. It then considers Williamson’s particular interest in antitrust policy as well as his thesis about transaction cost economics. Finally, it evaluates the implications of Williamson’s research for the long-term development of a politics of ideas about firms in markets.

scholarly journals THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS. THE SPECIFICITY OF AGRICULTURAL CONTRACTS

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Marzena Lemanowicz
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Economic Literature ◽  
Contract Signing

The article reviews Polish and foreign economic literature regarding new institutional economics (NIE) and various research approaches used in the framework of NIE. Particular attention was paid to the economic theory of contracts and the transaction costs, as the limitation of transaction costs is indeed the main stimulus for contract signing. Special attention was given to agricultural contracts and their specificity. The article discusses different theories applied in the analysis of contracts, characterizes contracts according to different criteria, and draws attention to the importance of transaction costs in the theory of contracts. In addition, factors which contribute to these costs have been identified, indicating the necessity of adapting the principles of transaction cost economics to the needs of the agricultural sector.

New Institutional Economics

2020 ◽  
pp. 102-124
Author(s):  
Barak Richman
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Real World ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Production Functions ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Intellectual Traditions ◽  
Micro Level

This chapter assesses New Institutional Economics (NIE). It begins by describing the author’s own understanding of the New Private Law (NPL). The chapter then provides a brief introduction to NIE and its intersection with the study of legal doctrines and institutions. NIE’s roots extend—at least—to Ronald Coase’s famous 1937 article, “The Nature of the Firm,” and more likely to the writings of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century political economists. These intellectual traditions have shaped what is now known as NIE into two distinct branches. The first branch examines institutions as “humanly designed constraints that structure political, social, and economic interactions.” The second branch of NIE focuses on more micro-level behavior. Called “the governance branch” and operationalized by transaction cost economics, the foundational idea is to describe firms not in neoclassical terms as production functions, but in organizational terms as governance structures. The chapter explains how both NPL and NIE exhibit the hallmarks of interdisciplinary, scholarly pluralism, and an inquisitive focus on real-world, tractable problems. It concludes with some thoughts about the future of NPL and, in particular, the lessons it can take from NIE’s successes.

scholarly journals Transaction Costs in Planning Literature: A Systematic Review

2021 ◽  
pp. 088541222110620
Author(s):  
Sina Shahab
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Theory ◽  
Planning Systems

“Transaction costs,” as a well-established theory in New Institutional Economics, has been used to explain and analyze various planning matters for about 30 years since its introduction to planning literature. However, there is no study on how planning-related studies have utilized the theory. This paper conducts a systematic review that aims to develop a better understanding of how transaction-cost theory is used in planning literature. The review shows that while potential contributions and implications of transaction costs have been conceptually discussed in planning literature, the empirical studies have remained limited, particularly concerning the magnitude of such costs in planning systems.

The New Institutional Economics Particularities in Subject Matter and Methodology

2003 ◽  
pp. 24-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Shastitko
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Quantitative Estimate ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Empirical Testing ◽  
Methodological Issues ◽  
Four Dimensions ◽  
Fundamental Transformation ◽  
Basic Concepts

Four dimensions related to methodological issues for development of new institutional economics as a research program are considered. Firstly, basic concepts and questions, including institutions, transactions, transaction cost, bounded rationality, assets specificity, fundamental transformation, private conflicts ordering, etc. Secondly, approaches to research by the description of new institutional economics as distinguished from other research programs. Thirdly, a set of models as instruments used for predictions. Fourthly, empirical testing of hypotheses formulated in the models, quantitative estimate.

Embedding organizational arrangements: towards a general model

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 567-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLAUDE MÉNARD
Keyword(s):  
Black Holes ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Hard Core ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Ongoing Research ◽  
Look Ahead ◽  
Recent Developments

AbstractNotwithstanding its major contributions, the ‘Williamsonian’ branch of New Institutional Economics suffers from black holes that recent developments have pinpointed. Rather than taking stock, this paper capitalizes on some of these developments to look ahead. Section 2 provides a reminder of the hard core of transaction cost economics (TCE) with an emphasis on problems that TCE has allowed to identify, particularly the richness of organizational arrangements, an issue that needs further investigation. Section 3 discusses how to better understand the embedment of organizational arrangements in their institutional environment. The concept of ‘meso-institutions’ is introduced as a mean to capture mechanisms providing the needed interface. Section 4 considers another neglected dimension that requires renewed attention: the interactions of organizational arrangements with technologies that partially define their setting. This paper proposes a roadmap to explore this issue, based on an ongoing research developed around the key concept of ‘criticality’. Section 5 concludes.

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