scholarly journals The Effects of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Manufacturing Sector Companies on the Indonesia and Philippines Stock Exchanges

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liliana Inggrit Wijaya ◽  
Arif Herlambang ◽  
Willi Brodus The Mone
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Stock Exchanges

Impact of Corporate Governance on the Cash Holding of the Firms: An Empirical Study of Indian Manufacturing Sector

GIS Business ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 47-52
Author(s):  
Karam Pal Narwal ◽  
Sonia Jindal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Control Variable ◽  
Cash Holding ◽  
Executive Directors ◽  
Control Effect ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Indian Manufacturing Sector ◽  
The Impact

The paper empirically examines the impact of corporate governance on the cash holding of the firms. The components of corporate governance are measured by board size, board meeting, audit committee members, directors remuneration and non executive directors and the cash holding is measured with the log of average cash and size is taken as control variable for the control effect on the dependent variables. Moreover, correlation and panel regression model were employed to examine the relationship between the corporate governance and cash holding. Empirical data was collected from 96 firms over the period of 2004-05 to 2013-14. The results show that directors remuneration and the number of audit committee members positively influence the cash holding and the board size also positively influences the cash holding whereas, the non executive directors and the board meetings do not play any role in enhancing the cash holding.

An Evolutionary Process—The Federalization of Corporate Governance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Federal Law ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley

This chapter provides an overview regarding the federalization of corporate governance as an evolutionary process. From this perspective, the chapter examines both state and federal law that impact corporate governance. As the chapter explains, from a historical perspective, the states emerged as the primary regulator of corporate governance. Today, Delaware has emerged as the preeminent state where publicly-held corporations elect to incorporate. Nonetheless, federal law, even from a traditional perspective, impacted corporate governance, such as the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule adopted over 75 years ago. With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, SEC rules adopted under the authority of these statutes, and the emergence of stricter substantive listing requirements mandated by the national stock exchanges, federal law principles are now firmly established.

Transformations of Self-Regulation and New Public Regulations in the Field of Swiss Corporate Governance (1985-2002)

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Mach ◽  
Gerhard Schnyder ◽  
Thomas David ◽  
Martin Lupold
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Private Governance ◽  
Proxy Voting ◽  
New Public ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Accounting Rules ◽  
Takeover Bids

Switzerland was for a very long time characterised by a strong tradition of self-regulation by private actors in the economic sphere rather than by an extensive and detailed legal framework. This is particularly true in the field of corporate governance and more precisely visible in the Stock Corporation Law, the supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to very lax legal rules, mechanisms of "private governance" complemented the minimal legal framework in these three fields. Over the last twenty or so years, these mechanisms of self-regulation have nonetheless undergone profound change. In fact, private self-regulation has been incrementally formalised and replaced by more specific public regulations in five important fields: the transferability of shares, proxy-voting by banks, takeover bids, supervision of the stock exchanges and accounting rules. Due to changes in the international context, to the shifting preferences of important economic actors, and to the emergence of new actors (institutional investors and accountants), the legal framework of Swiss corporate governance has been reformed in a significant way.

scholarly journals Stakeholders approach on corporate governance and performance of Vietnamese manufacturing firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
Thi Thanh Binh Dao ◽  
Thi Kim Anh Tran
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Production Function ◽  
Functional Form ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
External Factors ◽  
Executive Board ◽  
Internal Factors ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Relationship

Corporate governance is one of the most vital issues in this compound environment at present, which is indicated by the fact that the success or failure of firms strongly depends on performance of the control that board of directors and executive board, take on corporations’ activities. This issue has attracted a variety of researches worldwide, and become a popular buzz lately, however there is still limited researches on this topic in Vietnam. In this paper, we focus on manufacturing sector, one of the most important industries in Vietnam economy, which account for 41.2% of total GDP in 2012. By using stakeholder theory and Kitamura’s paper as a corner stone, a model using OLS regression and log functional form for production function, showing the relationship between some external factors and internal factors including corporate governance is built. From the result of the research, it has been found out that internal factors (corporate governance) significantly affect the firm’s performance, whereas external factors (market share) do not really show any influence. In term of production function, this manufacturing sector still benefits from an increase of capital but not that of labor.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Manufacturing Listed Firms in Ghana

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beatrice Sarpong-Danquah ◽  
Prince Gyimah ◽  
Richard Owusu Afriyie ◽  
Albert Asiama
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Gender Diversity ◽  
Generalized Least Squares ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Listed Firms

This paper assesses the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of manufacturing firms in a developing country. Specifically, the paper investigates whether gender diversity, board independence, and board size affects return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) of manufacturing listed firms in Ghana. We use the generalized least squares (GLS) panel regression model to analyze the dataset of 11 listed manufacturing firms from 2009-2013. Our result reveals an insignificant representation of women on boards. Also, the empirical result shows that board independence and board gender diversity have significant positive effect on ROE and ROA. However, there is no statistical significant relationship between board size and firm performance (ROE and ROA). We suggest that manufacturing firms should appoint female board members as well as outside directors on their boards as this can make significant contribution to firm’s performance. Our study provides the first comprehensive explicit exposition of corporate governance-performance nexus using data from the manufacturing sector in Ghana.

scholarly journals Impact of Corporate Governance index on Firm Performance: evidence from Pakistani manufacturing sector

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faisal Javaid ◽  
Abdul Saboor
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Inconsistent Result ◽  
Governance Index ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Relationship

Corporate governance is considered to have significant impact on the growth and development perspective of an economy. Sound corporate governance practices leads the economy towards the achievement of higher performance, provide sources for capital investment by increasing the creditability of shareholders. The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship of corporate governance and firm performance in terms of accounting as well as market performance i.e.to be measured by Return on asset, Return on equity and Tobin’s Q. The theoretical base to conduct the study is the demand of separation of ownership and control characterize as agency theory. The previous studies have yielded inconsistent result. To achieve the purpose 58 manufacturing sector companies were selected listed in the Karachi stock exchange and data was taken from annual reports of the companies for the period of 2009 to 2013. Descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression estimation using pooled, fixed effect, random effect and Hausman specification test were carried out after developing a composite index based on 21 proxies. The result entails that corporate governance index (CGI) and firm performance has positive and significant association but the relationship for each specific index is dependent upon the measure of firm performance. The result also shows that companies having strong corporate governance mechanism has greater chances to acquire finance. The implication of study demands that the reform effort should be directed towards the improvement in internal corporate governance mechanism and regulatory framework for the governance system.

Corporate governance, accounting transparency and stock exchange sizes in Germany, Japan and «Anglo-Saxon» economies, 1870–1950

2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-186
Author(s):  
Leslie Hannah
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Corporate Bond ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Anglo Saxon ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Legal Origins ◽  
The Us

AbstractModern discussions of corporate governance have focused on convergence of «varieties of capitalism», particularly the recent «Americanisation» of laws and voluntary codes in Germany, Japan, and other civil law countries. However German and Japanese legal and business historians have suggested that corporate governance, accounting transparency or other favourable factors in their countries were historically a match for – or even superior to – those in the US. An alleged consequence was deeper penetration by the Berlin and Tokyo stock exchanges of their domestic economies than of the US by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), using measures such as market capitalization/GDP ratios. This paper reviews the classic Rajan and Zingales data on the sizes of stock exchanges. It concludes that the evidence for Japanese historical precocity relative to the US, after the necessary allowance is made for regional stock exchanges and corporate bond finance, stands up better to this closer examination than that for Germany.Many financial historians now agree that stock exchange development was not historically determined by legal origins («Anglo-Saxon» common vs Euro-Japanese civil law), though today it appears to be driven by legal rules protecting shareholders and/or bondholders and limiting directorial autocracy and information asymmetry. However, both today and historically in some cultures private order rules (voluntary codes, bourse listing requirements, bankers as trusted intermediaries, block-holder monitoring, etc) offered substitute protections, or at least complemented protective laws. This paper reviews the plausibility of these determinants of historical stock exchange sizes – and others that have been neglected – in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere, before 1950.

scholarly journals Social responsibility of a stock exchange: Corporate governance at Borsa Istanbul

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-82
Author(s):  
A. Can Inci
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Call Auction ◽  
Positive Engagement

Accentuated intraday volatility and uncertainty leads to mispricing, inefficiency, and the potential unfair treatment of some market participants. As an important financial institution, the stock exchange is required to find mechanisms to reduce volatility for good corporate governance and for social responsibility. In this paper, one such mechanism, closing call auction, is explored in the actively traded industrials sector of the emerging Borsa Istanbul. Evidence of the successful implementation of the mechanism is provided. Volatility decreases and efficiency of the prices increases after the implementation of the closing call auction. The exchange executives’ positive engagement in good corporate governance is documented and is suggested to other stock exchanges as a social responsibility instrument.

scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance legislation on the market for corporate ownership

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-146
Author(s):  
Joseph Canada ◽  
Tanya Benford ◽  
Vicky Arnold ◽  
Steve G. Sutton
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Managerial Control ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Traditional Markets ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Impact

Over the past few years, the number of corporate scandals and failures throughout the world has escalated, prompting new legislation designed to enhance corporate governance. While the efforts to legislate corporate governance policies are designed to protect the public interest, they have altered the relationship between shareholders and management (Canada et al. 2008). Rather than be subjected to new corporate governance requirements, many companies have indicated an interest in not being traded on the various stock exchanges and have chosen to alter their corporate structure. The purpose of this study is to examine how a company‟s decision to shift corporate ownership and/or corporate control in the face of new corporate governance legislation and regulatory requirements can alter the traditional markets for ownership and control. In order to examine this issue, the paper first develops a typology for predicting the type of organizational restructuring that might occur. This typology incorporates factors from prior research and disentangles the market for ownership from the market for corporate control. The typology is then used as a basis for an in-depth examination of an organization whose corporate structure changed in response to mandated changes in corporate governance. The results provide evidence that corporate governance legislation can potentially induce incumbent management to voluntarily compete in the market for ownership, notwithstanding the associated exposure in the market for managerial control

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