scholarly journals The impact of corporate governance legislation on the market for corporate ownership

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-146
Author(s):  
Joseph Canada ◽  
Tanya Benford ◽  
Vicky Arnold ◽  
Steve G. Sutton

Over the past few years, the number of corporate scandals and failures throughout the world has escalated, prompting new legislation designed to enhance corporate governance. While the efforts to legislate corporate governance policies are designed to protect the public interest, they have altered the relationship between shareholders and management (Canada et al. 2008). Rather than be subjected to new corporate governance requirements, many companies have indicated an interest in not being traded on the various stock exchanges and have chosen to alter their corporate structure. The purpose of this study is to examine how a company‟s decision to shift corporate ownership and/or corporate control in the face of new corporate governance legislation and regulatory requirements can alter the traditional markets for ownership and control. In order to examine this issue, the paper first develops a typology for predicting the type of organizational restructuring that might occur. This typology incorporates factors from prior research and disentangles the market for ownership from the market for corporate control. The typology is then used as a basis for an in-depth examination of an organization whose corporate structure changed in response to mandated changes in corporate governance. The results provide evidence that corporate governance legislation can potentially induce incumbent management to voluntarily compete in the market for ownership, notwithstanding the associated exposure in the market for managerial control

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  

After the recent global crisis, corporate scandals and bankruptcy in US and Europe, there is some certain evidence on weak corporate governance, risk management and audit system. The 2009 India Code of Corporate Governance also revealed that during the crisis time, there are certain weaknesses although corporate structure is fairly durable. Hence, this paper chooses a different analytical approach and among its aims is to give some systematic opinions. First, it classifies limited South Asian representative corporate governance (CG) standards into each group: India and Malaysia latest CG principles covered, so-called relative good CG group, while it uses ACCA and OECD and ICGN principles as reference. Second, it , through analysis, identifies differences and advantages between above set of standards which are and have been used as reference principles for many relevant organizations. Third, it establishes a selected comparative set of standards for South Asian representative corporate governance system in accordance to international standards. Last but not least, this paper covers some ideas and policy suggestions.


Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter focuses on the important role that the national stock exchanges play in the federalization of corporate governance. Responding to federal legislative and SEC directives and, at times, acting on their own initiative, the stock exchanges have promulgated meaningful rules that comprise a significant component of the corporate governance landscape. Although technically not government regulation, the national stock exchanges play a central role in the enhancement of sound corporate governance practices and policies. Examples include the emphasis by the exchanges on independent directors, board committees (including audit, compensation, and nominating committees), and corporate codes of ethics. Hence, when addressing the federalization of corporate governance, stock exchange regulation is to be given prominent status.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Irfan Saleem ◽  
Mujtaba Nasir Ali Khan ◽  
Rashedul Hasan ◽  
Muhammad Ashfaq

Purpose Drawing from the firm’s entrepreneurial identity and ecology perspectives, this study aims to explain why the firms deviate from standard corporate governance practices and apply innovative management control. Design/methodology/approach The authors used a panel of 2,538 public companies listed with the New York Stock Exchange to explain the impact of corporate governance deviance on firm’s performance. The authors relied on unique governance variables extracted from the Bloomberg database to develop the governance deviance index. Findings Study unveils that deviance from governance practices influences firm’s performance. Consequently, it can be said that the firms which use innovative governance mechanisms, usually stay ahead of the market by leading the governance trends. The findings also generalise the firm’s entrepreneurial identity and organisational ecology perspectives. Research limitations/implications Research implies that the firm’s entrepreneurial identity demands innovative managerial control. This study is focused on the US financial market, but in future, researchers could revalidate the deviance index. Scholars can also use mixed methods to test the need for innovative governance mechanisms in emerging markets. Practical implications The firms should focus on innovative governance practices not only to safeguard the firm’s entrepreneurial identity but also to pursue the growth objectives. Such innovative mechanisms and managerial controls are helpful to deal with industrial transformations to satisfy key stakeholders. Originality/value The study contributed to governance and management control research by sharing insights and catering the potential endogeneity problem faced to measure corporate governance measures. The study also proposes an alternative testing tool to measure governance deviance to add methodological uniqueness and reduce knowledge gap.


1987 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael W. Santos

Although historians have thoroughly discussed the impact of transformations in the workplace and the corporate structure that accompanied the rise of modern business enterprises, Professor Santos argues that they have ignored the traditional firms that continued to exist amid these changes. Constituting a significant portion of companies operating in the industrial economy, firms like Byers employed simple systems of managerial control based on the entrepreneurs' personal authority and property interest in the business. While labor policy at modern corporations was shaped by the managers' need to establish administrative control over the production and distribution systems, Byers's labor policy was defined by family attitude and the company's history.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
Khairi Aseh ◽  
Kamal Kenny ◽  
Ravindran Pathmanathan

In recent years, with corporate scandals and the global financial crisis, the emerging concept of corporate governance has received increasing attention in the corporate world in these days. It is seen as a moral obligation and includes supporting the consistency of the law and showing ethical guidance. Corporate governance is seen as an important tool for the financial performance of companies, and investor investment decisions have become a more serious topic, so the relationship between corporate governance tools and measurement of financial performance has attracted researchers' interest in the past decade mainly in developed and developing cities. In this study, we attempted to examine the impact of corporate governance on corporate financial performance in Kuala Lumpur using a sample of 215 companies on KLSE. Like previous research, firm, age, firm size, board size, CEO duality, board composition, board committees is the independent variables and their influence is to measure the financial ROA, ROE and Tobin's q , all kinds of test is used to investigate the relationship such as descriptive analysis, Pearson moment related test and regression using first data over a period of time.


Author(s):  
Fadi Edaily ◽  
Norfadzilah Rashid ◽  
Osama Abdulmunim Ali ◽  
Saqer Al-Tahat ◽  
Mazen Basha

Author(s):  
Aarooj Kiran ◽  
Ayesha Ibrahim

In the wake of corporate scandals in major companies like Enron, Tyco, and East Asian crisis have emphasized the need of sufficient number of independent directors on the board for proper oversight and functioning of the company. Code of corporate governance recommends the presence of independent directors for better performance of the company. As board independence ensured good corporate governance practices, it is considered that having independent directors on the board is not for better performance but for better governance. In seeking reasonable answer for these arguments, the purpose of this study is to review some of the literature of board independence with respect to corporate governance theories specifically agency theory, stewardship, and resource dependency theory. All these theories have provided mixed evidences in different studies about the impact and importance of board independence and reason behind these mixed evidences might be the institutional context of different organizations in different countries.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Kenny

[Editors’ Comment: The following is the text of Mr. Kenny's remarks at the Second European Corporate Governance Conference, which was organized by the Vlerick Management Institute and the University of Gent, Belgium, and held at the Belgian National Bank, Brussels, 28 & 29 November 2002. The conference, which was convened by Professor Lutgart Van den Berghe of the University of Gent, was dedicated to the intensive debate over the marks and characteristics of “European Capitalism” in light of the international corporate governance debate, which has been affected by the recent earthquakes in the confidence of investors, shareholders and stakeholders precipitated by the corporate scandals of Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing and others. The conference also took note of the impact of America's new Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, which seeks to respond to the wave of corporate scandals, on the international corporate governance debate.


Author(s):  
Irina Belayeva ◽  
Olga Danilova ◽  
Kirill Uskov

The article deals with the influence of ownership relations on the elements of corporate governance in modern Russian companies. The assessed parameters that help to reveal the rela-tion have been offered: shareholder influence, notice of a general meeting of shareholders, infor-mation in notifications, availability of general meetings of shareholders, proxy voting, financial re-porting standards, access to documentation, etc. The analysis of the specific features of corporate governance in the Russian public joint-stock companies on the basis of open sources of information has been carried out. The study was conducted using the GAMMA method developed by the rating agency Standard & Poor’s. The main results of the study showed that the greater the representation of minority shareholders and/or higher their activity, the more independent directors in the company, the higher the level of disclosure. If there is one large private shareholder in the company, he can also act as chairman of the board of directors. It is difficult to assess the impact of ownership relations on corporate governance in state-owned companies. If the company has a small number of minority shareholders and their activity is low, transparency is limited only by disclosure of mandatory information. It has been inferred that the peculiarities of relations between shareholders, as well as relations between shareholders and hired managers indirectly affect corporate governance’s elements. Models of the corporate control in the Russian Federation have been given (private enterprise model, managers' collective ownership model, concentrated ownership corporate control model, dispersed ownership corporate control model). More research is needed to identify a more evident relation. The article has been written in the framework of the research work “De-velopment of property relations in a modern society”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria João Guedes

In recent years, corporate governance has been a popular topic of research, especially in the aftermath of corporate scandals and financial crisis. These events highlighted the effects that weak corporate governance may have in corporations, resulting in poor management decisions and financial performance, and even ending in the collapse of some corporations. This new issue (volume 18, issue 1) of the journal Corporate Ownership and Control contains an interesting selection of articles, with contributions on the role of different types of ownership (e.g., family and state-owned enterprises) and corporate governance mechanism, from internal control to new forms of socially responsible accountability in order to enable the corporations to ensure a commitment to all stakeholders and a safe global environment for the future.


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