Upon entering office in January 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower faced the challenge of satisfying the seemingly incompatible requirements of ensuring u.s. national security, especially in politically unstable East Asia, while limiting military spending. He adopted a robust policy of military aid, defense support, and security partnerships to limit American costs, while presenting a credible military force posture. This article examines the place the Mutual Security Program (msp) occupied in Eisenhower’s strategic policies and the role American military aid and advising played in developing a defensive military force on Taiwan. This case study provides compelling evidence of how Eisenhower’s mutual security program of allied “army building,” focusing on the development of military institutions, particularly military education, was an essential, but underappreciated, counterpart to the “New Look” strategic program. In particular, u.s. support for Taiwan during the Eisenhower administration was a key “strategic bargain,” where it could create a low-cost deterrent capability without the deployment of u.s. combat forces, and develop durable government institutions in allied Asian nations.
Why Did The Eisenhower Administration Decide To Deploy Jupiter Missiles In Turkey: A Case Study In Nuclearization Of Nato Strategy
