“Silly and Superficial”: Headline Tone in Press TV and Voice of America Coverage of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

2022 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Butler Cain

On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. President Trump had campaigned on removing the U.S. from the nuclear agreement, but the announcement still caught Iran and other parties to the JCPOA by surprise. This research analyzed three days of JCPOA-related news headlines from two international broadcasters: Press TV, headquartered in Tehran, and Voice of America, located in Washington, D.C. The majority of headlines published by both news organizations exhibited negative tone. Considering that reading a headline often substitutes for reading an entire news report, examining the headlines these international broadcasters used to present this event to their global audiences is a worthwhile pursuit. Keywords: Iran, United States, nuclear, headline, tone

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 130-134

This section, updated regularly on the blog Palestine Square, covers popular conversations related to the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the quarter 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018: #JerusalemIstheCapitalofPalestine went viral after U.S. president Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced his intention to move the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. The arrest of Palestinian teenager Ahed Tamimi for slapping an Israeli soldier also prompted a viral campaign under the hashtag #FreeAhed. A smaller campaign protested the exclusion of Palestinian human rights from the agenda of the annual Creating Change conference organized by the US-based National LGBTQ Task Force in Washington. And, UNRWA publicized its emergency funding appeal, following the decision of the United States to slash funding to the organization, with the hashtag #DignityIsPriceless.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 135-171
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This update summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and Israel during the quarter from 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018. Highlights include: U.S. president Donald Trump pledged to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and formally recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, reversing decades of U.S. policy. His decision provoked an international backlash, sparked a wave of protests and clashes in the occupied Palestinian territories, and compromised his own diplomatic efforts. The Israelis celebrated Trump's decision, while the Palestinians cited it as an illustration of the United States' pro-Israel bias and as the reason for their rejection of U.S. mediation in any future peace talks. Outraged, Trump ordered punitive cuts to U.S. humanitarian aid designated for Palestinian refugees, further undercutting any peace initiative, which advisors insisted was still under way. The Palestinians began pursuing a new, multilateral framework to continue the peace process. Amid these developments, the Palestinian national reconciliation process stalled once again.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Hwee-rhak Park

Abstract This article analyzed the two summits between United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019 respectively, from a negotiation theory perspective. The results of the analysis showed that the goals and bottom lines of the negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea were quite opposite to reach a meaningful agreement because the former wanted to dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons while the latter did not. President Trump opted for a hard positional negotiation strategy at the Hanoi summit, unlike the soft positional negotiation strategy he opted at the Singapore summit. However, Kim Jong-un maintained a hard positional strategy throughout the whole process which led to the failure of these summits. When it comes to a “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA), President Trump did not imply any BATNA before or during the Singapore summit, while Kim demonstrated a new BATNA, i.e. China. However, both leaders did not prepare any BATNA for the Hanoi summit, except for a collapse of the negotiation by the U.S. Both of them depended on a top-down decision-making style throughout the whole negotiations without the working-level officials in the decisions. By analyzing all these, the article found that President Trump did not follow the recommendations that negotiation theorists had suggested for a successful negotiation, failing to achieve any progress on the denuclearization of North Korea.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Chachko

On October 3, 2018, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a unanimous order indicating limited provisional measures against the United States. Iran initiated the case, Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), after the United States announced its decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and revoke related sanctions relief for Iran. While the ICJ found that it had prima facie jurisdiction to hear the case—contrary to the U.S. position—the provisional measures it granted fell significantly short of the relief Iran sought. The Court also hinted that it might accept a significant element of the U.S. jurisdictional objection at the merits stage of the case.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 318-322
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Pelias

Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, I find myself struggling, wanting to find a narrative that will let me sleep, but I am unable to find any comfort in the current political landscape. I call upon a fragmentary structure in this autoethnographic essay to display the troubling thoughts and incidents that have assailed me since the election, to point toward a frightening right wing agenda, and to demonstrate why I cannot sleep. Each numbered section offers evidence that the moral core of the United States has been deeply damaged by the election of Donald Trump.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-781

Iran, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and the European Union agreed to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit the scope and content of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from various nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the other signatories. Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump denounced the JCPOA. He said that, if elected, he would “renegotiate with Iran—right after … enabl[ing] the immediate release of our American prisoners and ask[ing] Congress to impose new sanctions that stop Iran from having the ability to sponsor terrorism around the world.” So far, however, the Trump administration has kept the agreement in place. The United States has continued to acknowledge Iran's compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and has waived various sanctions against Iran in compliance with its own obligations thereunder. Iran, by contrast, has charged the United States with failing to live up to its own JCPOA commitments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-175
Author(s):  
Wildan Ilmanuarif Shafar ◽  
Dian Mutmainah

Since 2015 the United States has been a signatory of the historic nuclear agreement with Iran known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was also agreed by other P5+1 countries. JCPOA is the achievement of the U.S. and other P5+1 countries' negotiations with Iran regarding the limitation of Iran's nuclear program. JCPOA is also known to be the vital instrument to reduce Iran's capabilities regarding its aggressive behavior and malign activities, creating destabilization in the Middle East. However, in 2018 the United States government decided to withdraw its participation from the JCPOA. As we know, this decision had an impact on Iran's behavior, which several times violated the contents of the JCPOA agreement even though they did not leave the agreement. We are also witnessing the impact of this decision increase the conflict between the US and Iran in recent years. This research aims to explain the rationale of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran in 2018. This research using the foreign policy decision-making framework model by Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. This concept focuses on explaining factors of foreign policy decision-making in three sources of analysis and the process of foreign policy-making based on rational choice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 297
Author(s):  
Satwika Paramasatya ◽  
Sigit Wiranto

Iran Nuclear Agreement or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)was the result of diplomatic negotiations achieved by the United States,United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, Germany, and Iran in 2015. Thenewly elected president of the United States Donald Trump brought newpolicies to the Iran’s nuclear issue. On May 8, 2018 The US governmentunilaterally withdraw themselves from the JCPOA agreement anddecided to reimpose the sanctions for Iran. This research tries to analyzewhy the US changed its policy to withdraw from the nuclear agreement byusing analytic eclecticism, with the combination of the security dilemmaand cognitive consistency theory. The result of this research shows thatthe US’ withdrawal from JCPOA psychologically caused by Trump’scognitive consistency. He thought that Iran’s nuclear agreement is a badand unreliable agreement because under this nuclear agreement, US andits allies still feel the security dilemma. Therefore, it pushed Trump toincrease the pressure to Iran by withdrawing themselves from the nuclearagreement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 183
Author(s):  
Mohamad Amine El Khalfi

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the result of diplomatic negotiations reached by the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, Germany and Iran in 2015 regarding the Iran Nuclear Agreement. The emergence of this agreement was due to Iran's actions abusing its nuclear development to serve as a weapon of mass destruction in 2011. In response to this, Western countries imposed economic sanctions on Iran in the hope of weakening Iran's position so that it does not have the ability to continue its nuclear weapons program. In fact, these sanctions succeeded in weakening the Iranian economy but were not politically effective enough because the Iranian government remained strong, this led to Iran being still involved in various conflicts in the region and still insisting on developing its uranium enrichment. Iran's tough stance made Western countries choose to bring Iran into the negotiations by making offers that could attract Iran's attention. During the Obama administration, the United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the talks. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020. The United States succeeded in bringing Iran into the negotiations. An achievement when the United States together with Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany succeeded in getting Iran to agree to stop developing its nuclear weapons in exchange for the lifting of sanctions from the West. However, when the Donald Trump administration tensions began to re-emerge with the assassination of one of Iran's war generals that took place in 2020.


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