Update on Conflict and Diplomacy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 135-171
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This update summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and Israel during the quarter from 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018. Highlights include: U.S. president Donald Trump pledged to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and formally recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, reversing decades of U.S. policy. His decision provoked an international backlash, sparked a wave of protests and clashes in the occupied Palestinian territories, and compromised his own diplomatic efforts. The Israelis celebrated Trump's decision, while the Palestinians cited it as an illustration of the United States' pro-Israel bias and as the reason for their rejection of U.S. mediation in any future peace talks. Outraged, Trump ordered punitive cuts to U.S. humanitarian aid designated for Palestinian refugees, further undercutting any peace initiative, which advisors insisted was still under way. The Palestinians began pursuing a new, multilateral framework to continue the peace process. Amid these developments, the Palestinian national reconciliation process stalled once again.

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-37
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This is part 137 of a chronology begun in JPS 13, no. 3 (Spring 1984), and covers events from 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018 on the ground in the occupied Palestinian territories and in the diplomatic sphere, regionally and internationally. U.S. president Donald Trump pledged to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and formally recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital, reversing decades of U.S. policy. His decision drew an international backlash, sparked a wave of protests and clashes in the oPt, and severely compromised his administration's peace-making efforts. While Israelis celebrated Trump's decision, the Palestinians argued that it demonstrated Trump's pro-Israel bias and announced their refusal to accept the U.S. as the sole mediator in any future peace talks. Furious with the Palestinian response, Trump ordered punitive cuts to U.S. humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people, further undermining his own peace initiative, which advisors insisted was still underway. The Palestinians began pursuing a new, multilateral framework to continue the peace process. Amid these developments, the Palestinian national reconciliation process stalled again.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 130-134

This section, updated regularly on the blog Palestine Square, covers popular conversations related to the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict during the quarter 16 November 2017 to 15 February 2018: #JerusalemIstheCapitalofPalestine went viral after U.S. president Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced his intention to move the U.S. embassy there from Tel Aviv. The arrest of Palestinian teenager Ahed Tamimi for slapping an Israeli soldier also prompted a viral campaign under the hashtag #FreeAhed. A smaller campaign protested the exclusion of Palestinian human rights from the agenda of the annual Creating Change conference organized by the US-based National LGBTQ Task Force in Washington. And, UNRWA publicized its emergency funding appeal, following the decision of the United States to slash funding to the organization, with the hashtag #DignityIsPriceless.


2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Hwee-rhak Park

Abstract This article analyzed the two summits between United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019 respectively, from a negotiation theory perspective. The results of the analysis showed that the goals and bottom lines of the negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea were quite opposite to reach a meaningful agreement because the former wanted to dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons while the latter did not. President Trump opted for a hard positional negotiation strategy at the Hanoi summit, unlike the soft positional negotiation strategy he opted at the Singapore summit. However, Kim Jong-un maintained a hard positional strategy throughout the whole process which led to the failure of these summits. When it comes to a “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA), President Trump did not imply any BATNA before or during the Singapore summit, while Kim demonstrated a new BATNA, i.e. China. However, both leaders did not prepare any BATNA for the Hanoi summit, except for a collapse of the negotiation by the U.S. Both of them depended on a top-down decision-making style throughout the whole negotiations without the working-level officials in the decisions. By analyzing all these, the article found that President Trump did not follow the recommendations that negotiation theorists had suggested for a successful negotiation, failing to achieve any progress on the denuclearization of North Korea.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
V. I. Bartenev

This paper identifi es and explains key changes in the U.S. aid policies towards Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) under Donald Trump. It seeks to validate two widespread arguments — the one about the current administration’s revision of pivotal principles of providing foreign assistance, and the other one — about an accelerated disengagement of the United States from the MENA region since 2017. The paper consists of four sections. The fi rst section explores the transformation of the U.S. strategic thinking and regional context under the Trump administration and then posits fi ve hypotheses about possible changes in the volume and composition of the U.S. assistance to the MENA region (in comparison with the fi nal two years of the Obama administration), as well as the diff erences in the executive branch and the Congress’s positions. The second section explains particularities of the statistical data and the methods of its exploration, the third section presents the results of hypothesis testing using aggregated data on aid fl ows to the region, and the fi nal section explains these results, sometimes unexpected, using the data disaggregated by country. Three of fi ve hypotheses proved wrong based on the aggregate data. First, the Trump administration did not cut assistance to the MENA more substantially than to other regions of the globe. Second, it did not ringfence aid accounts which helped yield direct dividends to the U.S. businesses. Third, the Republican Congress was clearly less willing to support the executive’s aid chocies under a new Republican President than during the last years of a Democrat Barack Obama’s second term. Only two hypotheses proved correct — one about a prioritization of security and military assistance under Donald Trump and the other one — about disproportionate cuts of democracy promotion assistance. Such an unexpected result calls for refi ning both aforementioned arguments and taking into account the dissimilarities in the dynamics of assistance to diff erent countries. The United States tends to practice a diff erentiated approach in dealing with two largest Arab aid recipients (Egypt and Jordan) and with other Arab countries. The assistance to Cairo and Amman is ringfenced and protected, while aid to other recipients, including security assistance and FMF grants, is prone to quite drastic cuts. This diff erentiation is explained by the fact that cooperation with Egypt and Jordan rests not only on more solid strategic foundations but also on a strong support within the United States — both from the defense contractors interested in large export contracts and from an infl uential pro-Israel lobby. The U.S. will not abandon this highly diff erentiated approach after the 2020 elections but the structure of assistance to the MENA region might undergo quite a dramatic transformation.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 318-322
Author(s):  
Ronald J. Pelias

Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election, I find myself struggling, wanting to find a narrative that will let me sleep, but I am unable to find any comfort in the current political landscape. I call upon a fragmentary structure in this autoethnographic essay to display the troubling thoughts and incidents that have assailed me since the election, to point toward a frightening right wing agenda, and to demonstrate why I cannot sleep. Each numbered section offers evidence that the moral core of the United States has been deeply damaged by the election of Donald Trump.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-157
Author(s):  
Paul Karolyi

This update summarizes bilateral, multilateral, regional, and international events affecting the Palestinians and the future of the peace process. It covers the quarter beginning on 16 August and ending on 15 November 2016. The surge of violence that escalated during the Jewish High Holidays in 9/2015 continued to subside this quarter. This year's holidays passed without major incidents. While the Palestinian Authority and Israeli government reached deals on electricity and postal service, neither altered their positions on a return to final-status negotiations, despite ongoing initiatives from the international community. The Palestinian leadership advanced initiatives in international institutions, including the United Nations Security Council. The recently reshuffled Israeli govt. instituted a new carrot-and-stick policy for administering the occupied Palestinian territories while struggling with internal differences over Amona, an illegal Israeli settlement outpost, as well as with the settlement enterprise itself. Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, ushering in a Republican-dominated U.S. government that portends significant changes to the U.S. position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


2022 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Butler Cain

On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the United States would withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. President Trump had campaigned on removing the U.S. from the nuclear agreement, but the announcement still caught Iran and other parties to the JCPOA by surprise. This research analyzed three days of JCPOA-related news headlines from two international broadcasters: Press TV, headquartered in Tehran, and Voice of America, located in Washington, D.C. The majority of headlines published by both news organizations exhibited negative tone. Considering that reading a headline often substitutes for reading an entire news report, examining the headlines these international broadcasters used to present this event to their global audiences is a worthwhile pursuit. Keywords: Iran, United States, nuclear, headline, tone


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-406
Author(s):  
Kurt Weyland

How grave is the threat that populist leaders pose to democracy? To elucidate the prospects of the United States under president Donald Trump, I conduct a wide-ranging comparative analysis of populism’s regime impact in Europe and Latin America. The investigation finds that the risks have been overestimated. Populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only when two crucial conditions coincide. First, institutional weakness, which comes in various types, creates vulnerabilities to populist power grabs. Second, even in weaker institutional settings populist leaders can only succeed with their illiberal machinations if acute yet resolvable crises or extraordinary bonanzas give them overwhelming support which enables them to override and dismantle institutional constraints to power concentration. Because none of these conditions prevail in the United States, an undemocratic involution is very unlikely. First, the federal system of checks and balances, rooted in an unusually rigid constitution, remains firm and stable. Second, President Trump encountered neither acute crises nor a huge windfall; consequently, his mass support has remained limited. Facing strong resistance from an energized opposition party and a vibrant civil society, the U.S. populist cannot destroy democracy. Instead, Trump’s transgressions of norms of civility have sparked an intense counter-mobilization that may inadvertently revitalize U.S. democracy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 104-118
Author(s):  
Michael R. Fischbach

The September 2018 decision by the administration of U.S. president Donald Trump to close the offices of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Washington and expel the PLO ambassador and his family was the latest chapter in the long and difficult history of Palestinian efforts to maintain information and diplomatic offices in the United States. From the opening of the first Arab information office in the United States in 1945, to the establishment of the first specifically Palestinian information center in 1955, to the creation of the first PLO office in 1965, the Palestinians’ twin goals of representing their people and providing information about their cause on the soil of Israel's greatest ally has been hindered by challenges and threats from a variety of sources. Indeed, the long saga of trying to maintain an official presence in the United States is a microcosm of the wider Palestinian national drama of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, replete with Zionist attacks, debilitating inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian rivalries, political ineptitude, the struggle to achieve diplomatic legitimacy, and hostility from the U.S. government and its pro-Zionist politicians.


2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 80-101
Author(s):  
Walid Khalidi

One of the most difficult issues of the final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is Jerusalem. The complexity of this issue has been compounded by U.S. actions to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and by allegations that the prospective site of the embassy is Palestinian refugee property confiscated by Israel since 1948. Evidence of Palestinian ownership of the 7.7-acre site-the subject of this report-was gathered by a group of Palestinians from the records of the United Nations Conciliation Committee on Palestine (UNCCP) in New York, the Public Records Office (PRO) in London, the U.S. State Department (DOS), the Jerusalem Municipality, the Israeli Land Registry Records (Tapu), the Israeli Ministry of justice, and heirs of the original owners. The research extended over a six-year period and involved some forty individuals. Although hampered by the inaccessibility of the site to surveyors and by Israel's rezoning and reparcellation of the land in question, the evidence yielded by this research shows that at least 70 percent of the site is refugee private property, of which more than a third is Islamic waqf (trust). On 15 May 1948, the last day of the Mandate, the site was owned by seventy-six Palestinians. On 28 October 1999, the American Committee on Jerusalem (ACJ) addressed a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlining the results of this research and requesting a meeting to share the findings with the DOS. It was only on 28 December that the DOS replied to the effect that any data that the group had should be communicated to the DOS "to be kept on file." Given the grave implications of the embassy issue for the peace process and the credibility of the United States, the ACJ felt as a result of the correspondence that it had no alternative but to go public.


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