scholarly journals Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level

<p></p><p>Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p><br><p></p>

scholarly journals Does intense electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level

<p></p><p>Does intense electoral competition in electoral autocracies (EAs) increase the government health expenditure? Previous studies on EAs and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs as a significant determinant on the expenditure. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators; hence. multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture well-known impact of elections, such as the electoral competition increasing health expenditure. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. This paper analyzes the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition indicates a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health expenditure to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p><br><p></p>

scholarly journals Does electoral competition increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Electoral Competition ◽  
Health Issues ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact

<p>Previous studies on the electoral autocracies (EAs) and public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in EAs. Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators. Multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture the impact of characteristics during elections such as the electoral competition in EAs. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competition is high. I analyze the effect of electoral competition on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competition affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competition stands for a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health policy to voters when the level of electoral competition is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competition in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competition does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competition in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p>

scholarly journals Does electoral competitiveness increase the government health expenditure in EAs?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong Woo Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Electoral Competitiveness

<p>Previous studies on the public health expenditure focus on the presence of multiparty elections in electoral autocracies (EAs). Most of elections in EAs often are unfair because those are for the victory of dictators. Multiparty elections <i>per se</i> do not capture the impact of characteristics during elections such as the electoral competitiveness in EAs. Some EAs pay health expenditure less than others even though electoral competitiveness is high. I analyze the effect of electoral competitiveness on the government health expenditure with the balanced panel data of 20 EAs from 2001 to 2017. There are two rival arguments on how electoral competitiveness affect the expenditure according to previous studies; (a) a high level of electoral competitiveness stands for a difficulty of dictatorial winning in elections. Autocrats, hence, gather various demands including health issues from voters, and can increase the government health expenditure; (b) Autocrats pursue the victory in elections. Pork and personal benefits to voters rather than programmed policies are helpful for the victory. Therefore, there is no incentive for autocrats to provide government health policy to voters when the level of electoral competitiveness is high. Empirical findings demonstrate that electoral competitiveness in EAs lead the decrease of government health expenditure. This paper concludes that electoral competitiveness does not increase the public health expenditure; the higher level of competitiveness in autocracies does not mean that voters can exert their power to autocrats to realize policies.</p>

scholarly journals How the Chinese Government Has Done with Public Health from the Perspective of the Evaluation and Comparison about Public-Health Expenditure

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (24) ◽  
pp. 9272
Author(s):  
Hui Jin ◽  
Xinyi Qian
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Growth Trend ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Health Emergencies ◽  
The Government ◽  
Chinese Public

The COVID-19 epidemic has crashed on the social and economic stability of China and even the world, and raised the question: how has the Chinese government done with public health in recent years? The purpose of this paper is to clarify the definition and items of Chinese public-health expenditure, then to objectively evaluate the Chinese government’s performance, so as to help the government to perform better in public health. To achieve this goal, we measure the Chinese public-health expenditure at national and provincial levels based on our definition, and then compare it with the expenditures of other countries. The results show that: (1) the level of public-health expenditure in China is relatively low and far lower than that in developed countries; (2) Chinese governments have not paid enough attention to the prevention and control of major public-health emergencies, which may be an important reason for the outbreak of COVID-19; (3) Chinese public-health expenditure shows a fluctuating growth trend, but the growth rate is so slow that it is lower than that of GDP and fiscal expenditure; (4) although the Chinese government inclines the public-health expenditure to the poor provinces in central and western regions, the imbalance and inequity of public-health resource allocation are still expanding among provinces; (5) there is a lot of waste of resources in the public-health system, which seriously reduces the efficiency of public-health expenditure in China. Therefore, the Chinese government should improve the quantity and quality of public-health expenditure in the above aspects.

Empirical analysis of factors influencing the public health expenditure in Malaysia

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Kok Wooi Yap ◽  
Doris Padmini Selvaratnam
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Mortality Rate ◽  
Infant Mortality ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Price Index ◽  
Infant Mortality Rate ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Per Capita

This study aims to investigate the determinants of public health expenditure in Malaysia. An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach proposed by Pesaran & Shin (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001) is applied to analyse annual time series data during the period from 1970 to 2017. The study focused on four explanatory variables, namely per capita gross domestic product (GDP), healthcare price index, population aged 65 years and above, as well as infant mortality rate. The bounds test results showed that the public health expenditure and its determinants are cointegrated. The empirical results revealed that the elasticity of government health expenditure with respect to national income is less than unity, indicating that public health expenditure in Malaysia is a necessity good and thus the Wagner’s law does not exist to explain the relationship between public health expenditure and economic growth in Malaysia. In the long run, per capita GDP, healthcare price index, population aged more than 65 years, and infant mortality rate are the important variables in explaining the behaviour of public health expenditure in Malaysia. The empirical results also prove that infant mortality rate is significant in influencing public health spending in the short run. It is noted that macroeconomic and health status factors assume an important role in determining the public health expenditure in Malaysia and thus government policies and strategies should be made by taking into account of these aspects.

Health Status, Government Health Expenditure and Economic Growth Nexus in India: A Toda–Yamamoto Causality Approach

2020 ◽  
pp. 097674792096340
Author(s):  
Avinash Kaur
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Health Status ◽  
Mortality Rate ◽  
Infant Mortality ◽  
Life Expectancy ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Infant Mortality Rate ◽  
Government Health ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Health Expenditure

This article attempts to examine the causal linkage among government health expenditure, health status and economic growth in India for the period from 1981–1982 to 2015–2016. The results of Johansen co-integration test indicate that government health expenditure, health status and economic growth have long-run relationship in India. The results of Toda–Yamamoto causality test showed that there existed unidirectional causal relationship running from government health expenditure to gross domestic product—GDP (economic growth); GDP (economic growth) to life expectancy; government health expenditure to infant mortality rate and infant mortality rate to life expectancy. On the other hand, there is no evidence showing causality in any direction between infant mortality rate to GDP (economic growth) and government health expenditure to life expectancy. The study strongly confirmed that the government health expenditure has an effect on GDP (economic growth) and infant mortality rate (which depicts health status) in India. The health outcomes, namely life expectancy and infant mortality rare, reveal unidirectional causality between them. Therefore, the study concludes that policymakers and the government should pay proper attention to the health sector in order to ultimately achieve economic growth in the country.

scholarly journals Optimum Testing Strategy for COVID-19 and Its Effect on Health Expenditure in India: An Experience of the Initial 155 Days of the Pandemic

2021 ◽  
pp. 001946622098182
Author(s):  
Saswata Ghosh ◽  
Arup Kumar Das ◽  
Akhilesh Yadav
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Health System ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Health Expenditure ◽  
Health Spending ◽  
Published Data ◽  
Middle Income ◽  
Public Health Expenditure ◽  
The Public ◽  
Testing Rate

India has gradually increased its testing capacity of COVID-19 by mid-September 2020. However, the level of testing is substantially low in comparison with many high- and middle-income countries. Evidently, the pandemic in India is likely to be prolonged and affect millions in comparison to other countries, due to its huge population size. The possibility of a sudden upsurge of infections may turn overwhelming, jeopardising the health system, if an appropriate testing policy is not immediately adopted, given that the public health expenditure capacity of India has remained at a suboptimal level. Against this backdrop, a descriptive analysis has been carried out using the published data of the number of infections, tests and daily COVID-19 cases and public health expenditure data published by different sources and available in the public domain. The analysis suggests that a differential strategy is required to deal with the situation, which varies across states and depends upon the health spending capacity of individual states and their population size, among other factors. The specific strategy recommendations would be as follows. First, the testing rate should not be too high or too low, and this can be assessed using a marker: marginal return on testing. Second, India should follow the upper-middle-income-country standard in assessing the testing rate. Third, as a long-term strategy, there is a need to strengthen the public health system to avert a future catastrophe in the form of such pandemic.

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