scholarly journals Correcting Inaccurate Metaperceptions Reduces Americans’ Support for Partisan Violence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Mernyk ◽  
Sophia Lerner Pink ◽  
James Druckman ◽  
Robb Willer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
The United States ◽  
Total N ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Willingness To Engage

Scholars, policy makers, and the general public have expressed growing concern about the possibility of large-scale political violence in the United States. These worries find support in studies revealing that many American partisans support the use of violence against rival partisans. Here we propose that support for partisan violence is based in part on greatly exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans’ support for violence. We also predict that correcting these inaccurate “metaperceptions” can reduce partisans’ own support for partisan violence. We test these hypotheses in a series of pre-registered, nationally representative, correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies (total n = 4,741), collected both before and after the 2020 U.S. Presidential election and the 2021 U.S. Capitol attack. In Studies 1 and 2 we found that both Democrats’ and Republicans’ perceptions of their rival partisans’ support for violence and willingness to engage in violence were very inaccurate, with estimates ranging from 239% to 489% higher than actual levels. Further, we find that a brief, informational correction of these misperceptions reduced support for violence by 37% (Study 3) and willingness to engage in violence by 44% (Study 4). In the latter study, a follow-up survey revealed the correction continued to significantly reduce support for violence approximately one month following the study. Together, these results suggest that support for partisan violence in the United States stems in part from systematic overestimations of rival partisans’ support for violence, and that correcting these misperceptions can durably reduce support for partisan violence in the mass public.

Partisanship and violent intentions in the United States

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oluf Gøtzsche-Astrup
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
The United States ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Total N ◽  
Original Population ◽  
The Past ◽  
Drastic Increase

We have witnessed a drastic increase in partisanship in the United States in the past decades. This increase has sparked concern about the risk that the effects may not be as benign as the positive political engagement and activism behaviors that the political science literature has traditionally investigated. This paper explicitly targets the risk that increased partisan identities may lead to stronger intentions to engage in violent political behaviors. By integrating insights form the literature on radicalization to political violence, and using three original, population representative cross-sectional and experimental studies of adult Americans (total n=3,797), this paper shows that stronger partisan identities drive stronger intentions to engage in political violence, but that this effect holds for partisans with a callous, manipulative personality structure only.

scholarly journals Impact of the first COVID-19 shelter-in-place order in the United States on emergency department utilization, Marin County, California

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett R. Bayles ◽  
Michaela F George ◽  
Haylea Hannah ◽  
Patti Culross ◽  
Rochelle R. Ereman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
San Francisco ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Temporal Dynamics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Emergency Department Utilization ◽  
Marin County ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Ed Visits ◽  
The Impact

Background: The first shelter-in-place (SIP) order in the United States was issued across six counties in the San Francisco Bay Area to reduce the impact of COVID-19 on critical care resources. We sought to assess the impact of this large-scale intervention on emergency departments (ED) in Marin County, California. Methods: We conducted a retrospective descriptive and trend analysis of all ED visits in Marin County, California from January 1, 2018 to May 4, 2020 to quantify the temporal dynamics of ED utilization before and after the March 17, 2020 SIP order. Results: The average number of ED visits per day decreased by 52.3% following the SIP order compared to corresponding time periods in 2018 and 2019. Both respiratory and non-respiratory visits declined, but this negative trend was most pronounced for non-respiratory admissions. Conclusions: The first SIP order to be issued in the United States in response to COVID-19 was associated with a significant reduction in ED utilization in Marin County.

scholarly journals Is Men's Heterosexuality Perceived as More Precarious than Women's? An Intersectional, Race-by-Gender Analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher D Petsko ◽  
Tony Silva ◽  
Stefan Vogler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sexual Behavior ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
The United States ◽  
Target Person ◽  
Gender Analysis ◽  
Same Sex ◽  
Nationally Representative

In the United States, people perceive men’s masculinity to be more precarious, or easier to lose, than women’s femininity. In the present manuscript, we investigated (1) whether men’s heterosexuality is likewise perceived to be more precarious than women’s, and if so, (2) whether this effect is exaggerated when the targets in question are Black rather than White. To investigate these questions, we conducted a large-scale (N = 3,010), nationally representative experiment in which participants read about a target person who either did or did not engage in a single same-sex sexual behavior. Results revealed that participants questioned the heterosexuality of men more than the heterosexuality of women when they engaged (vs. did not engage) in a same-sex sexual behavior. Surprisingly, these effects were not moderated by whether targets were Black vs. White. In other words, men’s heterosexuality was indeed perceived to be more precarious than women’s, irrespective of targets’ race.

Ethnic Genocide

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
Rene Lemarchand
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Total Population ◽  
The United States ◽  
As If

There are few parallels to the human holocaust that took place in Burundi in 1972 in the wake of a tortuous competitive struggle between the country’s two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Scarcely noticed (let alone understood) by public opinion anywhere, the killings are conservatively estimated to have caused between 80,000 and 100,000 deaths. Approximately 3.5 percent of the country’s total population (3.5 million) were physically wiped out in a period of a few weeks. In comparative terms this is as if England had suffered a loss of 2 million or the United States about 8 million people. To speak of “selective genocide” in describing the outcome of such large-scale political violence seems scarcely an exaggeration.

Ethnic Genocide

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rene Lemarchand
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Total Population ◽  
The United States ◽  
As If

There are few parallels to the human holocaust that took place in Burundi in 1972 in the wake of a tortuous competitive struggle between the country’s two major ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Scarcely noticed (let alone understood) by public opinion anywhere, the killings are conservatively estimated to have caused between 80,000 and 100,000 deaths. Approximately 3.5 percent of the country’s total population (3.5 million) were physically wiped out in a period of a few weeks. In comparative terms this is as if England had suffered a loss of 2 million or the United States about 8 million people. To speak of “selective genocide” in describing the outcome of such large-scale political violence seems scarcely an exaggeration.

Damages Done: The Longitudinal Impacts of Natural Hazards on Wealth Inequality in the United States

2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 448-467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junia Howell ◽  
James R Elliott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Natural Hazards ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Natural Hazard ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
The United States ◽  
Income Dynamics ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Research And Policy

Abstract This study investigates a largely ignored contributor to wealth inequality in the United States: damages from natural hazards, which are expected to increase substantially in coming years. Instead of targeting a specific large-scale disaster and assessing how different subpopulations recover, we begin with a nationally representative sample of respondents from the restricted, geocoded Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We follow them through time (1999–2013) as hazard damages of varying scales accrue in the counties where they live. This design synthesizes the longitudinal, population-centered approach common in stratification research with a broad hazard-centered focus that extends beyond disasters to integrate ongoing environmental dynamics more centrally into the production of social inequality. Results indicate that as local hazard damages increase, so does wealth inequality, especially along lines of race, education, and homeownership. At any given level of local damage, the more aid an area receives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the more this inequality grows. These findings suggest that two defining social problems of our day – wealth inequality and rising natural hazard damages – are dynamically linked, requiring new lines of research and policy making in the future.

scholarly journals Biased and Inaccurate Meta-Perceptions about Out-Partisans’ Support for Democratic Principles May Erode Democratic Norms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael H. Pasek ◽  
Lee-Or Ankori Karlinsky ◽  
Alex Levy-Vene ◽  
Samantha Moore-Berg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Opposing Party ◽  
Democratic Practices ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Democratic Principles ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Democratic Norms

Two studies (one preregistered) of Americans (N = 2,200) drawn from a nationally representative panel show that both Democrats and Republicans personally value core democratic characteristics but severely underestimate opposing party members’ support for those same characteristics. In turn, the tendency to believe that political ingroup members value democratic characteristics more than political outgroup members is associated with support for anti-democratic practices. Results suggest biased and inaccurate intergroup “meta-perceptions”—beliefs about what others believe—may contribute to democratic erosion in the United States.

scholarly journals Perceived Social Consensus Can Reduce Ideological Biases on Climate Change

2019 ◽  
Vol 52 (5) ◽  
pp. 495-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew H. Goldberg ◽  
Sander van der Linden ◽  
Anthony Leiserowitz ◽  
Edward Maibach
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
United States ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Representative Survey ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Total N ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Change Beliefs

It is well established that conservatives in the United States are substantially less likely than liberals to accept that climate change is happening and is human caused and are less supportive of policies to limit climate change. However, it is likely that ideological differences in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences are smaller when people have close friends and family members who care about climate change. Here, we use nine nationally representative survey samples (total N = 16,168) to evaluate this claim and test if perceived social consensus predicts a smaller difference in climate change beliefs between liberals and conservatives. We find that social consensus plays an important role in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences for people across the ideological spectrum, but especially among conservatives. These findings provide important insights on how to bridge ideological divides in large social dilemmas such as climate change.

The Polarizing Effects of Online Partisan Criticism: Evidence from Two Experiments

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Suhay ◽  
Emily Bello-Pardo ◽  
Brianna Maurer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Social Polarization ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Democratic Elections ◽  
Democrats And Republicans ◽  
Western Democracies

Affective and social political polarization—a dislike of political opponents and a desire to avoid their company—are increasingly salient and pervasive features of politics in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. One contributor to these related phenomena may be increasing exposure to online political disagreements in which ordinary citizens criticize, and sometimes explicitly demean, opponents. This article presents two experimental studies that assessed whether U.S. partisans’ attitudes became more prejudiced in favor of the in-party after exposure to online partisan criticism. In the first study, we draw on an online convenience sample to establish that partisan criticism that derogates political opponents increases affective polarization. In the second, we replicate these findings with a quasi-representative sample and extend the pattern of findings to social polarization. We conclude that online partisan criticism likely has contributed to rising affective and social polarization in recent years between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, and perhaps between partisan and ideological group members in other developed democracies as well. We close by discussing the troubling implications of these findings in light of continuing attempts by autocratic regimes and other actors to influence democratic elections via false identities on social media.

scholarly journals The Psychological Burden of the COVID-19 Pandemic Is Associated With Antisystemic Attitudes and Political Violence

2021 ◽  
pp. 095679762110318
Author(s):  
Henrikas Bartusevičius ◽  
Alexander Bor ◽  
Frederik Jørgensen ◽  
Michael Bang Petersen
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
The United States ◽  
Psychological Burden ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Intentions To Participate ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Attitudes And Behavior ◽  
Robust Evidence ◽  
Actual Participation

What are the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for people’s political attitudes and behavior? We tested, specifically, whether the psychological burden of the COVID-19 pandemic relates to antisystemic attitudes (dissatisfaction with the fundamental social and political order), peaceful political activism, and political violence. Nationally representative two-wave panel data were collected via online surveys of adults in the United States, Denmark, Italy, and Hungary ( ns = 6,131 and 4,568 in Waves 1 and 2, respectively). Overall, levels of antisystemic attitudes were low, and only a small share of interviewees reported behavioral intentions to participate in and actual participation in political violence. However, preregistered analyses indicated that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with antisystemic attitudes and intentions to engage in political violence. In the United States, the burden of COVID-19 was also associated with self-reported engagement in violence surrounding the Black Lives Matter protests and counterprotests. We found less robust evidence that perceived COVID-19 burden was associated with peaceful activism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document