The Polarizing Effects of Online Partisan Criticism: Evidence from Two Experiments

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Suhay ◽  
Emily Bello-Pardo ◽  
Brianna Maurer

Affective and social political polarization—a dislike of political opponents and a desire to avoid their company—are increasingly salient and pervasive features of politics in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. One contributor to these related phenomena may be increasing exposure to online political disagreements in which ordinary citizens criticize, and sometimes explicitly demean, opponents. This article presents two experimental studies that assessed whether U.S. partisans’ attitudes became more prejudiced in favor of the in-party after exposure to online partisan criticism. In the first study, we draw on an online convenience sample to establish that partisan criticism that derogates political opponents increases affective polarization. In the second, we replicate these findings with a quasi-representative sample and extend the pattern of findings to social polarization. We conclude that online partisan criticism likely has contributed to rising affective and social polarization in recent years between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, and perhaps between partisan and ideological group members in other developed democracies as well. We close by discussing the troubling implications of these findings in light of continuing attempts by autocratic regimes and other actors to influence democratic elections via false identities on social media.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Mernyk ◽  
Sophia Lerner Pink ◽  
James Druckman ◽  
Robb Willer

Scholars, policy makers, and the general public have expressed growing concern about the possibility of large-scale political violence in the United States. These worries find support in studies revealing that many American partisans support the use of violence against rival partisans. Here we propose that support for partisan violence is based in part on greatly exaggerated perceptions of rival partisans’ support for violence. We also predict that correcting these inaccurate “metaperceptions” can reduce partisans’ own support for partisan violence. We test these hypotheses in a series of pre-registered, nationally representative, correlational, longitudinal, and experimental studies (total n = 4,741), collected both before and after the 2020 U.S. Presidential election and the 2021 U.S. Capitol attack. In Studies 1 and 2 we found that both Democrats’ and Republicans’ perceptions of their rival partisans’ support for violence and willingness to engage in violence were very inaccurate, with estimates ranging from 239% to 489% higher than actual levels. Further, we find that a brief, informational correction of these misperceptions reduced support for violence by 37% (Study 3) and willingness to engage in violence by 44% (Study 4). In the latter study, a follow-up survey revealed the correction continued to significantly reduce support for violence approximately one month following the study. Together, these results suggest that support for partisan violence in the United States stems in part from systematic overestimations of rival partisans’ support for violence, and that correcting these misperceptions can durably reduce support for partisan violence in the mass public.


2018 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 614-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVIDE MORISI ◽  
JOHN T. JOST ◽  
VISHAL SINGH

When political polarization is high, it may be assumed that citizens will trust the government more when the chief executive shares their own political views. However, evidence is accumulating that important asymmetries may exist between liberals and conservatives (or Democrats and Republicans). We hypothesized that an asymmetry may exist when it comes to individuals’ willingness to trust the government when it is led by the “other side.” In an extensive analysis of several major datasets (including ANES and GSS) over a period of five decades, we find that in the United States, conservatives trust the government more than liberals when the president in office shares their own ideology. Furthermore, liberals are more willing to grant legitimacy to democratic governments led by conservatives than vice versa. A similar asymmetry applies to Republicans compared with Democrats. We discuss implications of this asymmetrical “president-in-power” effect for democratic functioning.


Author(s):  
Pierre Rosanvallon

It's a commonplace occurrence that citizens in Western democracies are disaffected with their political leaders and traditional democratic institutions. But this book argues that this crisis of confidence is partly a crisis of understanding. The book makes the case that the sources of democratic legitimacy have shifted and multiplied over the past thirty years and that we need to comprehend and make better use of these new sources of legitimacy in order to strengthen our political self-belief and commitment to democracy. Drawing on examples from France and the United States, the book notes that there has been a major expansion of independent commissions, NGOs, regulatory authorities, and watchdogs in recent decades. At the same time, constitutional courts have become more willing and able to challenge legislatures. These institutional developments, which serve the democratic values of impartiality and reflexivity, have been accompanied by a new attentiveness to what the book calls the value of proximity, as governing structures have sought to find new spaces for minorities, the particular, and the local. To improve our democracies, we need to use these new sources of legitimacy more effectively and we need to incorporate them into our accounts of democratic government. This book is an original contribution to the vigorous international debate about democratic authority and legitimacy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 675-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan Yarbrough ◽  
Pam Martin ◽  
Danita Alfred ◽  
Charleen McNeill

Background: Hospitals are experiencing an estimated 16.5% turnover rate of registered nurses costing from $44,380 - $63,400 per nurse—an estimated $4.21 to $6.02 million financial loss annually for hospitals in the United States of America. Attrition of all nurses is costly. Most past research has focused on the new graduate nurse with little focus on the mid-career nurse. Attrition of mid-career nurses is a loss for the profession now and into the future. Research objective: The purpose of the study was to explore relationships of professional values orientation, career development, job satisfaction, and intent to stay in recently hired mid-career and early-career nurses in a large hospital system. Research design: A descriptive correlational study of personal and professional factors on job satisfaction and retention was conducted. Participants and research context: A convenience sample of nurses from a mid-sized hospital in a metropolitan area in the Southwestern United States was recruited via in-house email. Sixty-seven nurses met the eligibility criteria and completed survey documents. Ethical considerations: Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from both the university and hospital system. Findings: Findings indicated a strong correlation between professional values and career development and that both job satisfaction and career development correlated positively with retention. Discussion: Newly hired mid-career nurses scored higher on job satisfaction and planned to remain in their jobs. This is important because their expertise and leadership are necessary to sustain the profession into the future. Conclusion: Nurse managers should be aware that when nurses perceive value conflicts, retention might be adversely affected. The practice environment stimulates nurses to consider whether to remain on the job or look for other opportunities.


2012 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 416-428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathryn E. Roach ◽  
Jody S. Frost ◽  
Nora J. Francis ◽  
Scott Giles ◽  
Jon T. Nordrum ◽  
...  

Background Based on changes in core physical therapy documents and problems with the earlier version, the Physical Therapist Clinical Performance Instrument (PT CPI): Version 1997 was revised to create the PT CPI: Version 2006. Objective The purpose of this study was to validate the PT CPI: Version 2006 for use with physical therapist students as a measure of clinical performance. Design This was a combined cross-sectional and prospective study. Methods A convenience sample of physical therapist students from the United States and Canada participated in this study. The PT CPI: Version 2006 was used to collect CPI item–level data from the clinical instructor about student performance at midterm and final evaluation periods in the clinical internship. Midterm evaluation data were collected from 196 students, and final evaluation data were collected from 171 students. The students who participated in the study had a mean age of 24.8 years (SD=2.3, range=21–41). Sixty-seven percent of the participants were from programs in the United States, and 33% were from Canada. Results The PT CPI: Version 2006 demonstrated good internal consistency, and factor analysis with varimax rotation produced a 3-factor solution explaining 94% of the variance. Construct validity was supported by differences in CPI item scores between students on early compared with final clinical experiences. Validity also was supported by significant score changes from midterm to final evaluations for students on both early and final internships and by fair to moderate correlations between prior clinical experience and remaining course work. Limitations This study did not examine rater reliability. Conclusion The results support the PT CPI: Version 2006 as a valid measure of physical therapist student clinical performance.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eaman Jahani ◽  
Natalie McDaniel Gallagher ◽  
Friedolin Merhout ◽  
Nicolo Cavalli ◽  
Douglas Guilbeault ◽  
...  

Longstanding theory indicates the threat of a common enemy can mitigate conflict between members of rival groups. We tested this hypothesis in a pre-registered experiment where 1,670 Republicans and Democrats in the United States were asked to complete a collaborative online task with an automated agent or “bot” that was labelled as a member of the opposing party. Prior to this task, we exposed respondents to primes about a) a common enemy (involving threats from Iran, China, and Russia); b) a patriotic event; or c) a neutral, apolitical prime. Though we observed no significant differences in the behavior of Democrats as a result of these primes, we found that Republicans—and particularly those with very strong conservative views—were significantly less likely to cooperate with Democrats when primed about a common enemy. We also observed lower rates of cooperation among Republicans who participated in our study during the 2020 Iran crisis, which occurred in the middle of our fieldwork. These findings indicate common enemies may not reduce inter-group conflict in highly polarized societies, and contribute to a growing number of studies that find evidence of asymmetric political polarization. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for research in social psychology, political conflict, and the rapidly expanding field of computational social science.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 94-102
Author(s):  
Lance E Mason

The present sociopolitical environment in the United States is perpetually mediated and beset with information from innumerable sources. This paper argues that Dewey’s conception of communication as a mutual act of meaning-making holds insights for explaining the connections between pervasive mediation and political polarization, in addition to understanding why political discourse has become more degrading in recent years. It also points the way toward viable solutions by arguing for the reorientation of schools toward valuable living experiences that are becoming less pronounced in the broader culture, such as sustained face to face engagement on matters of social import.


Author(s):  
Tatiana A. Karasova

Israeli-U.S. relations are an important factor in U.S. policy in the Middle East. USA maintain Israel as a strategic ally and Israel was granted American “major non-NATO ally” status. United States actively influenced the Israeli regional policy. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict settlement was always America’ the most priority area. Israelis and Americans share the view that the United States has a predominant role and responsibility in the Palestinians - Israeli dispute peace-making. The two-state outcome and critical issue over Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem was a topic of American concerns for a long time relied on bipartisanship support of Democrats and Republicans. During Osama’s  presidency D. Biden held post of deputy president and supported no new ideas for restarting negotiations between the sides of the conflict but its policies have failed, from Israel’s refusal to freeze settlement. The next Trump administration however was the “most pro-Israel ever”. Trump’s White House led a radical departure from the U.S.’s traditional role as the honest broker between Israelis and Palestinians. Biden’s victory in 2021 signals restructure Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, rehabilitating a durable two-state formula that establishes political, territorial, and demographic separation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). But uunlike the Obama and Trump administrations, the Biden administration doesn't see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a foreign policy priority. The question is: what really a Biden presidency might mean for the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan C. Busby ◽  
Adam J. Howat ◽  
Jacob E. Rothschild ◽  
Richard M. Shafranek

In the United States, politics has become tribal and personalized. The influence of partisan divisions has extended beyond the political realm into everyday life, affecting relationships and workplaces as well as the ballot box. To help explain this trend, we examine the stereotypes Americans have of ordinary Democrats and Republicans. Using data from surveys, experiments, and Americans' own words, we explore the content of partisan stereotypes and find that they come in three main flavors—parties as their own tribes, coalitions of other tribes, or vehicles for political issues. These different stereotypes influence partisan conflict: people who hold trait-based stereotypes tend to display the highest levels of polarization, while holding issue-based stereotypes decreases polarization. This finding suggests that reducing partisan conflict does not require downplaying partisan divisions but shifting the focus to political priorities rather than identity—a turn to what we call responsible partisanship.


2019 ◽  
pp. 32-47
Author(s):  
Dannagal Goldthwaite Young

This chapter describes the regulatory, political, and technological changes in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s that set the stage for the television satire and outrage programming of the early 2000s. It summarizes the story of the deregulation of the American media industry and argues that the resulting increased demand for profits from television news eroded the journalistic mission. It also explains the roots of political polarization in the United States, from social and cultural shifts to changes in the party nominating processes and to the increased role of soft (and dark) money in elections. The chapter chronicles the history of the cable television industry and how the proliferation of channels in the 1980s upended the economics of media, erasing the concept of the “mass audience” in favor of smaller niche audiences defined by psychographics and sociodemographics.


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