scholarly journals Modeling market power on a constrained electricity network

Author(s):  
Steven Dahlke

A closed electricity network with three markets is modeled to illustrate the impacts of transmission constraints and market power on prices and economic welfare. Four scenarios are presented, the first two assume perfect competition with and without transmission constraints, while the second two model market power with and without transmission constraints. The results show that transmission constraints reduce total surplus relative to the unconstrained case. When firms exercise market power their profits increase, while consumer surplus and total surplus decrease. Some results are counter intuitive, such as price exceeding the marginal cost of the most inefficient generator in a market with perfect competition, caused by transmission constraints and Kirchoff’s voltage law governing power flows. The GAMS code used to solve the models is included in the appendix. Next steps for research involve building the model to replicate a real-world market, to simulate impacts of proposed market restructuring or to identify areas of deregulated markets at high-risk of market power abuse.

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (S1) ◽  
pp. 69-69
Author(s):  
Mikel Berdud ◽  
Niklas Wallin-Bernhardsson ◽  
Bernarda Zamora ◽  
Peter Lindgren ◽  
Adrian Towse

IntroductionWe estimate the life-cycle value of risperidone – Second-Generation Antipsychotics (SGA) – to balance the view that cost per Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) estimates at launch are enough to guide access decisions. Study results will also drive discussion on access and price to recognize the dynamic nature of pharmaceutical pricing over the long-run.MethodsWe estimated number of patients treated for schizophrenia with risperidone in Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) between 1994-2017 based on usage data form national statistics and volume sales data from IQVIA. We collected data from literature on the effectiveness (QALYs) and costs (EUR 2017) of risperidone (SGA) and haloperidol – First-Generation antipsychotic (FGA). We estimate the life-cycle value added by risperidone versus haloperidol, and the life-cycle distribution of the social surplus between the payer (consumer surplus) and the innovator (producer surplus).ResultsWe estimated the consumer surplus, the producer surplus, the Net Monetary Benefit (NMB) and Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) at each year and in aggregate terms (1993-2017). For the UK the producer surplus was ~28 percent out of the total surplus before patent expiration and five percent after patent expiration. In Sweden, producer surplus was around 6 percent out of the total surplus before patent expiration and one percent thereafter. In both countries, during the life-cycle of risperidone, the NMB per patient increased and the ICER decreased as a response to: (i) the launch of Risperidone Long-Acting Injectable (RLAI); and (ii) the generic entry.ConclusionsThe value added by risperidone increased during the life-cycle due to the launch of RLAI and the generic competition. This suggests that, considering the entire life-cycle, the value added by SGAs to the system is higher than the expected value estimated using cost-effectiveness analysis at launch. Pricing and reimbursement decisions should take into account the dynamic nature of pharmaceutical markets and the value added by innovative medicines over the long-run.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (7) ◽  
pp. 3462-3482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhijun Chen ◽  
Patrick Rey

We show that large retailers, competing with smaller stores that carry a narrower range, can exercise market power by pricing below cost some of the products also offered by the smaller rivals, in order to discriminate multistop shoppers from one-stop shoppers. Loss leading thus appears as an exploitative device rather than as an exclusionary instrument, although it hurts the smaller rivals as well; banning below-cost pricing increases consumer surplus, rivals' profits, and social welfare. Our insights extend to industries where established firms compete with entrants offering fewer products. They also apply to complementary products such as platforms and applications. (JEL L11, L13, L81)


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaxin Li

In market economy, there are four types of markets: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, monopoly. The main differences among them are the ability to set price, barrier to enter and exit the market, numbers of companies. To study innovation’s efficiency in these markets, it is necessary to understand their special characteristics. To simplify the problem, when patent is employed, only the innovation company has the access to this new technology. When it does not exist, every company in the market can use the new technology. In perfect competition market, there are no barrier to enter or exit and lots of companies producing identical products, so no company can set the price. Because there is no barrier, companies that can earn profit will enter the market, which decreases the price. Eventually, all companies’ marginal cost, average cost and marginal benefit is equal to the price, average benefit. In other words, companies in perfect competition market earn zero economic profit. Social welfare is always maximum in this type of markets. In this case, when one company discovers new production technology, other companies will follow immediately. Lower cost causes higher supply, which makes the price decrease and equal to the average cost eventually, leaving every company having zero economic profit, including the first company discovered the new technology, so there is no incentive for any company to spend resource on innovation. However, consumers’ welfare would increase because of lower price. When patent is employed, one company can produce products in a lower price and earn certain economic profit, but can hardly make an influence on the market because there are too many suppliers. Thus, in perfect competition market, patent is a good way to provide incentives for innovations. In monopolistic competition market, there are lots of companies selling slightly different products. The difference among products enables one company to increase the price over in a limited range, so monopolistic competition market is inefficient. In this type of markets, there are two types of innovations: technology and product. The former one reduces the cost and has the same consequence as that in perfect competition market. The latter one, product innovation, makes the product more special, giving the company more market power. However, without patent, product innovation will be copied easily, making the original product less special and canceling out the market power gained by the original company. Since there is no economic benefit, there is no incentive for any company in the market to innovate. When patent is employed, products’ difference is kept and gives the company more market power since there is consumer preference in monopolistic competition market. This increase of market power is not as negligible as that in perfect competition market, so the market becomes less efficient when the company with patent increases the price. In oligopoly market, there are only a few companies with great market power, so all of them can set the price. In this market, companies make decision based on both output and price effects. Output effect means when price is higher than marginal cost, companies can increase profit by increase its output. Price effect means when a company increases its output, the market price goes down, causing less profit for the company. When output effect is more impactful than price effect, companies will increase sales. When price effect is more impactful than output effect, companies will decrease sales. Oligopoly market can be inefficient without restrictions. Regarding innovations, there is still no incentives without the presence of patents. With patent, innovation company will gain market power that is huge enough to cause inefficiency and even to force other companies to exit the market. Thus, patent in oligopoly market will cause negative impact on society, which should be limited. The last type of markets if monopoly. In monopoly market, there is only one company, so patent is necessary. When this company innovates and decreases its production cost, it will tend to increase its output to maximize profit, which enlarges consumers’ welfare. However, this increase is not as much as that in perfect competition market, so innovation in monopoly market is still inefficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 133
Author(s):  
Eny Susilowati, Budi Purwanto, Wita Juwita Ermawati

In order to encourage credit growth that experienced sluggishness from 2012 to 2016, Bank Indonesia sought to increase lending by lowering the benchmark interest rate so that it could be followed by a decline in lending rates by banks in Indonesia. But this is thought to cause competition to become a low oligopoly and decrease efficiency. This study aims to determine the factors that affect the amount of credits paid, estimating the market power and efficiency of commercial banks in Indonesia for the 2012-2016 period. Efficiency method used is Data Envelopment Analysis, while to estimate market power using two stage least square. The results of the demand equation show GDP and WCCR_GDP have no significant effect while the rest variables have significant effect. From the two equations using Bresnahan-Lau’s model, market power is 0.231. Efficiency measurement obtained a good efficiency scale even reaching 100% in 2013, 2015 and 2016.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 147
Author(s):  
Lixia Wang ◽  
Lining Gan

The market power of firms can take an important effect on their value through the influence of residual incomes. Based on Ohlson’s residual income model (RIM model, also called EBO model), the paper puts financial account—unearned revenue to build the new model, market-power adjusted RIM model. Then we make empirical analysis using the data from 2003 to 2011 year in China capital market. The empirical evidence proofs that unearned revenue has an obvious effect on the value of firms. The result shows that the new model has important complementary role to evaluate the firms’ value in China capital market.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Horst Gischer ◽  
Mike Stiele

Abstract In this paper we adopt the Panzar-Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002.We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.


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