Research on the Connection between Game Theory and Cryptography

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
S M Nazmuz Sakib
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Operation Condition ◽  
Message Transmission ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
Multiparty Interaction

As may be seen, cryptography and game theory are the 2 primary parts of the phrase. game theory thinks about with optimizing a result involving 2 or a lot of well-defined parties, every with well-defined behavior. Nash equilibrium could be a notion in game theory that emphasizes the participants' mutual profit. , the unpredictability of the operational state of affairs, don't seem to be laid out in game theory. The goal of cryptography is to produce safe message transmission between genuine and approved parties. Multiparty computing could be a cryptographical technique that enables 2 or a lot of participants to calculate a perform conjointly. this can be kind of like the concept of reciprocal profit in game theory. throughout the employment of the protocol, all parties have a precise set of behavior determined, kind of like game theory. The parties, as an example, a probabilistic polynomials in nature. Cryptography doesn't specify however AN assailant could use it to breach the system just like the operation condition. In cryptography, multiparty interaction is outlined as parties communication to judge a perform on their inputs.

scholarly journals Holding a group together: non-game-theory vs. game-theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Richter ◽  
Ariel Rubinstein
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Competitive Equilibrium ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
Equilibrium Concept

Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group’s harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

scholarly journals Quantum Mean-Field Games with the Observations of Counting Type

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Vassili N. Kolokoltsov
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Open Problem ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Existence Of Solutions ◽  
Mean Field ◽  
Mean Field Games ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Quantum Games ◽  
Interesting Open Problem

Quantum games and mean-field games (MFG) represent two important new branches of game theory. In a recent paper the author developed quantum MFGs merging these two branches. These quantum MFGs were based on the theory of continuous quantum observations and filtering of diffusive type. In the present paper we develop the analogous quantum MFG theory based on continuous quantum observations and filtering of counting type. However, proving existence and uniqueness of the solutions for resulting limiting forward-backward system based on jump-type processes on manifolds seems to be more complicated than for diffusions. In this paper we only prove that if a solution exists, then it gives an ϵ-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N-player quantum game. The existence of solutions is suggested as an interesting open problem.

Bayesian Rationality and Social Epistemology

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Epistemology ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Famous Theorem ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Natural Equilibrium ◽  
Bayesian Rationality

This chapter uses epistemic game theory to expand on the notion of social norms as choreographer of a correlated equilibrium, and to elucidate the socio-psychological prerequisites for the notion that social norms implement correlated equilibria. The correlated equilibrium is a much more natural equilibrium criterion than the Nash equilibrium, because of a famous theorem of Aumann (1987), who showed that Bayesian rational agents in an epistemic game G with a common subjective prior play a correlated equilibrium of G. Thus, while rationality and common priors do not imply Nash equilibrium, these assumptions do imply correlated equilibrium and social norms act not only as choreographer, but also supply the epistemic conditions for common priors.

scholarly journals Over-supply in Public Transportation: Case Study of Bus and Metro Lines in Harbin City, China

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 471-477
Author(s):  
Shumin Feng ◽  
Xianghao Shen ◽  
Baoyu Hu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Public Transportation ◽  
Operation Mode ◽  
Utility Model ◽  
Coordinated Development ◽  
Supply Problem ◽  
Harbin City ◽  
Fundamental Reason

As the two most important modes in public transportation, the coordinated development of bus and metro networks significantly influences the efficiency of public transportation. However, two parallel bus and metro lines belonging to different operators may lead to supply competition and consequently yield over-supply. Taking two parallel bus and metro lines in Harbin city, China as a case study, this paper, drawing on game theory, establishes a utility model based on the two lines’ frequencies, and reveals and explains the fundamental reason for the over-supply problem using a Nash equilibrium. In an attempt to resolve this issue, the study proposes a new operation mode: integrating frequencies of the two modes to obtain larger total profits then reallocating the total profits to the two modes. The case study shows that this new operation mode can effectively solve the over-supply problem while satisfying both operators of the two modes, and hence having practical value.

Model of Intrusion Detection Based on the Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 3971-3974 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heng Xiao ◽  
Cao Fang Long
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Security ◽  
Intrusion Detection ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Network Application ◽  
Stage Game

With the development of network application, network security is facing greater pressure. Based on the characteristics of intrusion detection in the wireless network of the Ad hoc working group, the article introduces the game theory, proposes a game model of network security, concluds the Nash equilibrium in the stage game, repeats game, the pareto Nash equilibrium, more attack both income and payment, so that they get the best choice.

scholarly journals Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory

1999 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 1067-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Noncooperative Game Theory ◽  
History Of Social Science ◽  
History Of

John Nash's formulation of noncooperative game theory was one of the great breakthroughs in the history of social science. Nash's work in this area is reviewed in its historical context to better understand how the fundamental ideas of noncooperative game theory were developed and how they changed the course of economic theory.

The governance of Internet and game theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2.28) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Olivier Lefebvre
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Mobile Phones ◽  
Net Neutrality ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Strategic Effect ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Access Charges

The professional milieu of telecommunications is livened up by controversies lasting decades.  The controversy about access charges (or termination rates, the price paid by an operator to another when the subscriber’s call ends on its network) is ending, while the controversy about Net neutrality is starting. The article focuses on a “fragment”: the regulator’s action. Game theory is useful to answer two questions: (1) why does the regulator decide the decrease and cancellation of access charges (justification)? (2) How does he do it (tactical feasibility)? When the access charges decrease and are cancelled the retail prices decrease and the consumers’ surplus increases. And concerning the tactical feasibility, the regulator can let untouched the profits when he decides some decrease of the access charges (direct effect), then the retail prices decrease when there is a new Nash equilibrium (strategic effect). The operators cannot protest, neither during the first stage (the profits are untouched) neither during the second stage (it would be to admit that access charges are useful to have higher profits thanks to high retail prices, which is detrimental to consumers).One brings some explanation of the move towards access charges lowered or cancelled. Examples are: (1) the peering in the governance of Internet and (2) what is called the Eurotariff (for instance, roaming charges for users of mobile phones in Europe have been cancelled).  

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