scholarly journals “You can’t bullshit a bullshitter” (or can you?): Bullshitting frequency predicts receptivity to various types of misleading information

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Littrell ◽  
Jonathan Albert Fugelsang
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Thinking Style ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Misleading Information ◽  
Competing Hypotheses ◽  
Analytic Cognitive Style

Research into both receptivity to falling for bullshit and the propensity to produce it have recently emerged as active, independent areas of inquiry into the spread of misinformation. However, it remains unclear whether those who frequently produce bullshit are inoculated from its influence. For example, both bullshit receptivity and bullshitting frequency are negatively related to cognitive ability and aspects of analytic thinking style, suggesting that those who frequently engage in bullshitting may be more likely to fall for bullshit. However, separate research suggests that individuals who frequently engage in deception are better at detecting it, thus leading to the possibility that frequent bullshitters may be less likely to fall for bullshit. Here we present 3 studies (N = 826) attempting to distinguish between these competing hypotheses, finding that frequency of persuasive bullshitting positively predicts bullshit receptivity (sensitivity) and that this association is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style.

scholarly journals Investigating the robustness of the illusory truth effect across individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Alan Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David Gertler Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Need For Cognitive Closure ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Study 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Study 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

scholarly journals Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas De keersmaecker ◽  
David Dunning ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
David G. Rand ◽  
Carmen Sanchez ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Cognitive Measures ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Closure ◽  
Need For Cognitive Closure ◽  
Truth Effect ◽  
Illusory Truth Effect

People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.

The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and psychometric properties

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane Littrell ◽  
Evan F. Risko ◽  
Jonathan Albert Fugelsang
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Psychometric Properties ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Psychological Research ◽  
Research Attention ◽  
Misleading Information ◽  
Social Decision ◽  
Frequency Scale ◽  
Dispositional Factors ◽  
Reliable Scale

Recent psychological research has identified important individual differences associated with receptivity to bullshit, which has greatly enhanced our understanding of the processes behind susceptibility to pseudo-profound or otherwise misleading information. However, the bulk of this research attention has focused on cognitive and dispositional factors related to bullshit (the product), while largely overlooking the influences behind bullshitting (the act). Here, we present results from four studies (focusing on the construction and validation of a new, reliable scale measuring the frequency with which individuals engage in two types of bullshitting (persuasive and evasive) in everyday situations. Overall, bullshitting frequency was negatively associated with sincerity, honesty, cognitive ability, open-minded cognition, and self-regard. Additionally, the Bullshitting Frequency Scale was found to reliably measure constructs that are: 1) distinct from lying, and; 2) significantly related to performance on overclaiming and social decision tasks. These results represent an important step forward by demonstrating the utility of the Bullshitting Frequency Scale as well as highlighting certain individual differences that may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in everyday bullshitting.

The Negative Intelligence–Religiosity Relation: New and Confirming Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 856-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miron Zuckerman ◽  
Chen Li ◽  
Shengxin Lin ◽  
Judith A. Hall
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Theoretical Work ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Analytic Cognitive Style

Zuckerman et al. (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of 63 studies that showed a negative intelligence–religiosity relation (IRR). As more studies have become available and because some of Zuckerman et al.’s (2013) conclusions have been challenged, we conducted a new meta-analysis with an updated data set of 83 studies. Confirming previous conclusions, the new analysis showed that the correlation between intelligence and religious beliefs in college and noncollege samples ranged from −.20 to −.23. There was no support for mediation of the IRR by education but there was support for partial mediation by analytic cognitive style. Thus, one possible interpretation for the IRR is that intelligent people are more likely to use analytic style (i.e., approach problems more rationally). An alternative (and less interesting) reason for the mediation is that tests of both intelligence and analytic style assess cognitive ability. Additional empirical and theoretical work is needed to resolve this issue.

Individual differences in religiosity as a function of cognitive ability and cognitive style

Intelligence ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 667-673 ◽  
Author(s):  
Soroush Razmyar ◽  
Charlie L. Reeve
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style

scholarly journals The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiment 1 and 4), likeability (Experiment 1, 2, and 3) and brightness (Experiment 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments. However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Lower Levels of Resistance to Change (but not Opposition to Equality) Is Related to Analytic Cognitive Style

2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 65-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Onurcan Yilmaz ◽  
S. Adil Saribay
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Resistance To Change ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Total N ◽  
Research Attention ◽  
Negative Relation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Conservative Ideology ◽  
Analytic Cognitive Style

Abstract. In recent years, there has been increasing research attention to cognitive style differences between liberals and conservatives. While some studies have found a negative relation between conservatism and analytic thinking tendency, others have not observed such a relation. None of these studies has measured the core motives underlying conservative ideology and investigated their relation with analytic cognitive style (ACS). We predicted that ACS is related to only one of the core motives underlying conservatism (resistance to change), but not the other (opposition to equality). This hypothesis was supported in three non-Western samples (total n = 1,552). This finding may clarify why some studies found a relation between cognitive style and conservatism, while others did not.

EXPRESS: The Bright Homunculus in our Head: Individual Differences in Intuitive Sensitivity to Logical Validity

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110446
Author(s):  
Omid Ghasemi ◽  
Simon J Handley ◽  
Stephanie Howarth
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Ability ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Processing Time ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Logical Validity ◽  
Process Theories ◽  
Dual Process Theories ◽  
Deliberative Reasoning

Classic dual process theories of human reasoning attribute explicit reasoning to effortful, deliberative thinking. According to these models, intuitive processes lack any access to the formal rules of logic and probability and hence rely exclusively on superficial problem features to determine a response. However, in recent years, researchers have demonstrated that reasoners are able to solve simple logical or probabilistic problems relatively automatically, a capability which has been called ‘logical intuition’. In four experiments, we instructed participants to judge the validity (Experiments 1 and 4), likeability (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and physical brightness (Experiments 2, 3, and 4) of the conclusion to several reasoning problems. Brightness judgments were made by evaluating the font shade brightness of the argument’s conclusion. Participants were also asked to complete a range of individual differences measures, drawing on cognitive ability and cognitive style, in order to evaluate the extent to which ‘logical intuitions’ were linked to measures of deliberative reasoning. The results showed that participants judged the conclusion of logically valid statements to be more valid, more likable and more physically bright. Participants with higher cognitive ability and unlimited processing time showed greater effects of logical validity in their liking judgments (varied across experiments). However, these effects were absent in the brightness tasks, suggesting that logic effects observed under instructions to judge conclusion brightness are a purer measure of ‘logical intuition’. We discuss the implications of our findings for recent dual process theories of human reasoning.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document