The values of survival: Socio-cultural values predict COVID-19-related mortality

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar D Endress

Preexisting conditions affect disease susceptibility. Here, I show that socio-cultural values are population-level risk factors for disease. Using data from the World Values Survey, I show that, between 2 weeks and 6 months after the first COVID-19-related death in a country, COVID-19-related mortality is increased in countries endorsing values related to political participation, but decreased in countries with more trust in institutions and materialistic orientations. After controlling for income, age, urbanicity, smoking, overweight, private health expenditure and lockdown delay, these socio-cultural values were consistent across country-sets, reduced prediction errors by up to 52% and explained up to 68% of inter-country variability. They were relatively specific to COVID-19-related mortality. I could not identify values predicting general health outcomes, and values predicting increased COVID-19-related mortality predicted decreased mortality due to other causes like environmental-related mortality, explaining up to 90% of inter-country variability. Socio-cultural values might be specific predictors of health outcomes.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansgar D Endress

Preexisting conditions affect disease susceptibility. Here, I show that socio-cultural values are population-level risk factors for disease. Using data from the World Values Survey, I show that, between 2 weeks and 6 months after the first COVID-19-related death in a country, COVID-19-related mortality is increased in countries endorsing values related to political participation, but decreased in countries with more trust in institutions and materialistic orientations. After controlling for income, age, urbanicity, smoking, overweight, private health expenditure and lockdown delay, these socio-cultural values were consistent across country-sets, reduced prediction errors by up to 52% and explained up to 68% of inter-country variability. They were relatively specific to COVID-19-related mortality. I could not identify values predicting general health outcomes, and values predicting increased COVID-19-related mortality predicted decreased mortality due to other causes like environmental-related mortality, explaining up to 90% of inter-country variability. Socio-cultural values might be specific predictors of health outcomes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Damian J. Ruck ◽  
Joshua Borycz ◽  
R. Alexander Bentley

AbstractNational responses to a pandemic require populations to comply through personal behaviors that occur in a cultural context. Here we show that aggregated cultural values of nations, derived from World Values Survey data, have been at least as important as top-down government actions in predicting the impact of COVID-19. At the population level, the cultural factor of cosmopolitanism, together with obesity, predict higher numbers of deaths in the first two months of COVID-19 on the scale of nations. At the state level, the complementary variables of government efficiency and public trust in institutions predict lower death numbers. The difference in effect between individual beliefs and behaviors, versus state-level actions, suggests that open cosmopolitan societies may face greater challenges in limiting a future pandemic or other event requiring a coordinated national response among the population. More generally, mass cultural values should be considered in crisis preparations.


2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 437-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olena Nikolayenko

Abstract. Regime change in Eastern Europe affords an excellent opportunity for investigating linkages between age and politics in times of social turmoil. Using data from three waves of the World Values Survey, this paper explores life cycle, generational and period effects on protest potential in Yeltsin's Russia. The study finds that an individual's position in the life cycle is the strongest predictor of protest potential in the post-communist state. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that citizens socialized during periods of relative socioeconomic stability exhibit the highest protest potential under conditions of uncertainty characteristic of the transition period.Résumé. Les changements de régime en Europe de l'Est permettent d'examiner la relation complexe entre l'âge et la politique pendant les périodes d'instabilité sociale. S'appuyant sur les données de trois vagues du World Values Survey (sondage mondial sur les valeurs), cet article explore l'incidence du cycle de vie, de la génération et de la période sur le potentiel protestataire dans la Russie d'Eltsine. L'étude démontre que la position de l'individu dans le cycle de vie est le plus puissant facteur de prédiction du potentiel protestataire dans la société postcommuniste. En outre, les citoyens socialisés pendant des périodes de relative stabilité socio-économique présentent le potentiel protestataire le plus élevé dans des conditions d'incertitude caractéristiques de la période de transition.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
RUSSELL J. DALTON

Over 40 years ago, Daniel Bell made the provocative claim that ideological polarization was diminishing in Western democracies, but new ideologies were emerging and driving politics in developing nations. This article tests the End of Ideology thesis with a new wave of public opinion data from the World Values Survey (WVS) that covers over 70 nations representing more than 80 per cent of the world's population. We find that polarization along the Left/Right dimension is substantially greater in the less affluent and less democratic societies than in advanced industrial democracies. The correlates of Left/Right orientations also vary systematically across regions. The twin pillars of economic and religious cleavages remain important in European states; cultural values and nationalism provide stronger bases of ideology in Asia and the Middle East. As Bell suggested, social modernization does seem to transform the extent and bases of ideological polarization within contemporary societies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rena C Zito

This study draws on insights from institutional anomie theory to examine justification of morally dubious behavior and violence cross-nationally. Further, it builds on a burgeoning body of multilevel institutional anomie theory and research on crime-relevant attitudes by considering whether and how individual financial hardship intersects with anomic structural and cultural systems at the national level, acknowledging that individual responses to anomie may be contingent upon experiences with such hardships. Results from multilevel modeling using data from 74,930 World Values Survey respondents in 52 nations, the World Bank, and other organizations provide partial support for the hypotheses. Specifically, conditions of “want amid plenty,” (Bjerregaard & Cochran, 2008a, p. 183) weakened family and education institutions, and monetary fetishism predict justifications cross-nationally. Moreover, economic inequality and individualism moderate the effect of financial hardship on justifications of morally dubious actions and violence, consistent with expectations.


Author(s):  
Bala Ramasamy ◽  
Matthew C.H. Yeung

Cultural, institutional, and psychic distances between countries are critical determinants of bilateral trade. In this paper we examine if ethical distance and difference between an exporting country and an importing country matter in international trade. Using data from 53 countries that participated in the World Values Survey, we show that the closer the ethical distance between countries the greater the trade. We also find that the ethicality of importers matter more than exporters as a determinant of bilateral trade.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Gore ◽  
Phil Zuckerman ◽  
Luke W Galen ◽  
David Pollack ◽  
LeRon Shults

We investigate the relationships among individuals' religiosity (or secularity), affiliation with like-minded religious others, volunteerism, and trust and tolerance. Using data analysis of the World Values Survey, we pose and answer research questions about the types of individuals who are the most trusting, the most tolerant, and who volunteer the most. We show how distinguishing between different types of volunteer activities and using longitudinal data can provide more insight into these questions. We also use an established agent-based model to generate measures similar to those operationalized in the World Values Survey. We then reproduce the findings of the World Values Survey data analysis and extract the internal dynamics of simulation experiments (under a reasonable parameterization of the model) to provide an explanation for those findings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 571-579
Author(s):  
Lisa Blaydes ◽  
Justin Grimmer

AbstractUsing data from the World Values Survey, we analyze the extent to which value consensus exists within countries. To do this, we introduce a statistical model which allows us to generate country-level measures of cultural heterogeneity. Our statistical approach models each country as a mixture of subcultures that are shared across the world. Our results demonstrate that value consensus varies substantially across countries and regions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Mariya Omelicheva ◽  
Brittnee Carter

AbstractIs it joint democracy or state similarity that has a pacifying impact on interstate relations? This study explores the complementarity of the two propositions and demonstrates the potential of a particular kind of shared emancipative culture embracing values of autonomy, equality, choice, and voice to amplify the impact of joint democracy on interstate conflict. The data on cultural values, which comes from the World Values Survey, was integrated with the data from the Correlates of War Project to test the impact of joint democracy and cultural similarity on militarised interstate disputes (1981–2010). We find that culturally similar dyads are less likely to be involved in conflict with each other than culturally dissimilar dyads. Although, cultural similarity does not wash out the pacifying effect of democracy, it offers a complementary explanation to the democratic peace. We also find that states that are democratic and share higher than average scores on the emancipative values are less likely to engage in militarised interstate disputes than democratic states, which are culturally dissimilar or score low on the emancipative dimensions. This provides support for an additional normative/cultural impact on democratic peace.


Author(s):  
Sjoerd Beugelsdijk ◽  
Mariko J. Klasing

Diversity research has shown that ethno-linguistic, religious, and genetic diversity are related to a variety of socio-economic outcomes. We complement this literature by focusing on a dimension of diversity so far ignored in diversity research for lack of data: Diversity in key human values. Using data from all available waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study we develop a multi-item indicator of value diversity. This measure reflects the extent to which key human values are shared among the inhabitants of a country. Our newly developed measure is available for up to 111 countries and three decades (1981-2014). We conclude by comparing our newly developed measure of value diversity with existing measures of social diversity and relating it to various indicator of socio-economic performance.


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