Towards a formal neurophenomenology of metacognition: modelling meta-awareness, mental action, and attentional control with deep active inference
Metacognition refers to the capacity to access, monitor, and control aspects of one’s mental operations and is central to the human condition and experience. Disorders of metacognition are a hallmark of many psychiatric conditions and the training of metacognitive skills is central in education and in many psychotherapies. This paper provides first steps towards the development of a formal neurophenomenology of metacognition. To do so, we leverage the tools of the active inference framework, extending a previous computational model of implicit metacognition by adding a hierarchical level to model explicit (conscious) meta-awareness and the voluntary control of attention through covert action. Using the example of mind-wandering and its regulation in focused attention, we provide a computational proof of principle for an inferential architecture apt to enable the emergence of central components of metacognition: namely, the ability to access, monitor, and control cognitive states.