Beyond the Distributed Practice Effect: Is Distributed Learning Also Effective for Learning With Non-repeated Text Materials?

Distributed learning is often recommended as a general learning strategy, but previous research has established its benefits mainly for learning with repeated materials. In two experiments, we investigated distributed learning with complementary text materials. 77 (Experiment 1) and 130 (Experiment 2) seventh graders read two texts, massed vs. distributed, by 1 week (Experiment 1) or 15 min (Experiment 2). Learning outcomes were measured immediately and 1 week later and metacognitive judgments of learning were assessed. In Experiment 1, distributed learning was perceived as more difficult than massed learning. In both experiments, massed learning led to better outcomes immediately after learning but learning outcomes were lower after 1 week. No such decrease occurred for distributed learning, yielding similar outcomes for massed and distributed learning after 1 week. In sum, no benefits of distributed learning vs. massed learning were found, but distributed learning might lower the decrease in learning outcomes over time.

Certainty and Singular Causal Judgment

In this paper, I map out broad aims, challenges, predictions, and implica- tions for the resulting intersection of singular causal judgment and metacognition that I (tentatively) call causal metacognition. First, I will overview research on sin- gular causal judgment, focusing on popular counterfactual theories that provide a formal framework for evaluating dependency relationships, as well as several compet- ing definitions of singular causal strength. Next, I will provide relevant background in the literature on metacognition for perception and decision-making, discussing major computational theories of metacognitive judgments. After covering the small amount of work on uncertainty in causal judgments, I will then argue that although singular causal judgments pose a particular problem for some theories of metacognition, coun- terfactual theories of singular causal judgment already provide testable predictions for confidence in causal judgments and can be extended to account for a wide range of patterns in confidence in singular causal judgments. Finally, I will summarize why we need a study of causal metacognition, and what empirical and theoretical advancements in that field might look like.

Differential Effects of Experience and Information Cues on Metacognitive Judgments About Others’ Change Detection Abilities

This study explored the interaction between visual metacognitive judgments about others and cues related to the workings of System 1 and System 2. We examined how intrinsic cues (i.e., saliency of a visual change) and experience cues (i.e., detection/blindness) affect people’s predictions about others’ change detection abilities. In Experiment 1, 60 participants were instructed to notice a subtle and a salient visual change in a magic trick that exploits change blindness, after which they estimated the probability that others would detect the change. In Experiment 2, 80 participants watched either the subtle or the salient version of the trick and they were asked to provide predictions for the experienced change. In Experiment 1, participants predicted that others would detect the salient change more easily than the subtle change, which was consistent with the actual detection reported in Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, participants’ personal experience (i.e., whether they detected the change) biased their predictions. Moreover, there was a significant difference between their predictions and offline predictions from Experiment 1. Interestingly, change blindness led to lower predictions. These findings point to joint contributions of experience and information cues on metacognitive judgments about other people’s change detection abilities.

THE ILLUSION OF NOT KNOWING IN METACOGNITIVE MONITORING: A BRIEF REVIEW

Purpose. The paper is aimed to analyze some key features of the illusion of not knowing in metacognitive monitoring of the learning activity of university students. Among the main conceptions of the influence of the illusion of not knowing on metacognitive monitoring accuracy of the learning activity of university students we tend to study and to analyse different types of the learned information, as well as personal, cognitive, metacognitive, and individual psychological characteristics of students. Moreover, the study may allow to clarifying the phenomenon of the illusion of not knowing and its influence on metacognitive monitoring accuracy measures. Methods. The theoretical and comparative practical methods of studying the illusion of not knowing in metacognitive monitoring of university students have been used in the study. The participants learned texts, statements and pairs of words in Ukrainian. They performed JOLs, aJOLs, RCJs, and aRCJs. Calibration procedure helped to define average indicators of both the illusion of knowing and the illusion of not knowing. Results. The findings indicate that the illusion of not knowing as an error of metacognitive monitoring accuracy (alongside the illusion of knowing) can occur in all types of metacognitive judgments, especially in the prospective judgments of learning. The highest levels of the illusion of not knowing are shown in learning pairs of words, smaller texts of all styles, and in ‘Yes’/‘No’/‘Do not know’ questions. Moreover, the effects of personal, cognitive, metacognitive, and individual psychological characteristics are also allocated. Conclusions. The paper provides an account of the effects of different types of information chosen for the experiment, and of personal, cognitive, metacognitive, and individual psychological characteristics of university students. The findings indicate the illusion of not knowing as an error of metacognitive monitoring accuracy alongside the illusion of knowing. These findings might help to solve the problem of metacognitive monitoring accuracy in the learning activity of university students.

ОГЛЯД СПОСОБІВ ВИМІРЮВАННЯ МЕТАКОГНІТИВНОГО МОНІТОРИНГУ

Purpose. Of special importance of the current study is the observation of some theoretical and methodological aspects of the peculiarities of measures of metacognitive monitoring. In particular, we highlight some common in the psychological research approaches to the measures and discrepancies of metacognitive monitoring. We provide the description of the factors that can moderate metacognitive monitoring judgments accuracy, the reasons of its importance, the summary of three general classes of cues, and some significant studies about the measures of metacognitive monitoring. The types of outcome measures of metacognitive monitoring (such as absolute accuracy, relative accuracy, bias, scatter, and discrimination) are also analyzed. Moreover, we describe some major impacts of effective calibration on the assessment of subjective confidence.Methods. The theoretical and comparative methods of studying metacognitive monitoring accuracy and peculiar nature of different measures of metacognitive monitoring have been taken into account. The necessity in studying such aspects of metacognitive monitoring accuracy measures has been caused by its impact on students’ learning activity.Results. Metacognitive monitoring is an important component of metacognition, as well as of self-regulated learning. The research provides hindsight into the background of metacognitive monitoring measures. The current intention was to describe some theoretical and methodological aspects of the accuracy and discrepancies of metacognitive judgments. The learners’ ability to discriminate what is known and how it is possible to get to accurate knowledge judgments is an inevitable part of the learning process and is worthy further investigation in both psychological and educational studies.Conclusions. The results of the theoretical analysis found in the study play a significant role in the studying of metacognitive monitoring of university students’ learning activity. The peculiarities of measures of metacognitive monitoring are an important issue for future research.Key words: metacognitive monitoring, measures, absolute accuracy, relative accuracy, calibration. Мета. Стаття зосереджена на аналізі деяких теоретичних та методологічних аспектів огляду способів вимірювання метакогнітивного моніторингу. Зокрема, ми виділяємо деякі наявні в психологічних дослідженнях підходи до вивчення способів вимірювання точності та розбіжностей метакогнітивного моніторингу. Ми досліджуємо чинники, які можуть зменшити точність суджень метакогнітивного моніторингу, причини важливості питання, подаємо короткий аналіз трьох загальних класів підказок метакогнітивних суджень, а також опис цілої низки важливих досліджень щодо особливостей вимірювання точності метакогнітивного моніторингу. Також аналізуються види показників точності, що вини-кають у результаті здійснення суджень метакогнітивного моніторингу (це абсолютна точність, відносна точність, упередженість, розкид (розсіювання) значень та дискримінація). Навіть більше, ми описуємо деякі основні наслідки ефективного калібрування на оцінку суб’єктивної впевненості студентів.Методи. У дослідженні використані теоретичні та порівняльні методи вивчення точності метакогнітивного моніторингу та способів її вимірювання. Необхідність вивчення таких аспектів цього питання зумовлена впливом точності метакогнітивного моніторингу на навчальну діяльність студентів. Результати. Метакогнітивний моніторинг є важливим складником як метапізнання, так і саморегульованого навчання. У дослідженні здійснено огляд способів вимірювання метакогнітивного моніторингу. Метою було – здійснити аналіз особливостей способів вимірювання метакогнітивного моніторингу, описати деякі теоретичні та методологічні аспекти точності та розбіжностей метакогнітивних суджень. Здатність тих, хто навчається, розрізняти між тим, що відомо і що ні, а також способи сприяння точності метакогнітивних суджень, є невід’ємною частиною навчального процесу, і тому питання потребує подальшого вивчення.Висновки. Pезультати теоретичного аналізу, виявлені в дослідженні, відіграють вагому роль у вивченні метакогнітивного моніторингу навчальної діяльності студентів. Врахування особливостей способів вимірювання метакогнітивного моніторингу є важливим для подальших досліджень.Ключові слова: метакогнітивний моніторинг, вимірювання, абсолютна точність, відносна точність, калібрування.

Effects of Raising Student Teachers’ Metacognitive Awareness of Their Educational Psychological Misconceptions

Fostering metacognitive awareness of misconceptions should enhance deep processing of scientifically correct explanations and thereby decrease misconceptions. To explore these potentially beneficial effects, we conducted a field study implemented in a regular educational psychology course in an Australian teacher education program. In a two-by-two within-subject experimental design, student teachers ( n = 119) answered misconception questionnaires, made metacognitive judgments, and participated in awareness activities at the start (T1) and the end (T2) of the semester (within-subject factor: time). Half of the misconception items focused on educational psychology course content, while the other half focused on related topics that were not covered in the course (non-course content). Awareness activities (AA) consisted of providing feedback regarding all misconception items. During the lectures, we provided additional scientifically correct refutational explanations (RE) regarding course content. Thus, we compared the combined AA+RE treatment for course content with the AA treatment for non-course content (within-subject factor: treatment). Our findings confirm that student teachers harbor numerous high-confidence educational psychological misconceptions. Furthermore, awareness activities plus refutational explanations resulted in significant increases in metacognitive awareness and in performance. Additionally, initial metacognitive overconfidence was related to persistent misconceptions, indicating that overconfidence may hinder correction of course content misconceptions.

Metamemory and memory discrepancies in directed forgetting of emotional information

Directed Forgetting (DF) studies show that it is possible to exert cognitive control to intentionally forget information. The aim of the present study was to investigate how aware individuals are of the control they have over what they remember and forget when the information is emotional. Participants were presented with positive, negative and neutral photographs, and each photograph was followed by either a Remember or a Forget instruction. Then, for each photograph, participants provided Judgments of Learning (JOLs) by indicating their likelihood of recognizing that item on a subsequent test. In the recognition phase, participants were asked to indicate all old items, irrespective of instruction. Remember items had higher JOLs than Forget items for all item types, indicating that participants believe they can intentionally forget even emotional information—which is not the case based on the actual recognition results. DF effect, which was calculated by subtracting recognition for Forget items from Remember ones was only significant for neutral items. Emotional information disrupted cognitive control, eliminating the DF effect. Response times for JOLs showed that evaluation of emotional information, especially negatively emotional information takes longer, and thus is more difficult. For both Remember and Forget items, JOLs reflected sensitivity to emotionality of the items, with emotional items receiving higher JOLs than the neutral ones. Actual recognition confirmed better recognition for only negative items but not for positive ones. JOLs also reflected underestimation of actual recognition performance. Discrepancies in metacognitive judgments due to emotional valence as well as the reasons for underestimation are discussed.

General Accuracy and General Error Factors in Metacognitive Monitoring and the Role of Time on Task in Predicting Metacognitive Judgments

Gutierrez et al. (2016) conducted an experiment that provided evidence for the existence of two distinct factors in metacognitive monitoring: general accuracy and general error. They found level-1 domain-specific accuracy and error factors which loaded on second-order domain-general accuracy and error factors, which then loaded on a third-order general monitoring factor. In the present study, that experiment was repeated with 170 different participants from the same population. The present study confirmed the original findings. Both studies suggest that metacognitive monitoring consists of two different types of cognitive processes: one that is associated with accurate monitoring judgments and one that is associated with error in monitoring judgments. In addition, both studies suggest domain-specific accuracy and error factors which load onto second-order domain-general accuracy and error factors. Furthermore, in this study we devised an experiment in which general accuracy and general error are treated as separate latent dimensions and found that subjects employ the same resources they use to develop accurate judgments as a “baseline” for calibrating resources necessary in erroneous judgments, but not vice-versa. This finding supports and extends previous findings which suggests that the processes involved in managing metacognitive accuracy are different from those involved in contending with metacognitive error. Future instructional interventions in metacognitive monitoring will be better focused by concentrating on improving accuracy or reducing error, but not both concurrently.

Mindreading and metacognition patterns in patients with borderline personality disorder: experimental study

Current psychopathology attempts to understand personality disorders in relation to deficits in higher cognition such as mindreading and metacognition. Deficits in mindreading are usually related to limitations in or a complete lack of the capacity to understand and attribute mental states to others, while impairments in metacognition concern dysfunctional control and monitoring of one’s own processes. The present study investigated dysfunctional higher cognition in the population of patients with borderline personality disorder (BPD) by analyzing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in a mindreading task [reading the mind in the eyes Test (RMET)] and a subsequent metacognitive task based on self-report scales: a confidence rating scale (CR) versus a post-decision wagering scale (PDW). It turned out that people from the BPD group scored lower in the RMET. However, both groups had the same levels of confidence on the PDW scale when giving incorrect answers in the RMET test. As initially hypothesized, individuals with BPD overestimated their confidence in incorrect answers, regardless of the type of metacognitive scales used. The present findings indicate that BPD individuals show dysfunctional patterns between instances of mindreading and metacognition.

New measures of agency from an adaptive sensorimotor task

Self-agency, the sense that one is the author or owner of one’s behaviors, is impaired in multiple psychological and neurological disorders, including functional movement disorders, Parkinson’s Disease, alien hand syndrome, schizophrenia, and dystonia. Existing assessments of self-agency, many of which focus on agency of movement, can be prohibitively time-consuming and often yield ambiguous results. Here, we introduce a short online motion tracking task that quantifies movement agency through both first-order perceptual and second-order metacognitive judgments. The task assesses the degree to which a participant can distinguish between a motion stimulus whose trajectory is influenced by the participant’s cursor movements and a motion stimulus whose trajectory is random. We demonstrate the task’s reliability in healthy participants and discuss how its efficiency, reliability, and ease of online implementation make it a promising new tool for both diagnosing and understanding disorders of agency.