scholarly journals Speed-accuracy tradeoffs in decision making: Perception shifts and goal activation bias decision thresholds

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeff Larson ◽  
Guy Hawkins

A fundamental aspect of decision making is the speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT): slower decisions tend to be more accurate, but since time is a scarce resource people prefer to conclude decisions more quickly. The current research adds to the SAT literature by documenting two previously unrecognized influences on the SAT: perception shifts and goal activation. Decision makers' perceptions of what constitutes a fast or a slow decision, and what constitutes an accurate or inaccurate decision, are based on prior experience, and these perceptions influence decision speed. Similarly, previous experience in a decision context associates the context with a particular decision goal. Thus, in later decisions the decision context will activate this goal, and thereby influence decision speed. Both of these mechanisms contribute to a specific decision bias: decision speeds are biased toward original decision speeds in a decision context. Four experiments provide evidence for the bias and the two contributing mechanisms.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fanny Fievez ◽  
Gerard Derosiere ◽  
Frederick Verbruggen ◽  
Julie Duque

Errors and their consequences are typically studied by investigating changes in decision speed and accuracy in trials that follow an error, commonly referred to as "post-error adjustments". Many studies have reported that subjects slow down following an error, a phenomenon called "post-error slowing" (PES). However, the functional significance of PES is still a matter of debate as it is not always adaptive. That is, it is not always associated with a gain in performance and can even occur with a decline in accuracy. Here, we hypothesized that the nature of PES is influenced by one's speed-accuracy tradeoff policy, which determines the overall level of choice accuracy in the task at hand. To test this hypothesis, we investigated post-error adjustments in subjects performing the same task while they were required to either emphasize speed (low accuracy) or cautiousness (high accuracy) in two distinct contexts (hasty and cautious contexts, respectively) experienced on separate days. Accordingly, our data indicate that post-error adjustments varied according to the context in which subjects performed the task, with PES being solely significant in the hasty context. In addition, we only observed a gain in performance after errors in a specific trial type, suggesting that post-error adjustments depend on a complex combination of processes that affect the speed of ensuing actions as well as the degree to which such PES comes with a gain in performance.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1433-1444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuğçe Tosun ◽  
Dilara Berkay ◽  
Alexander T. Sack ◽  
Yusuf Ö. Çakmak ◽  
Fuat Balcı

Decisions are made based on the integration of available evidence. The noise in evidence accumulation leads to a particular speed–accuracy tradeoff in decision-making, which can be modulated and optimized by adaptive decision threshold setting. Given the effect of pre-SMA activity on striatal excitability, we hypothesized that the inhibition of pre-SMA would lead to higher decision thresholds and an increased accuracy bias. We used offline continuous theta burst stimulation to assess the effect of transient inhibition of the right pre-SMA on the decision processes in a free-response two-alternative forced-choice task within the drift diffusion model framework. Participants became more cautious and set higher decision thresholds following right pre-SMA inhibition compared with inhibition of the control site (vertex). Increased decision thresholds were accompanied by an accuracy bias with no effects on post-error choice behavior. Participants also exhibited higher drift rates as a result of pre-SMA inhibition compared with the vertex inhibition. These results, in line with the striatal theory of speed–accuracy tradeoff, provide evidence for the functional role of pre-SMA activity in decision threshold modulation. Our results also suggest that pre-SMA might be a part of the brain network associated with the sensory evidence integration.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (45) ◽  
pp. 12868-12873 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mehdi Keramati ◽  
Peter Smittenaar ◽  
Raymond J. Dolan ◽  
Peter Dayan

Behavioral and neural evidence reveal a prospective goal-directed decision process that relies on mental simulation of the environment, and a retrospective habitual process that caches returns previously garnered from available choices. Artificial systems combine the two by simulating the environment up to some depth and then exploiting habitual values as proxies for consequences that may arise in the further future. Using a three-step task, we provide evidence that human subjects use such a normative plan-until-habit strategy, implying a spectrum of approaches that interpolates between habitual and goal-directed responding. We found that increasing time pressure led to shallower goal-directed planning, suggesting that a speed-accuracy tradeoff controls the depth of planning with deeper search leading to more accurate evaluation, at the cost of slower decision-making. We conclude that subjects integrate habit-based cached values directly into goal-directed evaluations in a normative manner.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (7) ◽  
pp. e2635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Ivanoff ◽  
Philip Branning ◽  
René Marois

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Edward Cox ◽  
Gordon D. Logan ◽  
Jeffrey Schall ◽  
Thomas Palmeri

Evidence accumulation is a computational framework that accounts for behavior as well as the dynamics of individual neurons involved in decision making. Linking these two levels of description reveals a scaling paradox: How do choices and response times (RT) explained by models assuming single accumulators arise from a large ensemble of idiosyncratic accumulator neurons? We created a simulation model that makes decisions by aggregating across ensembles of accumulators, thereby instantiating the essential structure of neural ensembles that make decisions. Across different levels of simulated choice difficulty and speed-accuracy emphasis, choice proportions and RT distributions simulated by the ensembles are invariant to ensemble size and the accumulated evidence at RT is invariant across RT when the accumulators are at least moderately correlated in either baseline evidence or rates of accumulation and when RT is not governed by the most extreme accumulators. To explore the relationship between the low-level ensemble accumulators and high-level cognitive models, we fit simulated ensemble behavior with a standard LBA model. The standard LBA model generally recovered the core accumulator parameters (particularly drift rates and residual time) of individual ensemble accumulators with high accuracy, with variability parameters of the standard LBA modulating as a function of various ensemble parameters. Ensembles of accumulators also provide an alternative conception of speed-accuracy tradeoff without relying on varying thresholds of individual accumulators, instead by adjusting how ensembles of accumulators are aggregated or by how accumulators are correlated within ensembles. These results clarify relationships between neural and computational accounts of decision making.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kobe Desender ◽  
Luc Vermeylen ◽  
Tom Verguts

AbstractHumans differ in their capability to judge the accuracy of their own choices via confidence judgments. Signal detection theory has been used to quantify the extent to which confidence tracks accuracy via M-ratio, often referred to as metacognitive efficiency. This measure, however, is static in that it does not consider the dynamics of decision making. This could be problematic because humans may shift their level of response caution to alter the tradeoff between speed and accuracy. Such shifts could induce unaccounted-for sources of variation in the assessment of metacognition. Instead, evidence accumulation frameworks consider decision making, including the computation of confidence, as a dynamic process unfolding over time. We draw on evidence accumulation frameworks to examine the influence of response caution on metacognition. Simulation results demonstrate that response caution has an influence on M-ratio. We then tested and confirmed that this was also the case in human participants who were explicitly instructed to either focus on speed or accuracy. We next demonstrated that this association between M-ratio and response caution was also present in an experiment without any reference towards speed. The latter finding was replicated in an independent dataset. In contrast, when data were analyzed with a novel dynamic measure of metacognition, which we refer to as v-ratio, in all of the three studies there was no effect of speed-accuracy tradeoff. These findings have important implications for research on metacognition, such as the question about domain-generality, individual differences in metacognition and its neural correlates.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 1283-1294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles de Hollander ◽  
Ludovica Labruna ◽  
Roberta Sellaro ◽  
Anne Trutti ◽  
Lorenza S. Colzato ◽  
...  

In perceptual decision-making tasks, people balance the speed and accuracy with which they make their decisions by modulating a response threshold. Neuroimaging studies suggest that this speed–accuracy tradeoff is implemented in a corticobasal ganglia network that includes an important contribution from the pre-SMA. To test this hypothesis, we used anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to modulate neural activity in pre-SMA while participants performed a simple perceptual decision-making task. Participants viewed a pattern of moving dots and judged the direction of the global motion. In separate trials, they were cued to either respond quickly or accurately. We used the diffusion decision model to estimate the response threshold parameter, comparing conditions in which participants received sham or anodal tDCS. In three independent experiments, we failed to observe an influence of tDCS on the response threshold. Additional, exploratory analyses showed no influence of tDCS on the duration of nondecision processes or on the efficiency of information processing. Taken together, these findings provide a cautionary note, either concerning the causal role of pre-SMA in decision-making or on the utility of tDCS for modifying response caution in decision-making tasks.


2015 ◽  
Vol 235 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Björn Frank ◽  
Sha Li ◽  
Christoph Bühren ◽  
Haiying Qin

Summary Much hope is put into the ‘‘four eyes principle’’ as an anti corruption device in many countries. However, as recent cases have shown, entire groups of decision makers can be corrupt as well. This paper reports on an experimental investigation of individual versus group decision making in a corruption experiment. We find that the group decisions, as compared to individual decisions, lead to a higher level of corruption, for bribers and for bribees, and in China as well as in Germany. Only German women are less corrupt in a group decision context than when deciding individually. Further differences between Germany and China with respect to the effect of the teams’ gender composition were found. In Germany, groups that consist only of females are the most honest and the male groups are the most corrupt, whereas in China the groups with mixed gender combination have shown a higher inclination to make corrupt decisions than the groups that are homogenous with respect to gender.


2019 ◽  
Vol 121 (4) ◽  
pp. 1300-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathieu Servant ◽  
Gabriel Tillman ◽  
Jeffrey D. Schall ◽  
Gordon D. Logan ◽  
Thomas J. Palmeri

Stochastic accumulator models account for response times and errors in perceptual decision making by assuming a noisy accumulation of perceptual evidence to a threshold. Previously, we explained saccade visual search decision making by macaque monkeys with a stochastic multiaccumulator model in which accumulation was driven by a gated feed-forward integration to threshold of spike trains from visually responsive neurons in frontal eye field that signal stimulus salience. This neurally constrained model quantitatively accounted for response times and errors in visual search for a target among varying numbers of distractors and replicated the dynamics of presaccadic movement neurons hypothesized to instantiate evidence accumulation. This modeling framework suggested strategic control over gate or over threshold as two potential mechanisms to accomplish speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Here, we show that our gated accumulator model framework can account for visual search performance under SAT instructions observed in a milestone neurophysiological study of frontal eye field. This framework captured key elements of saccade search performance, through observed modulations of neural input, as well as flexible combinations of gate and threshold parameters necessary to explain differences in SAT strategy across monkeys. However, the trajectories of the model accumulators deviated from the dynamics of most presaccadic movement neurons. These findings demonstrate that traditional theoretical accounts of SAT are incomplete descriptions of the underlying neural adjustments that accomplish SAT, offer a novel mechanistic account of decision-making mechanisms during speed-accuracy tradeoff, and highlight questions regarding the identity of model and neural accumulators. NEW & NOTEWORTHY A gated accumulator model is used to elucidate neurocomputational mechanisms of speed-accuracy tradeoff. Whereas canonical stochastic accumulators adjust strategy only through variation of an accumulation threshold, we demonstrate that strategic adjustments are accomplished by flexible combinations of both modulation of the evidence representation and adaptation of accumulator gate and threshold. The results indicate how model-based cognitive neuroscience can translate between abstract cognitive models of performance and neural mechanisms of speed-accuracy tradeoff.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document