scholarly journals Phenomenological control: response to imaginative suggestion predicts measures of mirror touch synaesthesia, vicarious pain and the rubber hand illusion

Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Vanessa Botan ◽  
Ryan Bradley Scott ◽  
Anil Seth ◽  
Jamie Ward ◽  
...  

[Published in Nature Communications as Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion] The control of top down processes to generate experience has been studied within the context of hypnosis since the birth of psychological science. In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) – which are experienced as involuntary – according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. The possibility that they account for experiential change in psychological studies has been overlooked. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants) we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change (mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion) comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Lush ◽  
V. Botan ◽  
R. B. Scott ◽  
A. K. Seth ◽  
J. Ward ◽  
...  

Abstract In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary — according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush

Reports of experiences of ownership over a fake hand following simple multisensory stimulation (the ‘rubber hand illusion’) have generated an expansive literature. Because such reports might reflect suggestion effects, demand characteristics are routinely controlled for by contrasting agreement ratings for ‘illusion’ and ‘control’ conditions. However, these methods have never been validated, and recent evidence that response to imaginative suggestion (‘phenomenological control’) predicts illusion report prompts reconsideration of their efficacy. A crucial assumption of the standard approach is that demand characteristics are matched across conditions. Here, a quasi-experiment design was employed to test demand characteristics in rubber hand illusion reports. Participants were provided with information about the rubber hand illusion procedure (text description and video demonstration) and recorded expectancies for standard ‘illusion’ and ‘control’ statements. Expectancies for control and illusion statements in synchronous and asynchronous conditions were found to differ similarly to published illusion reports. Therefore, rubber hand illusion control methods which have been in use for 22 years are not fit for purpose. Because demand characteristics have not been controlled in illusion report in existing studies, the illusion may be, partially or entirely, a suggestion effect. Methods to develop robust controls are proposed. That confounding demand characteristics have been overlooked for decades may be attributable to a lack of awareness that demand characteristics can drive experience in psychological science.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Laura Filippetti ◽  
Louise P. Kirsch ◽  
Laura Crucianelli ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou

AbstractOur sense of body ownership relies on integrating different sensations according to their temporal and spatial congruency. Nevertheless, there is ongoing controversy about the role of affective congruency during multisensory integration, i.e. whether the stimuli to be perceived by the different sensory channels are congruent or incongruent in terms of their affective quality. In the present study, we applied a widely used multisensory integration paradigm, the Rubber Hand Illusion, to investigate the role of affective, top-down aspects of sensory congruency between visual and tactile modalities in the sense of body ownership. In Experiment 1 (N = 36), we touched participants with either soft or rough fabrics in their unseen hand, while they watched a rubber hand been touched synchronously with the same fabric or with a ‘hidden’ fabric of ‘uncertain roughness’. In Experiment 2 (N = 50), we used the same paradigm as in Experiment 1, but replaced the ‘uncertainty’ condition with an ‘incongruent’ one, in which participants saw the rubber hand being touched with a fabric of incongruent roughness and hence opposite valence. We found that certainty (Experiment 1) and congruency (Experiment 2) between the felt and vicariously perceived tactile affectivity led to higher subjective embodiment compared to uncertainty and incongruency, respectively, irrespective of any valence effect. Our results suggest that congruency in the affective top-down aspects of sensory stimulation is important to the multisensory integration process leading to embodiment, over and above temporal and spatial properties.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible – precisely administered multisensory stimulation may result in the illusion that an external object is part of one’s body. There seems to be a general consensus that there are certain top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model for a shift in one’s body image to occur. However, empirical evidence contradicts the body model hypothesis: the sense of ownership may be spread over objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms or empty space) and direct empirical support for the theory is currently lacking. As an alternative, based on the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), I propose a multisensory integration account of how the sense of ownership is induced. In this account, the perception of one’s own body is a regular type of multisensory perception and multisensory integration processes are not only necessary but also sufficient for embodiment. In this paper, I propose how RHI can be modeled with the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation and natural correlation rules. I also discuss how Bayesian Coupling Priors and idiosyncrasies in sensory processing render prior distributions interindividually variable, accounting for large interindividual differences in susceptibility to RHI. Taken together, the proposed model accounts for exceptional malleability of human body perception, fortifies existing bottom-up multisensory integration theories with top-down models of relatedness of sensory cues, and generates testable and disambiguating predictions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Ryan Bradley Scott ◽  
Gyorgy Moga ◽  
Zoltan Dienes

There exist reliable and stable trait differences in the ability to control phenomenology in response to imaginative suggestion. Hypnotisability scales measure response to imaginative suggestion within a hypnotic context. Because hypnotisability has recently been shown to predict measures of experiential change in psychological experiments (e.g., the rubber hand illusion), there is a need for easy to use screening tools which are accessible to researchers with little or no background in hypnosis or imaginative suggestion research. The SWASH is a time efficient group hypnotisability scale which can be administered to up to 50 participants simultaneously. Here we present norms from an undergraduate sample for a recorded version delivered by a computer program alongside norms for a live presentation. Reliability, validity and mean scores are similar across the two presentations. Computer delivery of a pre-recorded script provides a simple tool to rapidly screen for hypnotisability in large groups for researchers with no prior experience of hypnosis research.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush ◽  
Ryan B. Scott ◽  
Anil K. Seth ◽  
Zoltan Dienes

Phenomenological control is the ability to generate experiences to meet expectancies. There are stable trait differences in this ability, as shown by responses to imaginative suggestions of, for example, paralysis, amnesia, and auditory, visual, gustatory and tactile hallucinations. Phenomenological control has primarily been studied within the context of hypnosis, in which suggestions are delivered following a hypnotic induction. Reports of substantial relationships between phenomenological control in a hypnotic context (hypnotizability) and experimental measures (e.g., the rubber hand illusion) suggest the need for a broad investigation of the influence of phenomenological control in psychological experiments. However, hypnosis is not required for successful response to imaginative suggestion. Because misconceptions about the hypnotic context may influence hypnotizability scores, a non-hypnotic scale which better matches the contextual expectancies of other experiments and avoids the hypnotic context is potentially better suited for such investigation. We present norms for the Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS), an adaptation of the Sussex Waterloo Scale of Hypnotizability (SWASH) which is free of the hypnotic context. Mean scores for the PCS are higher than for SWASH, and the subjective scales of PCS and SWASH show similar reliability. The PCS subjective scale is a reliable tool for measuring trait response to imaginative suggestion (i.e., phenomenological control) outside the context of hypnosis.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Henrik Ehrsson ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou ◽  
Dominika Radziun ◽  
Matthew Longo ◽  
Manos Tsakiris

In a recent study, Lush et al. (Nat Commun 11, 4853, 2020) claimed that they found “substantial relationships” between hypnotizability and experimental measures of the rubber hand illusion. The authors proposed that hypnotizable participants control their phenomenology to meet task expectations arising from the experimental paradigm. They further suggest that the rubber hand illusion “may or may not” be entirely explained by hypnotic suggestions driven by task expectancies and therefore could reflect top-down control of perception, instead of multisensory mechanisms. However, in reanalyzing their data, we observe no significant relationships between hypnotic suggestibility and the rubber hand illusion when quantified using a control condition in line with the authors’ preregistered hypothesis. Furthermore, we note that the relationships that the authors describe are weak and observed for a visual “hallucination” control experience and in the control condition, indicating a general influence of hypnotizability on cognition, rather than sensations that specifically relate to the rubber hand illusion. Overall, the results fit well with the view that the rubber hand illusion is a perceptual illusion driven primarily by multisensory mechanisms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110248
Author(s):  
V. Botan ◽  
Abigail Salisbury ◽  
H.D. Critchley ◽  
Jamie Ward

Some people report localised pain on their body when seeing other people in pain (sensory-localised vicarious pain responders). In this study we assess whether this is related to atypical computations of body ownership which, in paradigms such as the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), can be conceptualised as a Bayesian inference as to whether multiple sources of sensory information (visual, somatosensory) belong together on a single body (one’s own) or are distributed across several bodies (vision=other, somatosensory=self). According to this model, computations of body ownership depend on the degree (and precision) of sensory evidence, rather than synchrony per se. Sensory-localised vicarious pain responders exhibit the RHI following synchronous stroking and – unusually – also after asynchronous stroking. Importantly, this occurs only in asynchronous conditions in which the stroking is predictable (alternating) rather than unpredictable (random). There was no evidence that their bottom-up proprioceptive signals are less precise, suggesting individual differences in the top-down weighting of sensory evidence. Finally, the Enfacement illusion (EI) was also employed as a conceptually-related bodily illusion paradigm that involves a completely different response judgment (based on vision rather than proprioception). Sensory-localised responders show a comparable pattern on this task after synchronous and asynchronous stroking. This is consistent with the idea that they have top-down (prior) differences in the way body ownership is inferred that transcends the exact judgment being made (visual or proprioceptive).


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Lush

Reports of experiences of ownership over a fake hand following simple multisensory stimulation (the ‘rubber hand illusion’) have generated an expansive literature. Because such reports might reflect suggestion effects, demand characteristics are routinely controlled for by contrasting agreement ratings for ‘illusion’ and ‘control’ conditions. However, these methods have never been validated, and recent evidence that response to imaginative suggestion (‘phenomenological control’) predicts illusion report prompts reconsideration of their efficacy. A crucial assumption of the standard approach is that demand characteristics are matched across conditions. Here, a quasi-experiment design was employed to test demand characteristics in rubber hand illusion reports. Participants were provided with information about the rubber hand illusion procedure (text description and video demonstration) and recorded expectancies for standard ‘illusion’ and ‘control’ statements. Expectancies for ‘control’ and ‘illusion’ statements in synchronous and asynchronous conditions were found to differ similarly to published illusion reports. Therefore, rubber hand illusion control methods which have been in use for 22 years are not fit for purpose. Because demand characteristics have not been controlled in illusion report in existing studies, the illusion may be, partially or entirely, a suggestion effect. Methods to develop robust controls are proposed. That confounding demand characteristics have been overlooked for decades may be attributable to a lack of awareness that demand characteristics can drive experience in psychological science.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Litwin

Human body sense is surprisingly flexible – precisely administered multisensory stimulation may result in the illusion that an external object is part of one’s body. There seems to be a general consensus that there are certain top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model for a shift in one’s body image to occur. However, empirical evidence contradicts the body model hypothesis: the sense of ownership may be spread over objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms or empty space) and direct empirical support for the theory is currently lacking. As an alternative, based on the example of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), I propose a multisensory integration account of how the sense of ownership is induced. In this account, the perception of one’s own body is a regular type of multisensory perception and multisensory integration processes are not only necessary but also sufficient for embodiment. In this paper, I propose how RHI can be modeled with the use of Maximum Likelihood Estimation and natural correlation rules. I also discuss how Bayesian Coupling Priors and idiosyncrasies in sensory processing render prior distributions interindividually variable, accounting for large interindividual differences in susceptibility to RHI. Taken together, the proposed model accounts for exceptional malleability of human body perception, fortifies existing bottom-up multisensory integration theories with top-down models of relatedness of sensory cues, and generates testable and disambiguating predictions.


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