Justice-making institutions and the ancestral logic of conflict
Justice-making institutions rest on a vast network of rules, people, and artifacts. The federal criminal code of the United States, for example, has hundreds of sections with provisions for robbery and burglary, counterfeit bonds, chemical weapons, riots, expenditures to influence voting, and many others. This complexity can be traced to a handful of small-n-person games played by our foraging ancestors in their stateless societies. The overarching theme is conflict. Justice is predicated on actual or possible conflicts of interest. Individual brains include an array of adaptations that were selected because they regulated conflict-relevant behavior in fitness-promoting fashion: concepts (e.g., WRONGFUL ACT, UNJUST DISTRIBUTION), intuitions (e.g., a wrong deserves a punishment), and emotion systems (e.g., anger), among others. These ancient adaptations appear to form the core of justice-making institutions in modern societies—a core that is augmented by deliberation and writing systems. This theory of justice-making institutions can generate distinctive predictions. For example, the logic of justice-making institutions will echo the logic of their source adaptations, and thus will be apparent in laypeople’s naturalistic interactions. Further, laypeople will be able to intuitively recreate basic features of justice-making institutions near and far, past and present—because they have a common human nature with domestic and foreign lawmakers. Here, we review evidence relevant to (i) the criminal justice system and (ii) state-enacted redistribution in light of this adaptationist theory. We conclude that adaptationism is a productive framework to elucidate human institutions.