Sharp rise in vaccine hesitancy in a large and representative sample of the French population: reasons for vaccine hesitancy.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Sophie Hacquin ◽  
Sacha Altay ◽  
Emma de Araujo ◽  
Coralie Chevallier ◽  
Hugo Mercier

A safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine is our only hope to decisively stop the spread of the SARS-CoV-2. But a vaccine will only be fully effective if a significant share of the population agrees to get it. Five consecutive surveys of a large, nationally representative sample (N = 1000 for each wave) surveyed attitudes towards a future COVID-19 vaccine in France from May 2020 to October 2020. We found that COVID-19 vaccine refusal has steadily increased, reaching an all-time high with only 23% of participants willing to probably or certainly take a future COVID-19 vaccine in September 2020. Vaccine hesitant individuals are more likely to be women, young, less educated, to vote at the political extremes, to be dissatisfied with the government’s response to the COVID-19 crisis, and to feel less at risk of COVID-19. The reasons why French people would refuse to take the COVID-19 vaccine are similar to those offered for other vaccines, and these reasons are strikingly stable across gender, age and educational level. Finally, most French people declare they would not take the vaccine as soon as possible but would instead rather wait or not take it at all.

2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge Guimond ◽  
Michel Streith ◽  
Elodie Roebroeck

Studies on the perception of multiculturalism, in France and elsewhere, usually look only at personal attitudes without asking what individuals perceive as the norm in their community. This article presents the findings of a survey based on a representative sample of the French population ( N = 1001) which aims to fill this gap. In accordance with the concept of ‘pluralist ignorance’, the results reveal a significant difference between personal attitudes toward multiculturalism and assimilation (i.e. the French are personally in favor of multiculturalism) and the perceived social norm (they think that the majority of French people are opposed to multiculturalism). Furthermore, as expected, the perceptions of the norm are broadly shared, regardless of sex, age or political orientation, unlike personal attitudes. Thus, whereas both the far right and the far left agree on the perception of the norm, only sympathizers of the far right declare themselves personally in favor of assimilation. Finally, the results make an important contribution to understanding the influence of education (number of years of schooling), on individuals’ attitudes, showing that within the most educated categories there are significant differences according to field of study.


Author(s):  
Sara K. Yeo ◽  
Michael A. Xenos ◽  
Dominique Brossard ◽  
Dietram A. Scheufele

We use an experiment with a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population to examine how political partisans consume and process media reports about nanotechnology—a scientific issue that is unfamiliar to most Americans. We manipulate the extent to which participants receive ideological cues contextualizing a news article, and follow their subsequent information seeking about nanotechnology. Our results provide insights into patterns of media use and how media use differs among people with varying political ideologies. When cues clarifying the political stakes of nanotechnology are made available, individuals are willing to read information from countervailing sources. When such cues are lacking, however, individuals avoid incongruent information and opt for headlines from attitude-consistent sources. We explore variations in the circumstances under which ideological selectivity occurs and demonstrate that both confirmation bias and defensive avoidance are heightened under such conditions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110033
Author(s):  
Evren Balta ◽  
Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser ◽  
Alper H Yagci

What happens to the anti-establishment sentiments of pro-incumbent voters for a populist force that is in government and thus controls the political system? This article examines this question utilizing the case of Turkey, a country in which a populist force has been in power for more than a decade. By analyzing populist attitudes among a nationally representative sample, we demonstrate that while the voters of the incumbent populist party (AKP) are less likely, compared to everyone else, to hold populist sentiments, the same voters are also substantially more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that center on malign foreign powers. This finding is relevant beyond Turkey, because it demonstrates that populist forces might be able to maintain popular support and thus stay in power for a long stretch of time by employing government propaganda to fuel an antagonism against conspiratorial foreign and global forces.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Babson ◽  
Casey Trainor ◽  
Matthew Feldner ◽  
Natalie Sachs- Ericsson ◽  
Norman Schmidt ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 86 (5) ◽  
pp. 584-593 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie E. Roos ◽  
Tracie O. Afifi ◽  
Christina Gamache Martin ◽  
Robert H. Pietrzak ◽  
Jack Tsai ◽  
...  

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