scholarly journals Neural similarity between mentalizing and live social interaction

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid Salim Merchant ◽  
Diana Alkire ◽  
Elizabeth Redcay

Reciprocal social interactions are a quintessential part of human life, yet little neuroimaging research has examined the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms using social interactive experimental paradigms. Recent work using social interactive tasks has demonstrated brain activity in the mentalizing network, even in the absence of explicit mentalizing demands, suggesting that social interactive contexts automatically engage mentalizing. However, while overlapping brain activations are suggestive of similar underlying neural processes between explicit mentalizing and spontaneous mentalizing during interaction, they are not a direct test of whether or not these processes are represented similarly in the brain. Pattern-based approaches provide the sensitivity to examine the similarity between different neurocognitive processes. The current study used representational similarity analysis on a task wherein participants made mental and non-mental judgments about an abstract character and a live, social interactive partner during fMRI. The within-subject, 2 (Mental/Non-mental) x 2 (Peer/Character) design enabled us to examine the similarity in response patterns between conditions across numerous brain regions associated with social cognition, and estimate fit to three theoretical models of how the two processes relate: 1) social interaction and explicit mentalizing about an abstract character are represented similarly; 2) interactive peer and abstract character are represented differently regardless of the evaluation type; and 3) mental and non-mental states are represented dissimilarly regardless of target. Results demonstrate that the temporal poles and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus represent mentalizing and peer interactions similarly (Model 1), suggesting that response patterns in these regions provide a link between mentalizing and social interaction. Much of the rest of the social brain exhibits different representations for interactive peers and abstract characters (Model 2). Finally, model-free analyses showed that different regions show sensitivity to either the interaction partner or story character. Together, our findings highlight the importance of studying social cognitive processes using interactive approaches, and the utility of pattern-based approaches in understanding how social cognitive processes relate to each other.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victoria Guazzelli Williamson

During adolescence, our bodies, brains, and behaviors undergo marked developmental changes. Adolescents often become increasingly aware of their social worlds and use this stage of development to develop skills to help them navigate this changing landscape. Up until recently, an overwhelming majority of research on social cognition–specifically on understanding the mental states of others–has focused on childhood. In this chapter, I demonstrate that adolescence is an important developmental period for the refinement and sophistication of social cognitive processes that began developing during childhood. I also discuss the development of more advanced and distinct social cognitive processes. Additionally, I review the available literature on the developmental trajectories of advanced social cognition across adolescence–including individual differences, cultural considerations, and implications for adolescent health and wellbeing. Finally, I describe how future research may begin to address current knowledge gaps on this topic.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 1406-1417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Contreras ◽  
Jessica Schirmer ◽  
Mahzarin R. Banaji ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell

An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., “scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature”). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition—medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the “mind” of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.


2013 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-590 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda J. Lucas ◽  
Charlie Lewis ◽  
F. Cansu Pala ◽  
Katie Wong ◽  
Damon Berridge

Author(s):  
James S. Uleman ◽  
S. Adil Saribay

“Initial impressions” bring together personality and social psychology like no other field of study—“personality” because (1) impressions are about personalities, and (2) perceivers’ personalities affect these impressions; and “social” because (3) social cognitive processes of impression formation, and (4) sociocultural contexts have major effects on impressions. To make these points, we first review how people explicitly describe others: the terms we use, how these descriptions reveal our theories about others, the important roles of traits and types (including stereotypes) in these descriptions, and other prominent frameworks (e.g., narratives and social roles). Then we highlight recent research on the social cognitive processes underlying these descriptions: automatic and controlled attention, the many effects of primes (semantic and affective) and their dependence on contexts, the acquisition of valence, spontaneous inferences about others, and the interplay of automatic and control processes. Third, we examine how accurate initial impressions are, and what accuracy means, as well as deception and motivated biases and distortions. Fourth, we review recent research on effects of target features, perceiver features, and relations between targets and perceivers. Finally, we look at frameworks for understanding explanations, as distinct from descriptions: attribution theory, theory of mind, and simulation theory.


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 98-112
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This chapter addresses how animal studies are a crucial way to discover what makes people, and our theories of mind, uniquely human. Chimpanzee social understanding falls far short of human children’s. Nevertheless, people’s human theory of mind reflects beginnings owed to nonhuman ancestors. At the same time, human theory of mind is distinctive. It is broad, impacting almost all of human cognition and social interaction. It is fundamentally developmental, requiring more and more advanced mind-reading insights over an entire human life. It is also helpful and communicative. Even infants deploy their social–cognitive insights to help, communicate with, and learn about others. As such, while people sprang from animal ancestors, it is their advanced, rapidly developing social understanding that makes them uniquely human.


Appetite ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 126 ◽  
pp. 73-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter A. Hall ◽  
Cassandra J. Lowe ◽  
Adrian B. Safati ◽  
Huaqi Li ◽  
Emilia B. Klassen ◽  
...  

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