scholarly journals Virtues for Real-World Utilitarians

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Schubert ◽  
Lucius Caviola

Utilitarianism says that we should maximize aggregate well-being, impartially considered. But utilitarians that try to apply this principle will encounter many psychological obstacles, ranging from selfishness to moral biases to limits to epistemic and instrumental rationality. In this chapter, we argue that utilitarians should cultivate a number of virtues that allow them to overcome the most important of these obstacles. We select virtues based on two criteria. First, the virtues should be impactful: they should greatly increase your impact (according to utilitarian standards), if you acquire them. Second, the virtues should be acquirable: they should be psychologically realistic to acquire. Using these criteria, we argue that utilitarians should prioritize six virtues: moderate altruism, moral expansiveness, effectiveness-focus, truth-seeking, collaborativeness, and determination. Finally, we discuss how our suggested list of virtues compares with standard conceptions of utilitarianism, as well as with common sense morality.

Author(s):  
Roger Crisp ◽  
Tim Chappell

Utilitarianism is a theory about rightness, according to which the only good thing is welfare (well-being or ‘utility’). Welfare should, in some way, be maximized, and agents are to be neutral between their own welfare, and that of other people and of other sentient beings. The roots of utilitarianism lie in ancient thought. Traditionally, welfare has been seen as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, a view discussed in Plato. The notion of impartiality also has its roots in Plato, as well as in Stoicism and Christianity. In the modern period, utilitarianism grew out of the Enlightenment, its two major proponents being Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Hedonists, believing that pleasure is the good, have long been criticized for sensualism, a charge Mill attempted to answer with a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. He contended that welfare consists in the experiencing of pleasurable mental states, suggesting, in contrast to Bentham, that the quality, not simply the amount, of a pleasure is what matters. Others have doubted this conception, and developed desire accounts, according to which welfare lies in the satisfaction of desire. Ideal theorists suggest that certain things are just good or bad for people, independently of pleasure and desire. Utilitarianism has usually focused on actions. The most common form is act-utilitarianism, according to which what makes an action right is its maximizing total or average utility. Some, however, have argued that constantly attempting to put utilitarianism into practice could be self-defeating, in that utility would not be maximized by so doing. Many utilitarians have therefore advocated nonutilitarian decision procedures, often based on common-sense morality. Some have felt the appeal of common-sense moral principles in themselves, and sought to reconcile utilitarianism with them. In particular, the extreme demandingness of act-utilitarianism has been found objectionable, since it rules out the giving of any special weight by the agent to their own interests or the interests of those close to them. This is one of the reasons for the development of rule-utilitarianism, according to which the right action is that which is consistent with those rules which would maximize utility if all accepted them. There have been many arguments for utilitarianism, the most common being an appeal to reflective belief or ‘intuition’. One of the most interesting is Henry Sidgwick’s argument, which is ultimately intuitionist, and results from sustained reflection on common-sense morality. The most famous argument is Mill’s ‘proof’. In recent times, R. M. Hare has offered a logical argument for utilitarianism. The main problems for utilitarianism emerge out of its conflict with common-sense morality, in particular justice, and its impartial conception of practical reasoning.


Author(s):  
Dana Kay Nelkin ◽  
Samuel C. Rickless

Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For common-sense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions, even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. People who leave dogs in their car on a hot day or forget to pick something up from the store as they promised seem to be blameworthy. If moral responsibility requires awareness of one’s omission and its moral significance, it appears that the protagonists of these cases are not morally responsible. This chapter considers and rejects a number of influential views on this problem, including a view that grounds responsibility for such omissions in previous exercises of conscious agency, and “Attributionist” views that ground responsibility for such omissions in the value judgments or other aspects of the agents’ selves. The chapter proposes a new tracing view that grounds responsibility for unwitting omissions in past opportunities to avoid them.


Author(s):  
Derek Parfit

This chapter reveals some insights into act consequentialism. It begins with the claim that it would often be wrong to treat people in certain ways, such as deceiving or coercing them, or breaking our promises to them, even when such acts would make things go better. The chapter then turns to deontic and non-deontic badness. These are different kinds of badness, as is shown by cases in which such acts are not wrong, because their non-deontic badness is outweighed by the goodness of their effects. Since these acts would have this intrinsic badness, though they would not be wrong, it could not be their wrongness that made them intrinsically bad.


Ethics ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 98 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-172
Author(s):  
Dale Jamieson

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcio Krakauer ◽  
Jose Fernando Botero ◽  
Fernando J. Lavalle-González ◽  
Adrian Proietti ◽  
Douglas Eugenio Barbieri

Abstract Background Continuous glucose monitoring systems are increasingly being adopted as an alternative to self-monitoring of blood glucose (SMBG) by persons with diabetes mellitus receiving insulin therapy. Main body The FreeStyle Libre flash glucose monitoring system (Abbott Diabetes Care, Witney, United Kingdom) consists of a factory-calibrated sensor worn on the back of the arm which measures glucose levels in the interstitial fluid every minute and stores the reading automatically every 15 min. Swiping the reader device over the sensor retrieves stored data and displays current interstitial glucose levels, a glucose trend arrow, and a graph of glucose readings over the preceding 8 h. In patients with type 2 diabetes (T2D) receiving insulin therapy, pivotal efficacy data were provided by the 6-month REPLACE randomized controlled trial (RCT) and 6-month extension study. Compared to SMBG, the flash system significantly reduced the time spent in hypoglycemia and frequency of hypoglycemic events, although no significant change was observed in glycosylated hemoglobin (HbA1c) levels. Subsequent RCTs and real-world chart review studies have since shown that flash glucose monitoring significantly reduces HbA1c from baseline. Real-world studies in both type 1 diabetes or T2D populations also showed that flash glucose monitoring improved glycemic control. Higher (versus lower) scanning frequency was associated with significantly greater reductions in HbA1c and significant improvements in other measures such as time spent in hypoglycemia, time spent in hyperglycemia, and time in range. Additional benefits associated with flash glucose monitoring versus SMBG include reductions in acute diabetes events, all-cause hospitalizations and hospitalized ketoacidosis episodes; improved well-being and decreased disease burden; and greater treatment satisfaction. Conclusion T2D patients who use flash glucose monitoring might expect to achieve significant improvement in HbA1c and glycemic parameters and several associated benefits.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 31
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wai ◽  
Benjamin J. Lovett

Fully developing the talents of all students is a fundamental goal for personal well-being and development and ultimately for global societal innovation and flourishing. However, in this paper we focus on what we believe is an often neglected and underdeveloped population, that of the gifted. We draw from the cognitive aptitude and gifted education research literatures to make the case that solutions to consequential real-world problems can be greatly enhanced by more fully developing the talents of the intellectually gifted population, which we operationalize in this paper as roughly the top 5% of cognitive talent. Should well-supported high achievers choose to solve them, these problems span health, science, economic growth, and areas unforeseen. We draw from longitudinal research on intellectually precocious students and retrospective research on leaders and innovators in society, showing that mathematical, verbal, and spatial aptitudes are linked to societal innovation. We then discuss two remaining fundamental challenges: the identification of disadvantaged and marginalized groups of students who have traditionally been neglected in selection for gifted programming suited to their current developmental needs, and the building of skills beyond academic ones, specifically in the related areas of open-minded thinking and intellectual humility.


1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 154-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Rose ◽  
Katrin Maibaum

As transdisciplinary and transformative research approaches, real-world laboratories (RwLs) come with many pitfalls. Their design and implementation place high demands on everyone involved, which means that realistically, things rarely go smoothly. The following Design Report shares the lessons learned about establishing and adjusting communication and organisational structures in RwLs.What should we take into account when setting up real-world laboratories (RwLs)? In our analysis of the experience of (co-)designing three RwLs within the Well-Being Transformation Wuppertal research project, we examine both the origin of the project proposal and its implementation, from management, communication and inter- and transdisciplinarity to actor dynamics and recruitment criteria for staff. We especially highlight the effects of the initial co-design phase (project proposal) on the RwL’s implementation, focusing on the challenges which arose and how these were addressed.We conducted 19 semi-structured interviews, analysed relevant project documentation and reflected on the research team’s own experiences. The transdisciplinary and transformative dimensions of the RwL approach are the areas where significant lessons were learned. RwLs are unique in their extraordinarily strong need to balance different roles and resources, even as many of their challenges and solutions resemble those which also arise in transdisciplinary research. The uniqueness of RwLs lies in their objective to co-produce not only socially robust knowledge but also tangible real-world change through experimentation.


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