Utilitarianism

Author(s):  
Roger Crisp ◽  
Tim Chappell

Utilitarianism is a theory about rightness, according to which the only good thing is welfare (well-being or ‘utility’). Welfare should, in some way, be maximized, and agents are to be neutral between their own welfare, and that of other people and of other sentient beings. The roots of utilitarianism lie in ancient thought. Traditionally, welfare has been seen as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, a view discussed in Plato. The notion of impartiality also has its roots in Plato, as well as in Stoicism and Christianity. In the modern period, utilitarianism grew out of the Enlightenment, its two major proponents being Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Hedonists, believing that pleasure is the good, have long been criticized for sensualism, a charge Mill attempted to answer with a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. He contended that welfare consists in the experiencing of pleasurable mental states, suggesting, in contrast to Bentham, that the quality, not simply the amount, of a pleasure is what matters. Others have doubted this conception, and developed desire accounts, according to which welfare lies in the satisfaction of desire. Ideal theorists suggest that certain things are just good or bad for people, independently of pleasure and desire. Utilitarianism has usually focused on actions. The most common form is act-utilitarianism, according to which what makes an action right is its maximizing total or average utility. Some, however, have argued that constantly attempting to put utilitarianism into practice could be self-defeating, in that utility would not be maximized by so doing. Many utilitarians have therefore advocated nonutilitarian decision procedures, often based on common-sense morality. Some have felt the appeal of common-sense moral principles in themselves, and sought to reconcile utilitarianism with them. In particular, the extreme demandingness of act-utilitarianism has been found objectionable, since it rules out the giving of any special weight by the agent to their own interests or the interests of those close to them. This is one of the reasons for the development of rule-utilitarianism, according to which the right action is that which is consistent with those rules which would maximize utility if all accepted them. There have been many arguments for utilitarianism, the most common being an appeal to reflective belief or ‘intuition’. One of the most interesting is Henry Sidgwick’s argument, which is ultimately intuitionist, and results from sustained reflection on common-sense morality. The most famous argument is Mill’s ‘proof’. In recent times, R. M. Hare has offered a logical argument for utilitarianism. The main problems for utilitarianism emerge out of its conflict with common-sense morality, in particular justice, and its impartial conception of practical reasoning.

Author(s):  
Tim Chappell

Utilitarianism is a theory about rightness, according to which the only good thing is welfare (wellbeing or ‘utility’). Welfare should, in some way, be maximized, and agents are to be neutral between their own welfare, and that of other people and of other sentient beings. The roots of utilitarianism lie in ancient thought. Traditionally, welfare has been seen as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, a view discussed in Plato. The notion of impartiality also has its roots in Plato, as well as in Stoicism and Christianity. In the modern period, utilitarianism grew out of the Enlightenment, its two major proponents being Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Hedonists, believing that pleasure is the good, have long been criticized for sensualism, a charge Mill attempted to answer with a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. He contended that welfare consists in the experiencing of pleasurable mental states, suggesting, in contrast to Bentham, that the quality, not simply the amount, of a pleasure is what matters. Others have doubted this conception, and developed desire accounts, according to which welfare lies in the satisfaction of desire. Ideal theorists suggest that certain things are just good or bad for people, independently of pleasure and desire. Utilitarianism has usually focused on actions. The most common form is act-utilitarianism, according to which what makes an action right is its maximizing total or average utility. Some, however, have argued that constantly attempting to put utilitarianism into practice could be self-defeating, in that utility would not be maximized by so doing. Many utilitarians have therefore advocated non-utilitarian decision procedures, often based on common sense morality. Some have felt the appeal of common sense moral principles in themselves, and sought to reconcile utilitarianism with them. According to rule-utilitarianism, the right action is that which is consistent with those rules which would maximize utility if all accepted them. There have been many arguments for utilitarianism, the most common being an appeal to reflective belief or ‘intuition’. One of the most interesting is Henry Sidgwick’s argument, which is ultimately intuitionist, and results from sustained reflection on common sense morality. The most famous argument is Mill’s ‘proof’. In recent times, R.M. Hare has offered a logical argument for utilitarianism. The main problems for utilitarianism emerge out of its conflict with common sense morality, in particular justice, and its impartial conception of practical reasoning.


2019 ◽  
pp. 187-206
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of four key figures in the British utilitarian tradition. The associationist theory of virtue of John Gay (1699–1745) is outlined. It is shown how psychological and rational hedonism are combined with utilitarianism in the work of Abraham Tucker (1705–74). The largely instrumental view taken by William Paley (1743–1805) of the rules of common-sense morality is described, and it is demonstrated how he sometimes slides into a non-instrumental position. The ‘split-level’ act utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is placed within his largely legislative project. A conclusion outlines several philosophical themes running through the ethics of the period discussed in the book, and the importance of that period as an influence on, and a source for, contemporary ethics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-142
Author(s):  
Erik Magnusson ◽  

In law and common-sense morality, it is generally assumed that adults who meet a minimum threshold of parental competency have a presumptive right to parent their biological children. But what is the basis of this right? According to one prominent account, the right to parent one’s biological child is best understood as being grounded in an intimate relationship that develops between babies and their birth parents during the process of gestation. This paper identifies three major problems facing this view—the explanatory, adjudicatory, and theoretical problems—and explains how an alternative autonomy-based account is capable of avoiding them.


Author(s):  
David Papineau

The term ‘functionalism’ means different things in many different disciplines from architectural theory to zoology. In contemporary philosophy of mind, however, it is uniformly understood to stand for the view that mental states should be explained in terms of causal roles. So, to take a simple example, a functionalist in the philosophy of mind would argue that pains are states which are normally caused by bodily damage, and tend in turn to cause avoidance behaviour. Functionalism is often introduced by an analogy between mental states and mechanical devices. Consider the notion of a carburettor, say. For something to be a carburettor it need not have any particular physical make-up. Carburettors can come in many different materials and shapes. What makes it a carburettor is simply that it plays the right causal role, namely that it mixes air with petrol in response to movements of the accelerator and choke. Similarly, argue functionalists, with the mind. The possession of mental states does not depend on the physical make-up of the brain; it depends only on its displaying the right causal structure. Since organisms with very different sorts of biological make-up, like octopuses and humans, can have states with the causal role of pain, say, it follows from functionalism that octopuses and humans can both be in pain. There exists a number of different subspecies of functionalism. One important division depends on how the relevant causal roles are determined. ‘Common-sense’ functionalists take them to be fixed by common-sense psychology; ‘scientific’ functionalists take them to be fixed by the discoveries of scientific psychology. So, for example, common-sense functionalists will hold that emotions play the causal role that common-sense psychology ascribes to emotions, while scientific psychologists will argue that scientific psychology identifies this causal role. Functionalism, of whatever subspecies, is open to a number of well-known criticisms. One central objection is that it cannot accommodate the conscious, qualitative aspect of mental life. Could not a machine share the causal structure of someone who was in pain, and thereby satisfy the functionalist qualification for pain, and yet have no conscious feelings? It might seem that functionalists can respond to this difficulty by being more stringent about the requirements involved in the causal role of a given human sensation. But there is a danger that functionalism will then lose much of its appeal. The original attraction of functionalism was that its ‘liberal’ specification of causal roles allowed that humans could share mental states with non-humans. This feature is likely to be lost if we switch to more ‘chauvinist’ specifications designed to explain why non-humans do not share our conscious life. Another objection to functionalism is that it cannot account for mental representation. Functionalism focuses on the way mental states enter into causal structure. But it is doubtful that mental representation can be explained in purely causal terms. Some philosophers argue that the issue of mental representation can be dealt with by adding some teleology to functionalism, that is by considering the biological purposes for which mental states have been designed, as well as their actual structure of causes and effects. However, once we do appeal to teleology in this way, it is not clear that we still need a functionalist account of representational states, for we can now simply identify such states in terms of their biological purposes, rather than their causal roles.


Utilitas ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clay Splawn

The self-other asymmetry is a prominent and important feature of common-sense morality. It is also a feature that does not find a home in standard versions of act-utilitarianism. Theodore Sider has attempted to make a place for it by constructing a novel version of utilitarianism that incorporates the asymmetry into its framework. So far as I know, it is the best attempt to bring the two together. I argue, however, that Sider's ingenious attempt fails. I also offer a diagnosis that explains why no theory that remains recognizably act-utilitarian can successfully incorporate the asymmetry.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Schubert ◽  
Lucius Caviola

Utilitarianism says that we should maximize aggregate well-being, impartially considered. But utilitarians that try to apply this principle will encounter many psychological obstacles, ranging from selfishness to moral biases to limits to epistemic and instrumental rationality. In this chapter, we argue that utilitarians should cultivate a number of virtues that allow them to overcome the most important of these obstacles. We select virtues based on two criteria. First, the virtues should be impactful: they should greatly increase your impact (according to utilitarian standards), if you acquire them. Second, the virtues should be acquirable: they should be psychologically realistic to acquire. Using these criteria, we argue that utilitarians should prioritize six virtues: moderate altruism, moral expansiveness, effectiveness-focus, truth-seeking, collaborativeness, and determination. Finally, we discuss how our suggested list of virtues compares with standard conceptions of utilitarianism, as well as with common sense morality.


Author(s):  
Esther Engels Kroeker

This chapter presents Reid’s answers to three non-theistic implications of Hume’s moral philosophy. One non-theistic implication of Hume’s view is the claim that morality is tied to human nature, and is hence secular because it is autonomous from religious doctrines, beliefs, or motivations. Another implication is that the standard of morality is determined by human mental states and psychological processes, and hence renders all reference to an objective, mind-independent standard, unnecessary. A final implication, according to Hume, is that our human passions are not directed toward God, and hence that God is not the object of any human moral discourse. In response, Reid argues that the truth of moral principles is not relative to human nature and to natural human passions. It follows, Reid holds, that talk of a benevolent God is intelligible. Reid’s explicit objective is to criticize not only Hume’s moral philosophy, but also his moral atheism.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-20
Author(s):  
Inna Yeung

Choice of profession is a social phenomenon that every person has to face in life. Numerous studies convince us that not only the well-being of a person depends on the chosen work, but also his attitude to himself and life in general, therefore, the right and timely professional choice is very important. Research about factors of career self-determination of students of higher education institutions in Ukraine shows that self-determination is an important factor in the socialization of young person, and the factors that determine students' career choices become an actual problem of nowadays. The present study involved full-time and part-time students of Institute of Philology and Mass Communications of Open International University of Human Development "Ukraine" in order to examine the factors of career self-determination of students of higher education institutions (N=189). Diagnostic factors of career self-determination of students studying in the third and fourth year were carried out using the author's questionnaire. Processing of obtained data was carried out using the Excel 2010 program; factorial and comparative analysis were applied. Results of the study showed that initial stage of career self-determination falls down on the third and fourth studying year at the university, when an image of future career and career orientations begin to form. At the same time, the content of career self-determination in this period is contradictory and uncertain, therefore, the implementation of pedagogical support of this process among students is effective.


2020 ◽  
pp. 64-70
Author(s):  
E. Menzul ◽  
N. Ryazantseva ◽  
L. Karasyova

The article presents the results obtained with the use of psychodiagnostic techniques that allowed to analyze and assess professional success of nursing staff, level of emotional burnout and psychological stress, manifestations of anxiety and fear of failure in order to adjust the behavior and well-being of specialists in the process of professional activity.


Author(s):  
Irina V. Bogdashina

The article reveals the measures undertaken by the Soviet state during the “thaw” in the fi eld of reproductive behaviour, the protection of motherhood and childhood. Compilations, manuals and magazines intended for women were the most important regulators of behaviour, determining acceptable norms and rules. Materials from sources of personal origin and oral history make it possible to clearly demonstrate the real feelings of women. The study of women’s everyday and daily life in the aspect related to pregnancy planning, bearing and raising children will allow us to compare the real situation and the course of implementation of tasks in the fi eld of maternal and child health. The demographic surge in the conditions of the economy reviving after the war, the lack of preschool institutions, as well as the low material wealth of most families, forced women to adapt to the situation. In the conditions of combining the roles of mother, wife and female worker, women entrusted themselves with almost overwork, which affected the health and well-being of the family. The procedure for legalising abortion gave women not only the right to decide the issue of motherhood themselves, but also made open the already necessary, but harmful to health, habitual way of birth control. Maternal care in diffi cult material and housing conditions became the concern of women and the older generation, who helped young women to combine the role of a working mother, which the country’s leadership confi dently assigned to women.


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