scholarly journals The ring of truth: Irrelevant insights make worldviews seem true

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Laukkonen ◽  
Benjamin Kaveladze ◽  
John Protzko ◽  
Jason Marcus Tangen ◽  
Bill von Hippel ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Basic Beliefs

Our basic beliefs about reality can be impossible to prove and yet we can feel a strong intuitive conviction for them, as exemplified by insights that imbue an idea with immediate certainty. Here we presented participants with worldviews such as “people’s core qualities are fixed”, and simultaneously elicited an aha moment. In the first experiment (N = 3,000), which included a direct replication, participants rated worldview beliefs as truer when they solved anagrams and experienced aha moments. A second experiment (N = 1,005) showed that the worldview statement and the aha moment must be perceived simultaneously for the insight misattribution effect to occur. These results demonstrate that artificially induced aha moments can make worldviews seem truer, possibly because humans rely on feelings of insight to appraise an idea’s veracity. Feelings of insight are therefore not epiphenomenal and should be investigated for their effects on decisions, beliefs, and delusions.

Acerca del supuesto fundamentalismo de Wittgenstein en Sobre la certez

2007 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
José M. Ariso Salgado
Keyword(s):  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
On Certainty ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Basic Beliefs

RESUMENAl analizar si Ludwig Wittgenstein mantiene una posición fundamentalista en Sobre la certeza, suele discutirse si la citada obra se adapta al modelo de fundamentalismo propuesto por Avrum Stroll. Tras exponer las líneas básicas de dicho modelo, en esta nota se mantiene que Sobre la certeza no se adapta al modelo de Stroll debido al importante papel que Wittgenstein concede al contextualismo. Además, se añade que Wittgenstein no puede ser calificado de fundamentalista porque no reconoce ninguna propiedad que, sin tener en cuenta la diversidad de casos particulares, permita justificar de forma conjunta todas nuestras creencias básicas.PALABRAS CLAVEWITTGENSTEIN, FUNDAMENTALISMO, CONTEXTUALISMO, CERTEZAABSTRACTDid Wittgenstein hold a foundationalist position in On Certainty? When this question is tackled, it is often discussed, whether On Certainty fits in the foundationalist model devised by Avrum Stroll. After expounding the main lines of this model, I hold that On Certainty does not fit in Stroll’s model, because of the important role Wittgenstein attaches to contextualism. Furthermore, I add that Wittgenstein cannot be seen as a foundationalist –or a coherentist–, because he does not admit any feature in virtue of which the whole of our basic beliefs are justified without considering circumstances at all.KEYWORDSWITTGENSTEIN, CERTAINTY, FOUNDATIONALISM, CONTEXTUALISM

Unforgettable Experiences: The Relation of Life Events to Basic Beliefs About Self and World

1992 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-209 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Catlin ◽  
Seymour Epstein
Keyword(s):  
Life Events ◽  
Basic Beliefs

Worldview formation and Otto von Bismarck development as a politician

2021 ◽  
pp. 20-27
Author(s):  
Irina V. Lokhova
Keyword(s):  
Family Environment ◽  
Urban Life ◽  
Rural Life ◽  
Political Activities ◽  
Personal Character ◽  
The Family ◽  
Worldview Formation ◽  
Otto Von Bismarck ◽  
Basic Beliefs ◽  
Political Figure

The main aim of the article is to consider impartially the formation of O. Bismarck’s worldview and the stages of his development as a political figure. A lot of biographers are often biased and sometimes reach panegyric or censure in their attitude to this person. The article examines objectively the factors that influenced the formation of O. Bismarck’s personality, limiting itself only to the main features of his personal character and family environment, without dwelling in detail on his political activities. Bismarck’s mother was excellently educated, combined the sentimental-religious mood of her century and the liberal beliefs inherited from her father, she aimed to awaken ambition and the desire to achieve her goals in her children from childhood. His father, unlike emotionless and refined mother, was a former military man who preferred rural life to urban life and he spoiled children in every possible way and was the soul of the family. She was shrewd and ambitious, personified intelligence and she loved to have conversations with intelligent people and to play chess, he was full of humor and fun and he preferred living on the estate and hunting. Perhaps due to this inconsistency, Bismarck was not brought up in class prejudices in his native home, but later his basic beliefs were formed under the influence of the environment.

Mystical Experience and Non–Basically Justified Belief

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 335-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Levine
Keyword(s):  
Mystical Experience ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Epistemic Warrant ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Evidential Support ◽  
Basic Beliefs

Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’.

The Crucial Disanalogies Between Properly Basic Belief and Belief in God

1990 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Grigg
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Evidence ◽  
Basic Belief ◽  
Alvin Plantinga ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Classical Foundationalism ◽  
Basic Beliefs

The antifoundationalist defence of belief in God set forth by Alvin Plantinga has been widely discussed in recent years. Classical foundationalism assumes that there are two kinds of beliefs that we are justified in holding: beliefs supported by evidence, and basic beliefs. Our basic beliefs are those bedrock beliefs that need no evidence to support them and upon which our other beliefs must rest. For the foundationalist, the only beliefs that can be properly basic are either self-evident, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses. Belief in God is none of these. Thus, says the foundationalist, belief in God is justified only if there is sufficient evidence to back it up.

scholarly journals Good is stronger than bad for eudaimonic well-being

2022 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 455-490
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Martínez-Zelaya ◽  
Marian Bilbao Ramírez ◽  
Darío Páez Rovira
Keyword(s):  
Life Events ◽  
Representative Sample ◽  
Negative Life Events ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Negative Events ◽  
Positive Events ◽  
Post Traumatic Growth ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
Basic Beliefs

Perceived changes in basic beliefs and growth related to life events were examined in three studies. A representative sample (N = 885), a sample of students and their families (N = 291) and a sample of students (N = 245) responded with a list of positive and negative life events, a scale of changes in basic beliefs and a post-traumatic growth scale. Positive events were strongly associated with changes in basic beliefs, while only weak associations were found for negative events. In addition, negative changes in basic beliefs were associated with growth only in negative life events and positive changes in basic beliefs were generally associated with growth.

Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification

Episteme ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 203-218
Author(s):  
Jeremy Koons
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Epistemic Practice ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Basic Beliefs ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACTDiscussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic practice. Second, I will attempt to show how our basic beliefs are justified via this principle of conservatism.

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